DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

MASTER OF ARTS-POLITICAL SCIENCES

SEMESTER -IV

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

ELECTIVE 403

BLOCK-1

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

Postal Address:

The Registrar,

University of North Bengal,

Raja Rammohunpur,

P.O.-N.B.U., Dist-Darjeeling,

West Bengal, Pin-734013,

India.

Phone: (O) +91 0353-2776331/2699008

Fax: (0353) 2776313, 2699001

Email: regnbu@sancharnet.in ; regnbu@nbu.ac.in

Wesbsite: www.nbu.ac.in

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FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavours.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

BLOCK-1

BLOCK-2

BLOCK 1: POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

Introduction to the Block

Unit 1 deals with Basic theories of ideology Marxist. The objective of this unit is to introduce to the students the thoughts of Karl Marx, one of the greatest thinkers of all times.

Unit 2 deals with Basic theories of ideology: Non-Marxist traditions. In the study of Social Sciences the approaches are extremely important because they help us in identifying the problems for our study and deciding on the appropriate data to be used.

Unit 3 deals with The idea of discourse in Post-Marxist and Cultural Studies. Post-Marxism and cultural studies both explicitly engage with and take on the question of the political, of political engagement, and of ethical, political and university responsibility.

Unit 4 deals with The Structure and Role of Ideologies: “end of history” or ideology without end? The end of history is not an original one. Its best known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical development was a purposeful one determined by the interplay of material forces, and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions

Unit 5 deals with Modern Ideologies: Liberalism: Classical. Liberalism is the dominant ideology of the present-day Western world. The history of England, Western Europe and America for the last 300 years is closely associated with the evolution and development of liberal through.

Unit 6 deals with Liberalism: Modern and Neo-liberlism. The philosophy of neoliberalism is usually considered as a modern alternate of classical economic liberalism.

Unit 7 deals with Conservatism: Classical and Modern and its variations. Conservatism, as a philosophy dedicated to the defense of an established order or an attitude with a defensive strategy toirnaintain the present status quo or in the classical sense of a 'right wrong ideology', is an impbrtant intellectual force today.

UNIT 1: BASIC THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY (MARXIST)

STRUCTURE

1.0 OBJECTIVES

The objective of this unit is to introduce to the students the thoughts of Karl Marx, one of the greatest thinkers of all times. It aims to make the students familiar with his life and works, the historical factors that moulded his thought process and the main aspects of his Philosophy. It also invites the students to reflect on the political and economic system envisaged by Marx in the context of contemporary socio-economic and political realities.

After this unit, we can able to know:

- Historical Background
- Classical German philosophy
- Socialism

- Economics
- Historical Materialism
- Class and Class struggle
- Alienation
- Alienated Labour
- Communism

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly Marx is one of the most important philosophers of all times. No one in the 20th century has been more defended or vilified than Karl Marx for inspiring the many left-wing socialist or communist revolutions that changed the political landscape of the 20th century. Marx is also considered one of the fathers of democratic socialism that since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union is now the principle form of socialism throughout the world.

Karl Heinrich Marx was born into a comfortable middle-class Jewish family in Trier in Germany on May 5, 1818. His father Hirschel Marx was a lawyer and while Karl was still a child decided to abandon his Jewish faith and become a Christian to escape anti-Semitism. After finishing his schooling in Trier, Karl Marx entered Bonn University to study law. At Bonn he became engaged to Jenny von Westphalen. Later Karl joined Berlin University and changed his subject of specialization from Law to Philosophy. Here Marx came under the influence of the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, who had been the professor of philosophy at Berlin until his death in 1831. Marx became a member of the Young Hegelian movement, a group, which included Bruno Bauer, David Strauss and others who were involved in a radical critique of Christianity and the Prussian autocracy. After obtaining his doctorate from the University of Jena, Marx hoped to get a teaching post. However his radical political views and association with the Young Hegelian movement made it impossible. Marx took to journalism to make a living and moved to Cologne and there the Rheinische Zeitung published an article by him in which he defended the freedom of the press. Marx immigrated to France, arriving in Paris at the end of 1843; Marx rapidly made contact with organized groups of emigrant German workers and

with various sects of French socialists. He also edited the short-lived Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher which was intended to bridge French socialism and the German radical Hegelianism. During his first few months in Paris, Marx set down his views in a series of writings which later came to be known as Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844). It was also in Paris that Marx developed his lifelong partnership with Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). While working on their first book together, The Holy Family, the French government expelled Marx from the country, and Marx moved to Brussels where he remained for the next three years. While in Brussels Marx devoted himself to an intensive study of history and elaborated what came to be known as the materialist conception of history, which was later published as The German Ideology. At the same time, Marx also wrote a polemic the Poverty of Philosophy against the idealistic socialism of the French socialist thinker J.P Proudhon. In 1847 a meeting of the Communist League's Central Committee was held in London and Marx attended this meeting. After returning to Brussels at the request of the Central committee, he wrote The Communist Manifesto. Early in 1848 Marx moved back to Paris where a revolt against King Louis Philippe who was forced to abdicate, was on. Slowly the revolution reached Germany. On the outbreak of disturbances in Germany Marx went to Cologne. However the summer of 1848 brought the first reaction of counter revolution and the revolutionary movements were suppressed. Finally Marx settled down in London in May 1849 to begin the "long, sleepless night of exile" that was to last for the rest of his life. He wrote two lengthy pamphlets on the 1848 revolution in France and its aftermath, The Class struggle in France and the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. During the first half of the 1850s the Marx family lived in poverty in the Soho quarter of London. Marx and Jenny already had four children and two more were to follow. Of these only three survived. Marx's major source of income at this time was the help from Engels. From 1852 Marx wrote a series of articles in New York Daily Tribune and also contributed to New American Cyclopedia. In London Marx spent a lot of time in the British Museum reading books and journals that would help him analyze the capitalist society. By 1857 he had produced a gigantic 800 page manuscript on

capital, landed property, wage labor, the state, foreign trade and the world market, The Grundrisse (Outlines). Marx published A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in 1859. In the early 1860s he composed three large volumes, Theories of Surplus Value, which discussed the theoreticians of political economy. It was not until 1867 that Marx was able to publish volume 1 of Capital. Volumes II and III were finished during the 1860s but were published posthumously by Engels. Marx was elected to the General Council of the First International in 1864. During the last decade of his life though Marx's health declined, he managed to comment on contemporary politics in his Critique of Gotha Programme. In his correspondence with Vera Zasulich, Marx contemplated the possibility of Russia bypassing the capitalist stage of development and building communism on the basis of the existing peasant cooperatives. The deaths of his eldest daughter and his wife clouded the last years of Marx's life. He died on March 14, 1883 and was buried at Highgate Cemetery in London.

Marxism, a body of doctrine developed by Karl Marx and, to a lesser extent, by Friedrich Engels in the mid-19th century. It originally consisted of three related ideas: a philosophical anthropology, a theory of history, and an economic and political program. There is also Marxism as it has been understood and practiced by the various socialist movements, particularly before 1914. Then there is Soviet Marxism as worked out by Vladimir Ilich Lenin and modified by Joseph Stalin, which under the name of Marxism-Leninism (see Leninism) became the doctrine of the communist parties set up after the Russian Revolution (1917). Offshoots of this included Marxism as interpreted by the anti-Stalinist Leon Trotsky and his followers, Mao Zedong's Chinese variant of Marxism-Leninism, and various Marxisms in the developing world. There were also the post-World War II nondogmatic Marxisms that have modified Marx's thought with borrowings from modern philosophies, principally from those of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger but also from Sigmund Freud and others.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1) What is the importance of Marx today?

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2) What is the importance of Marx's life for his theory and praxis?

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3) What are some of the important works of Karl Marx?

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1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Marxism could be considered the continuation and culmination of German classical philosophy, French Socialism and British Economics. To gain an understanding of Marx's philosophy and the socialist praxis he advocated, it is necessary that we look into each of these fields of knowledge that formed the historical and academic background to Marx's thinking.

The written work of Marx cannot be reduced to a philosophy, much less to a philosophical system. The whole of his work is a radical critique of philosophy, especially of G.W.F. Hegel's idealist system and of the philosophies of the left and right post-Hegelians. It is not, however, a mere denial of those philosophies. Marx declared that philosophy must become reality. One could no longer be content with interpreting the world; one must be concerned with transforming it, which meant transforming both the world itself and human consciousness of it. This, in turn, required a critique of experience together with a critique of ideas. In fact, Marx believed that all knowledge involves a critique of ideas. He was not an empiricist. Rather, his work teems with concepts (appropriation, alienation, praxis, creative labour, value, and so on) that

he had inherited from earlier philosophers and economists, including Hegel, Johann Fichte, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill. What uniquely characterizes the thought of Marx is that, instead of making abstract affirmations about a whole group of problems such as human nature, knowledge, and matter, he examines each problem in its dynamic relation to the others and, above all, tries to relate them to historical, social, political, and economic realities.

Historical materialism

In 1859, in the preface to his Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy), Marx wrote that the hypothesis that had served him as the basis for his analysis of society could be briefly formulated as follows:

In the social production that men carry on, they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and intellectual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence; it is on the contrary their social existence which determines their consciousness.

Raised to the level of historical law, this hypothesis was subsequently called historical materialism. Marx applied it to capitalist society, both in Manifest der kommunistischen Partei (1848; The Communist Manifesto) and Das Kapital (vol. 1, 1867; “Capital”) and in other writings. Although Marx reflected upon his working hypothesis for many years, he did not formulate it in a very exact manner: different expressions served him for identical realities. If one takes the text literally, social reality is structured in the following way:

Notes

1. Underlying everything as the real basis of society is the economic structure. This structure includes (a) the “material forces of production,” that is, the labour and means of production, and (b) the overall “relations of production,” or the social and political arrangements that regulate production and distribution. Although Marx stated that there is a correspondence between the “material forces” of production and the indispensable “relations” of production, he never made himself clear on the nature of the correspondence, a fact that was to be the source of differing interpretations among his later followers.

2. Above the economic structure rises the superstructure, consisting of legal and political “forms of social consciousness” that correspond to the economic structure. Marx says nothing about the nature of this correspondence between ideological forms and economic structure, except that through the ideological forms individuals become conscious of the conflict within the economic structure between the material forces of production and the existing relations of production expressed in the legal property relations. In other words, “The sum total of the forces of production accessible to men determines the condition of society” and is at the base of society. “The social structure and the state issue continually from the life processes of definite individuals . . . as they are in reality, that is acting and materially producing.” The political relations that individuals establish among themselves are dependent on material production, as are the legal relations. This foundation of the social on the economic is not an incidental point: it colours Marx’s whole analysis. It is found in Das Kapital as well as in Die deutsche Ideologie (written 1845–46; The German Ideology) and the Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844).

Analysis of society

To go directly to the heart of the work of Marx, one must focus on his concrete program for humanity. This is just as important for an understanding of Marx as are The Communist Manifesto and Das

Kapital. Marx's interpretation of human nature begins with human need. "Man," he wrote in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,

Is first of all a natural being. As a natural being and a living natural being, he is endowed on the one hand with natural powers, vital powers…; these powers exist in him as aptitudes, instincts. On the other hand, as an objective, natural, physical, sensitive being, he is a suffering, dependent and limited being…, that is, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, independent of him, but are the objects of his need, indispensable and essential for the realization and confirmation of his substantial powers.

The point of departure of human history is therefore living human beings, who seek to satisfy certain primary needs. "The first historical fact is the production of the means to satisfy these needs." This satisfaction, in turn, opens the way for new needs. Human activity is thus essentially a struggle with nature that must furnish the means of satisfying human needs: drink, food, clothing, the development of human powers and then of human intellectual and artistic abilities. In this undertaking, people discover themselves as productive beings who humanize themselves through their labour. Furthermore, they humanize nature while they naturalize themselves. By their creative activity, by their labour, they realize their identity with the nature that they master, while at the same time, they achieve free consciousness. Born of nature, they become fully human by opposing it. Becoming aware in their struggle against nature of what separates them from it, they find the conditions of their fulfillment, of the realization of their true stature. The dawning of consciousness is inseparable from struggle. By appropriating all the creative energies, they discover that "all that is called history is nothing else than the process of creating man through human labour, the becoming of nature for man. Man has thus evident and irrefutable proof of his own creation by himself." Understood in its universal dimension, human activity reveals that "for man, man is the supreme being." It is thus vain to speak of God, creation, and metaphysical problems. Fully naturalized, humans are sufficient unto themselves: they have recaptured the fullness of humanity in its full liberty.

Living in a capitalist society, however, the individual is not truly free. He is an alienated being; he is not at home in his world. The idea of alienation, which Marx takes from Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach, plays a fundamental role in the whole of his written work, starting with the writings of his youth and continuing through Das Kapital. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts the alienation of labour is seen to spring from the fact that the more the worker produces the less he has to consume, and the more values he creates the more he devalues himself, because his product and his labour are estranged from him. The life of the worker depends on things that he has created but that are not his, so that, instead of finding his rightful existence through his labour, he loses it in this world of things that are external to him: no work, no pay. Under these conditions, labour denies the fullness of concrete humanity. "The generic being (Gattungwesen) of man, nature as well as his intellectual faculties, is transformed into a being which is alien to him, into a means of his individual existence." Nature, his body, his spiritual essence become alien to him. "Man is made alien to man." When carried to its highest stage of development, private property becomes "the product of alienated labour…the means by which labour alienates itself (and) the realization of this alienation." It is also at the same time "the tangible material expression of alienated human life."

Although there is no evidence that Marx ever disclaimed this anthropological analysis of alienated labour, starting with The German Ideology, the historical, social, and economic causes of the alienation of labour are given increasing emphasis, especially in Das Kapital. Alienated labour is seen as the consequence of market product, the division of labour, and the division of society into antagonistic classes. As producers in society, workers create goods only by their labour. These goods are exchangeable. Their value is the average amount of social labour spent to produce them. The alienation of the worker takes on its full dimension in that system of market production in which part of the value of the goods produced by the worker is taken away from him and transformed into surplus value, which the capitalist privately appropriates. Market production also intensifies the alienation of labour by encouraging specialization, piecework, and the setting up of large

enterprises. Thus the labour power of the worker is used along with that of others in a combination whose significance he is ignorant of, both individually and socially. In thus losing their quality as human products, the products of labour become fetishes, that is, alien and oppressive realities to which both the individual who possesses them privately and the individual who is deprived of them submit themselves. In the market economy, this submission to things is obscured by the fact that the exchange of goods is expressed in money.

This fundamental economic alienation is accompanied by secondary political and ideological alienations, which offer a distorted representation of and an illusory justification of a world in which the relations of individuals with one another are also distorted. The ideas that people form are closely bound up with their material activity and their material relations: “The act of making representations, of thinking, the spiritual intercourse of men, seem to be the direct emanation of their material relations.” This is true of all human activity: political, intellectual, or spiritual. “Men produce their representations and their ideas, but it is as living men, men acting as they are determined by a definite development of their powers of production.” Law, morality, metaphysics, and religion do not have a history of their own. “Men developing their material production modify together with their real existence their ways of thinking and the products of their ways of thinking.” In other words, “It is not consciousness which determines existence, it is existence which determines consciousness.”

In bourgeois, capitalist society the individual is divided into political citizen and economic actor. This duality represents his political alienation, which is further intensified by the functioning of the bourgeois state. From this study of society at the beginning of the 19th century, Marx came to see the state as the instrument through which the propertied class dominated other classes.

Marx, Karl: religion

Marx, Karl: religion

Learn about Karl Marx's opposition to religion.

Ideological alienation, for Marx, takes different forms, appearing in economic, philosophical, and legal theories. Marx undertook a lengthy critique of the first in Das Kapital and of the second in The German Ideology. But ideological alienation expresses itself supremely in religion. Taking up the ideas about religion that were current in left post-Hegelian circles, together with the thought of Feuerbach, Marx considered religion to be a product of human consciousness. It is a reflection of the situation of a person who "either has not conquered himself or has already lost himself again" (the individual in the world of private property). It is "an opium for the people." Unlike Feuerbach, Marx believed that religion would disappear only with changes in society.

Analysis of the economy

Marx analyzed the market economy system in Das Kapital. In this work he borrows most of the categories of the classical English economists Smith and Ricardo but adapts them and introduces new concepts such as that of surplus value. One of the distinguishing marks of Das Kapital is that in it Marx studies the economy as a whole and not in one or another of its aspects. His analysis is based on the idea that humans are productive beings and that all economic value comes from human labour. The system he analyzes is principally that of mid-19th-century England. It is a system of private enterprise and competition that arose in the 16th century from the development of sea routes, international trade, and colonialism. Its rise had been facilitated by changes in the forces of production (the division of labour and the concentration of workshops), the adoption of mechanization, and technical progress. The wealth of the societies that brought this economy into play had been acquired through an "enormous accumulation of commodities." Marx therefore begins with the study of this accumulation, analyzing the unequal exchanges that take place in the market.

According to Marx, if the capitalist advances funds to buy cotton yarn with which to produce fabrics and sells the product for a larger sum than he paid, he is able to invest the difference in additional production. "Not only is the value advance kept in circulation, but it changes in its

magnitude, adds a plus to itself, makes itself worth more, and it is this movement that transforms it into capital." The transformation, to Marx, is possible only because the capitalist has appropriated the means of production, including the labour power of the worker. Now labour power produces more than it is worth. The value of labour power is determined by the amount of labour necessary for its reproduction or, in other words, by the amount needed for the worker to subsist and beget children. But in the hands of the capitalist the labour power employed in the course of a day produces more than the value of the sustenance required by the worker and his family. The difference between the two values is appropriated by the capitalist, and it corresponds exactly to the surplus value realized by capitalists in the market. Marx is not concerned with whether in capitalist society there are sources of surplus value other than the exploitation of human labour—a fact pointed out by Joseph Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942). He remains content with emphasizing this primary source:

Surplus value is produced by the employment of labour power. Capital buys the labour power and pays the wages for it. By means of his work the labourer creates new value which does not belong to him, but to the capitalist. He must work a certain time merely in order to reproduce the equivalent value of his wages. But when this equivalent value has been returned, he does not cease work, but continues to do so for some further hours. The new value which he produces during this extra time, and which exceeds in consequence the amount of his wage, constitutes surplus value.

Throughout his analysis, Marx argues that the development of capitalism is accompanied by increasing contradictions. For example, the introduction of machinery is profitable to the individual capitalist because it enables him to produce more goods at a lower cost, but new techniques are soon taken up by his competitors. The outlay for machinery grows faster than the outlay for wages. Since only labour can produce the surplus value from which profit is derived, this means that the capitalist's rate of profit on his total outlay tends to decline. Along with the declining rate of profit goes an increase in unemployment. Thus, the equilibrium of the system is precarious, subject as it is to the internal

pressures resulting from its own development. Crises shake it at regular intervals, preludes to the general crisis that will sweep it away. This instability is increased by the formation of a reserve army of workers, both factory workers and peasants, whose pauperization keeps increasing. “Capitalist production develops the technique and the combination of the process of social production only by exhausting at the same time the two sources from which all wealth springs: the earth and the worker.” According to the Marxist dialectic, these fundamental contradictions can only be resolved by a change from capitalism to a new system.

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Class struggle

Marx inherited the ideas of class and class struggle from utopian socialism and the theories of Henri de Saint-Simon. These had been given substance by the writings of French historians such as Adolphe Thiers and François Guizot on the French Revolution of 1789. But unlike the French historians, Marx made class struggle the central fact of social evolution. “The history of all hitherto existing human society is the history of class struggles.”

Mahan, Alfred Thayer

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In Marx's view, the dialectical nature of history is expressed in class struggle. With the development of capitalism, the class struggle takes an acute form. Two basic classes, around which other less important classes are grouped, oppose each other in the capitalist system: the owners of the means of production, or bourgeoisie, and the workers, or proletariat. "The bourgeoisie produces its own grave-diggers. The fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable" (The Communist Manifesto) because

the bourgeois relations of production are the last contradictory form of the process of social production, contradictory not in the sense of an individual contradiction, but of a contradiction that is born of the conditions of social existence of individuals; however, the forces of production which develop in the midst of bourgeois society create at the same time the material conditions for resolving this contradiction. With this social development the prehistory of human society ends.

When people have become aware of their loss, of their alienation, as a universal nonhuman situation, it will be possible for them to proceed to a radical transformation of their situation by a revolution. This revolution will be the prelude to the establishment of communism and the reign of liberty reconquered. "In the place of the old bourgeois society with its classes and its class antagonisms, there will be an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

But for Marx there are two views of revolution. One is that of a final conflagration, "a violent suppression of the old conditions of production," which occurs when the opposition between bourgeoisie and proletariat has been carried to its extreme point. This conception is set forth in a manner inspired by the Hegelian dialectic of the master and the slave, in Die heilige Familie (1845; The Holy Family). The other conception is that of a permanent revolution involving a provisional coalition between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie rebelling against a capitalism that is only superficially united. Once a majority has

been won to the coalition, an unofficial proletarian authority constitutes itself alongside the revolutionary bourgeois authority. Its mission is the political and revolutionary education of the proletariat, gradually assuring the transfer of legal power from the revolutionary bourgeoisie to the revolutionary proletariat.

If one reads The Communist Manifesto carefully one discovers inconsistencies that indicate that Marx had not reconciled the concepts of catastrophic and of permanent revolution. Moreover, Marx never analyzed classes as specific groups of people opposing other groups of people. Depending on the writings and the periods, the number of classes varies; and unfortunately the pen fell from Marx's hand at the moment when, in Das Kapital (vol. 3), he was about to take up the question. Reading Das Kapital, one is furthermore left with an ambiguous impression with regard to the destruction of capitalism: will it be the result of the "general crisis" that Marx expects, or of the action of the conscious proletariat, or of both at once?

The contributions of Engels

Engels became a communist in 1842 and discovered the proletariat of England when he took over the management of the Manchester factory belonging to his father's cotton firm. In 1844, the year he began his close association and friendship with Marx, Engels was finishing his Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie (Outline of a Critique of Political Economy)—a critique of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and J.-B. Say. This remarkable study contained in seminal form the critique that Marx was to make of bourgeois political economy in Das Kapital. During the first years of his stay in Manchester, Engels observed carefully the life of the workers of that great industrial centre and described it in Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England (The Condition of the Working Class in England), published in 1845 in Leipzig. This work was an analysis of the evolution of industrial capitalism and its social consequences. He collaborated with Marx in the writing of The Holy Family, The German Ideology, and The Communist Manifesto. The correspondence between them is of fundamental importance for the student of Das Kapital, for it shows how Engels contributed by furnishing Marx with a great amount

of technical and economic data and by criticizing the successive drafts. This collaboration lasted until Marx's death and was carried on posthumously with the publication of the manuscripts left by Marx, which Engels edited, forming volumes 2 and 3 of Das Kapital. He also wrote various articles on Marx's work.

Friedrich Engels, detail of a portrait by H. Schey.
Novosti Press Agency

In response to criticism of Marx's ideas by a socialist named Eugen Dühring, Engels published several articles that were collected under the title Herr Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft (1878; Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science, better known as Anti-Dühring), and an unfinished work, Dialektik und Natur (Dialectics of Nature), which he had begun around 1875–76. The importance of these writings to the subsequent development of Marxism can be seen from Lenin's observation that Engels "developed, in a clear and often polemical style, the most general scientific questions and the different phenomena of the past and present according to the materialist understanding of history and the economic theory of Karl Marx." But Engels was driven to simplify problems with a view to being pedagogical; he tended to schematize and systematize things as if the fundamental questions were settled. The connections that he thus established between some of Marx's governing ideas and some of the scientific ideas of his age gave rise to the notion that there is a complete Marxist philosophy. The idea was to play a significant role in the transition of Marxism from a "critique of daily life" to an integrated doctrine in which philosophy, history, and the sciences are fused.

Anti-Dühring is of fundamental importance for it constitutes the link between Marx and certain forms of modern Marxism. It contains three parts: Philosophy, Political Economy, and Socialism. In the first, Engels attempts to establish that the natural sciences and even mathematics are dialectical, in the sense that observable reality is dialectical: the dialectical method of analysis and thought is imposed by the material forces with which they deal. It is thus rightly applied to the study of history and human society. "Motion, in effect, is the mode of existence of

matter," Engels writes. In using materialistic dialectic to make a critique of Dühring's thesis, according to which political forces prevail over all the rest in the molding of history, Engels provides a good illustration of the materialistic idea of history, which puts the stress on the prime role of economic factors as driving forces in history. The other chapters of the section Political Economy form a very readable introduction to the principal economic ideas of Marx: value (simple and complex), labour, capital, and surplus value. The section Socialism starts by formulating anew the critique of the capitalist system as it was made in Das Kapital. At the end of the chapters devoted to production, distribution, the state, the family, and education, Engels outlines what the socialist society will be like, a society in which the notion of value has no longer anything to do with the distribution of the goods produced because all labour "becomes at once and directly social labour," and the amount of social labour that every product contains no longer needs to be ascertained by "a detour." A production plan will coordinate the economy. The division of labour and the separation of town and country will disappear with the "suppression of the capitalist character of modern industry." Thanks to the plan, industry will be located throughout the country in the collective interest, and thus the opposition between town and country will disappear—to the profit of both industry and agriculture. Finally, after the liberation of humanity from the condition of servitude imposed by the capitalist mode of production, the state will also be abolished and religion will disappear by "natural death."

One of the most remarkable features of Anti-Dühring is the insistence with which Engels refuses to base socialism on absolute values. He admits only relative values, linked to historical, economic, and social conditions. Socialism cannot possibly be based on ethical principles: each epoch can successfully carry out only that of which it is capable. Marx had written this in his preface of 1859.

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German Marxism After Engels

The work of Kautsky and Bernstein

The theoretical leadership after Engels was taken by Karl Kautsky, editor of the official organ of the German Social Democratic Party, Die Neue Zeit. He wrote Karl Marx' ökonomische Lehren (1887; The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx), in which the work of Marx is presented as essentially an economic theory. Kautsky reduced the ideas of Marx and Marxist historical dialectic to a kind of evolutionism. He laid stress on the increasing pauperization of the working class and on the increasing degree of capitalist concentration. While opposing all compromise with the bourgeois state, he accepted the contention that the socialist movement should support laws benefiting the workers provided that they did not reinforce the power of the state. Rejecting the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, he believed that the overthrow of the capitalist state and the acquisition of political power by the working class could be realized in a peaceful way, without upsetting the existing structures. As an internationalist he supported peace, rejecting war and violence. For him, war was a product of capitalism. Such were the main features of "orthodox" German Marxism at the time when the "revisionist" theories of Eduard Bernstein appeared.

Karl Kautsky, lithograph by Max Liebermann.
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin—Preussischer Kulturbesitz

Bernstein created a great controversy with articles that he wrote in 1896 for Die Neue Zeit, arguing that Marxism needed to be revised. His divergence widened with the publication in 1899 of Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (Evolutionary Socialism), to which rejoinders were made by Kautsky in Bernstein und das Sozialdemokratische Programm: Eine Antikritik (1899; "Bernstein and the Social Democratic Program") and the Polish-born Marxist Rosa Luxemburg in Sozialreform oder Revolution (Reform or Revolution), both in 1899. Bernstein focused first of all upon the labour theory of value. Along with the economists of his time he considered it outdated, both in the form expounded by British classical economists and as set forth in Das Kapital. He argued, moreover, that class struggle was becoming less rather than more intense, for concentration was not accelerating in industry as Marx had forecast, and in agriculture it was

not increasing at all. Bernstein demonstrated this on the basis of German, Dutch, and English statistical data. He also argued that cartels and business syndicates were smoothing the evolution of capitalism, a fact that cast doubt on the validity of Marx's theory of capitalistic crises. Arguing that quite a few of Marx's theories were not scientifically based, Bernstein blamed the Hegelian and Ricardian structure of Marx's work for his failure to take sufficient account of observable reality.

To this, Kautsky replied that, with the development of capitalism, agriculture was becoming a sector more and more dependent on industry, and that in addition an industrialization of agriculture was taking place. Luxemburg took the position that the contradictions of capitalism did not cease to grow with the progress of finance capitalism and the exploitation of the colonies, and that these contradictions were leading to a war that would give the proletariat its opportunity to assume power by revolutionary means.

The radicals

One of the most divisive questions was that of war and peace. This was brought to the fore at the outbreak of World War I, when Social Democratic deputies in the German Reichstag voted for the financing of the war. Among German Marxists who opposed the war were Karl Liebknecht and Luxemburg. Liebknecht was imprisoned in 1916 for agitating against the war. On his release in 1918 he took the leadership of the Spartacus League, which was later to become the Communist Party of Germany. Luxemburg had also been arrested for her antimilitary activities. In addition to her articles, signed Junius, in which she debated with Lenin on the subject of World War I and the attitude of the Marxists toward it (published in 1916 as Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie [The Crisis in the German Social-Democracy]), she is known for her book Die Akkumulation des Kapitals (1913; The Accumulation of Capital). In this work she returned to Marx's economic analysis of capitalism, in particular the accumulation of capital as expounded in volume 2 of Das Kapital. There she found a contradiction that had until then been unnoticed: Marx's scheme seems to imply that the development of capitalism can be indefinite, though elsewhere he sees the contradictions

of the system as bringing about increasingly violent economic crises that will inevitably sweep capitalism away. Luxemburg concluded that Marx's scheme is oversimplified and assumes a universe made up entirely of capitalists and workers. If increases in productivity are taken into account, she asserted, balance between the two sectors becomes impossible; in order to keep expanding, capitalists must find new markets in noncapitalist spheres, either among peasants and artisans or in colonies and underdeveloped countries. Capitalism will collapse only when exploitation of the world outside it (the peasantry, colonies, and so on) has reached a limit. This conclusion has been the subject of passionate controversies.

The Austrians

The Austrian school came into being when Austrian socialists started publishing their works independently of the Germans; it can be dated from either 1904 (beginning of the Marx-Studien collection) or 1907 (publication of the magazine Der Kampf). The most important members of the school were Max Adler, Karl Renner, Rudolf Hilferding, Gustav Eckstein, Friedrich Adler, and Otto Bauer. The most eminent was Bauer, a brilliant theoretician whose Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (1906; "The Nationalities Question and the Social Democracy") was critically reviewed by Lenin. In this work he dealt with the problem of nationalities in the light of the experience of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He favoured the self-determination of peoples and emphasized the cultural elements in the concept of nationhood. Hilferding was finance minister of the German Republic after World War I in the Cabinets of the Social Democrats Gustav Stresemann (1923) and Hermann Müller (1928). He is known especially for his work Das Finanzkapital (1910), in which he maintained that capitalism had come under the control of banks and industrial monopolies. The growth of national competition and tariff barriers, he believed, had led to economic warfare abroad. Hilferding's ideas strongly influenced Lenin, who analyzed them in Imperializm, kak noveyshy etap kapitalizma (1917; Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism).

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Russian And Soviet Marxism

Das Kapital was translated into Russian in 1872. Marx kept up more or less steady relations with the Russian socialists and took an interest in the economic and social conditions of the tsarist empire. The person who originally introduced Marxism into Russia was Georgy Plekhanov, but the person who adapted Marxism to Russian conditions was Lenin.

Lenin

Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov, or Lenin, was born in 1870 at Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk). He entered the University of Kazan to study law but was expelled the same year for participating in student agitation. In 1893 he settled in St. Petersburg and became actively involved with the revolutionary workers. With his pamphlet Chto delat? (1902; What Is to Be Done?), he specified the theoretical principles and organization of a Marxist party as he thought it should be constituted. He took part in the second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, which was held in Brussels and London (1903), and induced the majority of the Congress members to adopt his views. Two factions formed at the Congress: the Bolshevik (from the Russian word for "larger") with Lenin as the leader and the Menshevik (from the Russian word for "smaller") with L. Martov at the head. The former wanted a restricted party of militants and advocated the dictatorship of the proletariat. The latter wanted a wide-open proletarian party, collaboration with the liberals, and a democratic constitution for Russia. In his pamphlet Shag vperyod, dva shaga nazad (1904; One Step Forward, Two Steps Back), Lenin compared the organizational principles of the Bolsheviks to those of the Mensheviks. After the failure of the Russian Revolution of 1905, he drew positive lessons for the future in Dve taktiki Sotsial-Demokraty v demokraticheskoy revolyutsi (1905; Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution. He fiercely attacked the influence of Kantian philosophy on German and Russian Marxism in Materializm i empiriokrititsizm (1908; Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1908). In 1912 at the Prague Conference the Bolsheviks constituted themselves as an independent party. During World War I Lenin resided in Switzerland,

where he studied Hegel's Science of Logic and the development of capitalism and carried on debates with Marxists like Luxemburg on the meaning of the war and the right of nations to self-determination. In 1915 at Zimmerwald, and in 1916 at Kiental, he organized two international socialist conferences to fight against the war. Immediately after the February 1917 revolution he returned to Russia, and in October the Bolshevik coup brought him to power.

Vladimir Ilich Lenin, 1918.
Tass/Sovfoto

The situation of Russia and the Russian revolutionary movement at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th led Lenin to diverge, in the course of his development and his analyses, from the positions both of "orthodox Marxism" and of "revisionism." He rediscovered the original thought of Marx by a careful study of his works, in particular Das Kapital and The Holy Family. He saw Marxism as a practical affair and tried to go beyond the accepted formulas to plan political action that would come to grips with the surrounding world.

As early as 1894, in his populist study Chto Takoye "Druzya Naroda," kak oni voyuyut protiv Sotsial-Demokratov? (What the "Friends of the People" Are, and How They Fight the Social-Democrats), Lenin took up Marx's distinction between "material social relations" and "ideological social relations." In Lenin's eyes the importance of Das Kapital was that "while explaining the structure and the development of the social formation seen exclusively in terms of its relations of production, (Marx) has nevertheless everywhere and always analyzed the superstructure which corresponds to these relations of production." In Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossi (1897–99; The Development of Capitalism in Russia) Lenin sought to apply Marx's analysis by showing the growing role of capital, in particular commercial capital, in the exploitation of the workers in the factories and the large-scale expropriation of the peasants. It was thus possible to apply to Russia the models developed by Marx for western Europe. At the same time Lenin did not lose sight of the importance of the peasant in Russian society. Although a disciple of

Marx, he did not believe that he had only to repeat Marx's conclusions. He wrote:

We do not consider the theory of Marx to be a complete, immutable whole. We think on the contrary that this theory has only laid the cornerstone of the science, a science which socialists must further develop in all directions if they do not want to let themselves be overtaken by life. We think that, for the Russian socialists, an independent elaboration of the theory is particularly necessary.

Lenin laid great stress upon the dialectical method. In his early writings he defined the dialectic as "nothing more nor less than the method of sociology, which sees society as a living organism, in perpetual development (and not as something mechanically assembled and thus allowing all sorts of arbitrary combinations of the various social elements) . . . " (Friends of the People). After having studied Hegel toward the end of 1914, he took a more activist view. Dialectic is not only evolution; it is praxis, leading from activity to reflection and from reflection to action.

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The dictatorship of the proletariat

Lenin also put much emphasis on the leading role of the party. As early as 1902 he was concerned with the need for a cohesive party with a correct doctrine, adapted to the exigencies of the period, which would be a motive force among the masses, helping to bring them to an awareness of their real situation. In What Is To Be Done? he called for a party of professional revolutionaries, disciplined and directed, capable of defeating the police; its aim should be to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. In order to do this, he wrote in Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, it was necessary "to subject the insurrection of the proletarian and non-proletarian masses to our influence, to our direction, to use it in our best interests." But this was not possible without a doctrine: "Without revolutionary theory, no revolutionary movement." On the eve of the revolution of October 1917, in Gosudarstvo i revolyutsiya (The State and Revolution), he set forth the

conditions for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the suppression of the capitalist state.

Lenin assigned major importance to the peasantry in formulating his program. It would be a serious error, he held, for the Russian revolutionary workers' movement to neglect the peasants. Even though it was clear that the industrial proletariat constituted the vanguard of the revolution, the discontent of the peasantry could be oriented in a direction favourable to the revolution by placing among the goals of the party the seizure of privately owned land. As early as 1903, at the third congress of the party, he secured a resolution to this effect. Thereafter, the dictatorship of the proletariat became the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. In 1917 he encouraged the peasants to seize land long before the approval of agrarian reform by the Constituent Assembly.

Among Lenin's legacies to Soviet Marxism was one that proved to be injurious to the party. This was the decision taken at his behest by the 10th congress of the party in the spring of 1921, while the sailors were rebelling at Kronstadt and the peasants were growing restless in the countryside, to forbid all factions, all factional activity, and all opposition political platforms within the party. This decision had grave consequences in later years when Stalin used it against his opponents.

Stalin

It is Joseph Stalin who codified the body of ideas that, under the name of Marxism-Leninism, constituted the official doctrine of the Soviet and eastern European communist parties. Stalin was a man of action in a slightly different sense than was Lenin. Gradually taking over power after Lenin's death in 1924, he pursued the development of the Soviet Union with great vigour. By practicing Marxism, he assimilated it, at the same time simplifying it. Stalin's Marxism-Leninism rests on the dialectic of Hegel, as set forth in Istoriya Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (Bolshevikov): Kratky kurs (1938; A Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and on a materialism that can be considered roughly identical to that of Feuerbach. His work Voprosy leninizma (1926; Problems of Leninism), which

appeared in 11 editions during his lifetime, sets forth an ideology of power and activism that rides roughshod over the more nuanced approach of Lenin.

Joseph Stalin, 1950.

Sovfoto

Soviet dialectical materialism can be reduced to four laws: (1) History is a dialectical development. It proceeds by successive phases that supersede one another. These phases are not separate, any more than birth, growth, and death are separate. Though it is true that phase B necessarily negates phase A, it remains that phase B was already contained in phase A and was initiated by it. The dialectic does not regard nature as an accidental accumulation of objects, of isolated and independent phenomena, but as a unified, coherent whole. Furthermore, nature is perpetually in movement, in a state of unceasing renewal and development, in which there is always something being born and developing and something disintegrating and disappearing. (2) Evolution takes place in leaps, not gradually. (3) Contradictions must be made manifest. All phenomena contain in themselves contradictory elements. "Dialectic starts from the point of view that objects and natural phenomena imply internal contradictions, because they all have a positive and a negative side." These contradictory elements are in perpetual struggle: it is this struggle that is the "internal content of the process of development," according to Stalin. (4) The law of this development is economic. All other contradictions are rooted in the basic economic relationship. A given epoch is entirely determined by the relations of production. They are social relations; relations of collaboration or mutual aid, relations of domination or submission; and finally, transitory relations that characterize a period of passage from one system to another. "The history of the development of society is, above all, the history of the development of production, the history of the modes of production which succeed one another through the centuries."

From these principles may be drawn the following inferences, essential for penetrating the workings of Marxist-Leninist thought and its application. No natural phenomenon, no historical or social situation, no

political fact, can be considered independently of the other facts or phenomena that surround it; it is set within a whole. Since movement is the essential fact, one must distinguish between what is beginning to decay and what is being born and developing. Since the process of development takes place by leaps, one passes suddenly from a succession of slow quantitative changes to a radical qualitative change. In the social or political realm, these sudden qualitative changes are revolutions, carried out by the oppressed classes. One must follow a frankly proletarian-class policy that exposes the contradictions of the capitalist system. A reformist policy makes no sense. Consequently (1) nothing can be judged from the point of view of "eternal justice" or any other preconceived notion and (2) no social system is immutable. To be effective, one must not base one's action on social strata that are no longer developing, even if they represent for the moment the dominant force, but on those that are developing.

Stalin's materialist and historical dialectic differs sharply from the perspective of Karl Marx. In The Communist Manifesto Marx applied the materialist dialectic to the social and political life of his time. In the chapter entitled "Bourgeois and Proletarians," he studied the process of the growth of the revolutionary bourgeoisie within feudal society, then the genesis and the growth of the proletariat within capitalism, placing the emphasis on the struggle between antagonistic classes. To be sure, he connected social evolution with the development of the forces of production. What counted for him, however, was not only the struggle but also the birth of consciousness among the proletariat. "As to the final victory of the propositions put forth in the Manifesto, Marx expected it to come primarily from the intellectual development of the working class, necessarily the result of common action and discussion" (Engels, preface to the republication of The Communist Manifesto, May 1, 1890).

The result of Stalin's dialectic, however, was what he called revolution from above, a dictatorial policy to increase industrialization and collectivize agriculture based upon ruthless repression and a strong centralization of power. For Stalin what counted was the immediate goal, the practical result. The move was from a dialectic that emphasized both the objective and the subjective to one purely objective, or more exactly,

objectivist. Human actions are to be judged not by taking account of the intentions of the actor and their place in a given historical web but only in terms of what they signify objectively at the end of the period considered.

Trotskyism

Alongside Marxism-Leninism as expounded in the former Soviet Union, there arose another point of view expressed by Stalin's opponent Leon Trotsky and his followers (see Trotskyism). Trotsky played a leading role in both the Russian Revolution of 1905 and that of 1917. After Lenin's death he fell out with Stalin. Their conflict turned largely upon questions of policy, both domestic and foreign. In the realm of ideas, Trotsky held that a revolution in a backward, rural country could be carried out only by the proletariat. Once in power the proletariat must carry out agrarian reform and undertake the accelerated development of the economy. The revolution must be a socialist one, involving the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production, or else it will fail. But the revolution cannot be carried out in isolation, as Stalin maintained it could. The capitalist countries will try to destroy it; moreover, to succeed the revolution must be able to draw upon the industrial techniques of the developed countries. For these reasons the revolution must be worldwide and permanent, directed against the liberal and nationalist bourgeoisie of all countries and using local victories to advance the international struggle.

Leon Trotsky.

H. Roger-Viollet

Tactically, Trotsky emphasized the necessity of finding or creating a revolutionary situation, of educating the working class in order to revolutionize it, of seeing that the party remained open to the various revolutionary tendencies and avoided becoming bureaucratized, and finally, when the time for insurrection comes, of organizing it according to a detailed plan.

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Variants Of Marxism

Maoism

When the Chinese communists took power in 1948, they brought with them a new kind of Marxism that came to be called Maoism after their leader Mao Zedong. The thought of Mao must always be seen against the changing revolutionary reality of China from 1930 onward. His thought was complex, a Marxist type of analysis combined with the permanent fundamentals of Chinese thought and culture.

Mao Zedong.

Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

One of its central elements has to do with the nature and role of contradictions in socialist society. For Mao, every society, including socialist (communist) society, contained "two different types of contradictions": (1) antagonistic contradictions—contradictions between us (the people) and our enemies (the Chinese bourgeoisie faithful), between the imperialist camp and the socialist camp, and so forth—which are resolved by revolution, and (2) nonantagonistic contradictions—between the government and the people under a socialist regime, between two groups within the Communist Party, between one section of the people and another under a communist regime, and so forth—which are resolved by vigorous fraternal criticism and self-criticism.

The notion of contradiction is specific to Mao's thought in that it differs from the conceptions of Marx or Lenin. For Mao, in effect, contradictions were at the same time universal and particular. In their universality, one must seek and discover what constitutes their particularity: every contradiction displays a particular character, depending on the nature of things and phenomena. Contradictions have alternating aspects—sometimes strongly marked, sometimes blurred. Some of these aspects are primary, others secondary. It is important to define them well, for if one fails to do so, the analysis of the social reality and the actions that follow from it will be mistaken. This is quite far from Stalinism and dogmatic Marxism-Leninism.

Another essential element of Mao's thought, which must be seen in the context of revolutionary China, is the notion of permanent revolution. It is an old idea advocated in different contexts by Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky but lacking, in Mao's formulation, the international dimension espoused by his predecessors. For Mao it followed from his ideas about the struggle of humans against nature (held from 1938, at least); the campaigns for the rectification of thought (1942, 1951, 1952); and the necessity of struggling against bureaucracy, waste, and corruption in a country then possessing 600 to 700 million inhabitants, where very old civilizations and cultures still permeated both the bourgeois classes and the peasantry, where bureaucracy was thoroughly entrenched, and where the previous society was extremely corrupt. It arose from Mao's conviction that the rhythm of the revolution must be accelerated. This conviction appeared in 1957 in his speeches and became manifest in 1958 in the Great Leap Forward, followed in 1966 by the Cultural Revolution.

Mao's concept of permanent revolution rests upon the existence of nonantagonistic contradictions in the China of the present and of the future. The people must be mobilized into a permanent movement in order to carry forward the revolution and to prevent the ruling group from turning bourgeois (as he perceived it had in the Soviet Union). It is necessary to shape among the masses a new vision of the world by tearing them from their passivity and their century-old habits. This is the background of the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966, following previous campaigns but differing from them in its magnitude and, it would seem, in the mobilization of youth against the cadres of the party. In these campaigns Mao drew upon his past as a revolutionary Marxist peasant leader, from his life in the red military and peasant bases and among the Red Guards of Yen-an, seeking in his past experience ways to mobilize the whole Chinese population against the dangers—internal and external—that confronted it in the present.

The distinguishing characteristic of Maoism is that it represents a peasant type of Marxism, with a principally rural and military outlook. While basing himself on Marxism-Leninism, adapted to Chinese requirements, Mao was rooted in the peasant life from which he himself came, in the

revolts against the warlords and the bureaucrats that have filled the history of China. By integrating this experience into a universal vision of history, Mao gave it a significance that flows beyond the provincial limits of China.

In his effort to remain close to the Chinese peasant masses, Mao drew upon an idea of nature and a symbolism found in popular Chinese Daoism, though transformed by his Marxism. It can be seen in his many poems, which were written in the classical Chinese style. This idea of nature is accompanied in his written political works by the Promethean idea of humanity struggling in a war against nature, a conception in his thought that goes back at least to 1938 and became more important after 1955 as the rhythm of the revolution accelerated.

Marxism in Cuba

The Marxism of Fidel Castro expressed itself as a rejection of injustice in any form—political, economic, or social. In this sense it is related to the liberal democracy and Pan-Americanism of Simón Bolívar in Latin America during the 19th century. In its liberalism, Castro's early socialism resembled the various French socialisms of the first half of the 19th century. Only gradually did Castroism come to identify itself with Marxism-Leninism, although from the very beginning of the Cuban revolution Castro revealed his attachment to certain of Marx's ideas. Castro's Marxism rejects some of the tenets and practices of official Marxism-Leninism: it is outspoken against dogmatism, bureaucracy, and sectarianism. In one sense, Castroism is a Marxist-Leninist "heresy." It exalts the ethos of guerrilla revolution over party politics. At the same time it aims to apply a purer Marxism to the conditions of Cuba: alleged American imperialism, a single-crop economy, a low initial level of political and economic development. One may call it an attempt to realize a synthesis of Marxist ideas and the ideas of Bolívar.

Marxism in the developing world

The emergence of Marxist variants in the developing world was primarily influenced by the undeveloped industrial state and the former colonial status of the nations in question. In the traditional Marxist view,

the growth of capitalism is seen as a step necessary for the breakup of precapitalist peasant society and for the rise of the revolutionary proletariat class. Some theorists believed, however, that capitalism introduced by imperialist rather than indigenous powers sustains rather than destroys the feudal structure of peasant society and promotes underdevelopment because resources and surplus are usurped by the colonial powers. Furthermore, the revolutionary socialist movement becomes subordinate to that of national liberation, which violates Marx's theory of class struggle by uniting all indigenous classes in the common cause of anti-imperialism. For these reasons, many developing countries chose to follow the Maoist model, with its emphasis on agrarian revolution against feudalism and imperialism, rather than the old Soviet one. Another alternative, one specific to the developing world, bypassed capitalism and depended upon the established strength of other communist countries for support against imperialism.

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Marxism in the West

There are two main forms of Marxism in the West: that of the traditional communist parties and the more diffuse New Left form, which is also known as Western Marxism. In general, the success of western European communist parties had been hindered by their perceived allegiance to the old Soviet authority rather than their own countries; the secretive, bureaucratic form of organization they inherited from Lenin; the ease with which they became integrated into capitalist society; and their consequent fear of compromising their principles by sharing power with bourgeois parties. The Western parties basically adhered to the policies of Soviet Marxism until the 1970s, when they began to advocate Eurocommunism, a moderate version of communism that they felt would broaden their base of appeal beyond the working class and thus improve their chances for political success. As described by Enrico Berlinguer, Georges Marchais, and Santiago Carrillo, the leaders in the 1970s and '80s of the Italian, French, and Spanish communist parties, respectively, Eurocommunism favoured a peaceful, democratic approach to achieving socialism, encouraged making alliances with other political parties,

guaranteed civil liberties, and renounced the central authority of the Soviet party. By the 1980s, however, Eurocommunism had largely been abandoned as unsuccessful, and communist parties in advanced capitalist nations returned to orthodox Marxism-Leninism despite the concomitant problems.

Western Marxism, however, can be seen as a repudiation of Marxism-Leninism, although, when it was first formulated in the 1920s, its proponents believed they were loyal to the dominant Soviet Communist Party. Prominent figures in the evolution of Western Marxism included the central Europeans György Lukács, Karl Korsch, and Lucien Goldmann; Antonio Gramsci of Italy; the German theorists who constituted the Frankfurt School, especially Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jürgen Habermas; and Henri Lefebvre, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty of France.

Western Marxism has been shaped primarily by the failure of the socialist revolution in the Western world. Western Marxists were concerned less with the actual political or economic practice of Marxism than with its philosophical interpretation, especially in relation to cultural and historical studies. In order to explain the inarguable success of capitalist society, they felt they needed to explore and understand non-Marxist approaches and all aspects of bourgeois culture. Eventually, they came to believe that traditional Marxism was not relevant to the reality of modern Western society.

Marx had predicted that revolution would succeed in Europe first, but, in fact, the developing world proved more responsive. Orthodox Marxism also championed the technological achievements associated with capitalism, viewing them as essential to the progress of socialism. Experience showed the Western Marxists, however, that technology did not necessarily produce the crises Marx described and did not lead inevitably to revolution. In particular they disagreed with the idea, originally emphasized by Engels, that Marxism is an integrated, scientific doctrine that can be applied universally to nature; they viewed it as a critique of human life, not an objective, general science. Disillusioned by the terrorism of the Stalin era and the bureaucracy of the communist party system, they advocated the idea of government by workers'

councils, which they believed would eliminate professional politicians and would more truly represent the interests of the working class. Later, when the working class appeared to them to be too well integrated into the capitalist system, the Western Marxists supported more anarchistic tactics. In general, their views are more in accord with those found in Marx's early, humanist writings rather than with his later, dogmatic interpretations.

Western Marxism has found support primarily among intellectuals rather than the working class, and orthodox Marxists have judged it impractical. Nevertheless, the Western Marxists' emphasis on Marx's social theory and their critical assessment of Marxist methodology and ideas have coloured the way even non-Marxists view the world.

1.3 CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

Hegel was the most important philosopher of the time and he believed that Reality was Spirit and that the human being is Spirit alienated from its objects and from itself. He believed that this alienation can be overcome by knowledge, knowledge that there is nothing in the object which was not put there by the subject spirit itself. During his university days Marx became a member of a radical left wing group, the Young Hegelians. Marx accepted Hegel's dialectic, but for him 5 history was not the dialectical manifestation of the Spirit but men and women transforming the world through the creation of their means of existence. He drifted away from the Young Hegelian movement and expressed his disagreements with their ideology in the Holy Family, the Theses on Feuerbach and the German Ideology. The Theses on Feuerbach contain one of Marx's most memorable remarks: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is to change it." (Thesis 11) Materialism of the time ignored the active role of the human subject in creating the world we perceive. Idealism as developed by Hegel, understood the active nature of the human subject, but confined it to thought or contemplation. Marx combined the insights of both the traditions to propose a view in which human beings transform the world they find themselves in. This transformation happens not in thought but in reality, through actual material activity. This historical version of materialism is

the foundation of Marx's theory of history; it was derived from his reflection on the history of philosophy, his experience of social and economic realities of the time, and his encounter with the working class.

1.4 SOCIALISM

Socialism as we know today is the product of modern industrial world. Millennial and utopian thought before the modern era only existed as forms of Christian heresy. Gradually the idea became secular especially during and after the French Revolution. G.D.H. Cole in the first volume of his History of Socialist Thought says that the word "socialist" was first used in 1827 in the Owenite Co-operative magazine as a general description of Robert Owen's co-operative doctrines, and then as "socialisme' in 1832 in La Globe. The general connotation of the word in 1830s was a system of society that stressed the social against the individual, the co-operative against the competitive, sociability against individual self-sufficiency; and social control on the accumulation and use of private property. Louis Blanqui, Fourier, Robert Owen etc advocated different versions of socialism. Marxism emerged as a critique and revolutionary transformation of the different schools of socialist thought and the political emancipation movements.

1.5 ECONOMICS

Capitalism is an economic theory which stresses that the means of production should be owned by private individuals. Capitalists believe that Private ownership and free enterprise will lead to 6 more efficiency, lower prices, and better products. Adam Smith believed that an individual, by pursuing his/her own interest frequently promotes that of the society more efficiently than when one intends to promote it. According to Capitalist thinking enlightened self-interest and competition in the free market would benefit society as a whole by keeping prices low, while providing incentive for the production of a wide variety of goods and services. Capitalist mode of production advocated the division of labour which it believed would contribute to an increase in production. Modern capitalism had created unprecedented

wealth. Capitalism could not exist without constantly revolutionizing the means of production. However the system made the workers, the real producers of wealth alienated and poorer, the more they worked the less they became. Marx felt that there was a need for a new economic and social system to liberate the vast majority of the people, the working class or the proletariat from the chains of oppression.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1) What are the historical and academic factors that contributed to Marx's thinking?

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2) Who were the left wing Hegelians and what was their philosophy?

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3) Describe the characteristics of socialism.

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4) Describe the characteristics of Capitalism.

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1.6 HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

The critique of Hegelian philosophy, different schools of socialism and capitalism made Marx to search for a new philosophy that would be instrumental in making communism a reality. He looked into history to

see how societies had evolved from primitive communism to slave economy, to feudalism and finally to contemporary capitalism. He believed that once we understand the laws of the development of history we could also direct them to achieve the goal we have. Marx's concept of historical materialism was his attempt to explain the historical process of development. The materialistic interpretation of history holds that history is a product of human beings, men and women make history but they make it under given conditions. The process of development and change is as follows. Human beings have needs and to satisfy these needs they enter into production. The mode of production is the manner in which men and women produce their means of existence. In the course of time, the modes of production become ossified into traditions and are handed down. It is this dynamic relationship to nature that Marx meant by the term productive forces. Human beings do not produce as isolated individuals but as members of a community, the relationship within which is determined to a great extent by the mode of production. This economic structure constitutes the base of the society on which superstructures like law, religion, and morality are built to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. Within the economic structure itself, the productive forces enjoy priority over relations of production. The superstructures once risen can react on the base and can have certain autonomy. 8 What triggers social change is the maturing of the contradictions within a given economic system: (i) conflict between new needs and old mode of production; (ii) conflict between the terms in relations of production; (iii) conflict between base and superstructure and (vi) conflict between superstructures. When the conflicts mature and the possibilities within a given system are exhausted, one form of society gives way to another. Human beings themselves are the most important agents of change, human beings who are aware of the conflicts and interests can change the course of history.

1.7 CLASS AND CLASS STRUGGLE

A class is a group of persons who stand in the same relation to property or to nonproperty, to the factors of production such as labour power and means of production. We might say that a class is a group of people who

by virtue of what they possess have to engage in the same type of activities if they want to make the best use of their endowments. Marx was not the first to discover the concepts of class and class struggle. But Marx was the first to see class and class conflict as central categories in the unfolding of history. Marx showed (1) that the existence of classes is linked to predetermined historical phases of the development of production; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; and (3) that the dictatorship itself is only the transition leading to the abolition of all classes and the establishment of a classless society. In the Manifesto Marx says that history hitherto has been a history of class struggle. As capitalism developed and the capitalists acquired more and more power and wealth it also created an impoverished proletariat. Two basic classes oppose each other in the capitalist system: the owners of the means of production, the capitalists and the workers who have sold their labour power. The conflict between the bourgeois who does not want to give up their privileges and the proletariat who have become aware of their loss, of their alienation, of the inhuman situation in which they live and work will create the conditions for a revolution. This revolution will be the prelude to the establishment of communism.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1) What is historical materialism?

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2) Describe class struggle and its implications.

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1.8 ALIENATION

For the first time in history we live in a world where we have the technology and the means to produce enough to satisfy the needs of everyone on the planet, yet millions of lives are stunted by poverty and destroyed by disease. Vast numbers of people live their lives characterized by feelings of desolation, loneliness and alienation. The situation is not natural or inevitable but the product of the existing socio-economic system, contemporary capitalism. Marx developed his theory of alienation to reveal the cause of these contradictions, namely alienated human activity that lies behind the seemingly impersonal forces dominating the society. For Marx, alienation was not rooted in the mind or in religion, as it was for his predecessors Hegel and Feuerbach but something rooted in the material world. Alienation meant loss of control, specifically the loss of control over worker's labour power, the product of labour and its commodification.

1.9 ALIENATED LABOUR

Marx considers human labour as one of the chief ways in which humans are distinguished from non-human animals. Non-human animals do produce, but only for survival, and only in an instinctual manner. In contrast, humans are creative and make their life-activity and labour the object of their own wills and consciousness. Marx sees capitalism as an economic and social system which has created and augmented productive forces greater than ever before in human history, yet it thwarts, distorts, and limits human potential. There are four aspects to alienated labour. The worker is alienated:

1. from products of one's own labour. The first aspect of alienated labour is the separation of the worker from the products of his/her labour. Under capitalism, commodities produced by labour are taken away from the worker and sold, and labour itself becomes a commodity. This alienation produces riches and power for the capitalist but enslavement and degradation for workers.

2. from the process of production. Under capitalism, work is controlled by employers and is external to the worker and is not experienced as part

of one's nature. While working, the worker does not have a sense of fulfilment.

3. from species. In capitalism individuals act less and less like human beings, and more and more like machines. Humans produce when free from physical need, reproduce and construct the world in freedom in accordance with sense of beauty as a member of a society. This is the essence of production as a species-being. In capitalism production is drudgery and merely a means to survive. In the process one is forced to sacrifice what is genuinely human. 4. from other persons. Humans are also alienated from other human beings, in capitalism, human relations are reduced to market or exchange relationships. According to Marx the exchange relationships are social relationships, even though they appear to have become only money relationships. The division of labour, wage labour and private property are expressions of alienation. In order to end alienation, it is necessary to abolish private property and abolish the relationship between private property and wage labour. Marx believed that through class struggle that would culminate in a revolution which leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, private property would be abolished and by implication, alienation.

1.10 COMMUNISM

The aim of Marxism is to bring about a communist society, i.e., a classless society. The dictatorship of the proletariat and the nascent socialist society will be characterized by factors such as the abolition of private property abolition of inheritance abolition of division of labour 11 universalization of education planned economy, rational and just allocation of the resources of the society As socialism develops one could expect the "withering away of the state" and creation of a society where the norm is "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need," as mentioned in the Critique of Gotha Programme. It will be "An association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." (The Manifesto) In a true communist society there will be no more a place for religion as the promise of an illusory happiness in the world to come or as opium to

alleviate the pain and misery the masses suffer. “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premise now in existence.’ (The German Ideology).

Check Your Progress 4

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1) What is alienation?

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2) Describe the different aspects of economic alienation.

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3) What are the characteristics of communist society?

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1.11 LET US SUM UP

Though Marx remain one of the most important thinkers even in the 21st century, the collapse of Soviet Union and other East European Economies, the economic changes that are taking place in China which still calls itself a communist state makes a critique of what had been accepted by Marxists as a dogma for a long time. A critique in the context of contemporary realities is what Marx himself would have expected, for his favourite motto was, De Omnibus dubitandum (you must have doubts about everything). Marx never wanted his thought to be ossified into a dogma to be believed by his followers. His endower was to make the working class aware of their situation and their

responsibility in bringing about a classless society where everyone will be able to develop all their potentialities unhindered by class divisions.

Marxism is a method of socioeconomic analysis that views class relations and social conflict using a materialist interpretation of historical development and takes a dialectical view of social transformation. It originates from the works of 19th-century German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marxism has developed into many different branches and schools of thought, with the result that there is now no single definitive Marxist theory.

Different Marxian schools place a greater emphasis on certain aspects of classical Marxism while rejecting or modifying other aspects. Many schools of thought have sought to combine Marxian concepts and non-Marxian concepts which has then led to contradictory conclusions. It has been argued that there is a movement toward the recognition that historical materialism and dialectical materialism remains the fundamental aspect of all Marxist schools of thought. This view is refuted by some post-Marxists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who claim that history is not only determined by the mode of production, but also by consciousness and will.

Marxism has had a profound impact on global academia and has influenced many fields such as archaeology, anthropology, media studies, science studies, political science, theater, history, sociology, art history and theory, cultural studies, education, economics, ethics, criminology, geography, literary criticism, aesthetics, film theory, critical psychology and philosophy.

1.12 KEY WORDS

Marxism: Marxism is a method of socioeconomic analysis that views class relations and social conflict using a materialist interpretation of historical development and takes a dialectical view of social transformation. It originates from the works of 19th-century German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

1.13 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1) What is the importance of Marx today?
2) What is the importance of Marx's life for his theory and praxis?
3) What are some of the important works of Karl Marx?

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1.15 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1) What is the importance of Marxism today? Karl Marx is one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century, whose insights and critique of Capitalism are still relevant at this time of economic crisis that is affecting large number of people throughout the world. Karl Marx is not only the principal socialist thinker of the last two centuries, but also one of the intellectual giants of all times. It was Marx who inspired the many left-wing socialist or communist revolutions that had changed the political landscape of the 20th century. Marx is also considered one of the fathers of democratic socialism that since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union is now the principle form of socialism throughout the world.

2) What is the importance of his life for his theory? Marx believed that human beings make their history but they make it under given circumstances. To understand Marxism the story of Marx's life too is very important. He was born a Jew and early in life understood the meaning of belonging to an ethnic minority; his father had to change his religion. He came to know about the plight of the proletariat during his stay in Paris, his journalism taught him the oppressive nature of the state. He himself experienced poverty and deprivation. In his search for a communist society, his own life and background played a very important role. Most of his life, he was an exile who understood the plight of contemporary proletariat, whose liberation was his life's mission.

3) What are some of the important works of Marx Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts The Holy Family The German Ideology Theses on Feuerbach The Communist Manifesto The Grundrisse Theories of Surplus Value The Capital, Vols. I,II,III Critique of Gotha Programme, etc.

Check Your Progress 2

1. What are the historical and academic factors that contributed to Marx's thinking? German classical philosophy French socialism British economics

2. Who were the left wing Hegelians and what was their philosophy? Young Hegelians were a group of radical left wing thinkers which included David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach and others who were critical of Christianity and the autocratic government of the time. Marx himself was a member of this group in his university days. They believed in the power of critique to change the situation, Marx gradually moved away from the group asserting that 'so far philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is to change it'. His criticism of the young Hegelians can be seen n the Holy Family, The German Ideology and the Theses on Feuerbach.

3. Describe the characteristics of socialism. Socialism is a social, economic and Political system that stresses the needs of the community rather than of the individual. The system stresses collaboration against competition, sociability against individual self-sufficiency. It advocates social control on the accumulation and use of private property. Louis Blanqui, Fourier, Robert Owen etc., advocated different versions of socialism. Marx realized that there was a need for a radical critique of the existing socialist ideas and means to bring about real socialism. Marxian socialism emerged as a critique and a revolutionary transformation of the different schools of socialist thought and the political emancipation movements.

4. Describe the characteristics of Capitalism Capitalism is an economic theory which stresses that the means of production should be owned by private individuals. It is a system which believes that private ownership and free enterprise will lead to more efficiency, lower prices, and better products. Capitalists hold that enlightened self-interest and competition in the free market would benefit society as a whole by keeping prices low, while providing incentive for the production of a wide variety of goods and services. Capitalism advocates the division of labour, free market, and competition. Modern capitalism had created unprecedented wealth. However the system makes the workers, the real producers of wealth alienated and poor.

Check Your Progress 3

1. What is historical materialism? Historical materialism is the interpretation of history from the perspective of the working class who are the real creators of history according to Marx. Marx sees history as a dialectical process through which different forms of societies come in to existence and get transformed. The process of development and change is as follows. Human beings have needs and to satisfy these needs they enter into production. The manner men and women produce their means of existence is the mode of production. In the course of time, the mode of production becomes ossified into traditions and is handed down. It is this dynamic relationship to nature that Marx meant by the term productive forces. Human beings do not produce as isolated individuals but as members of a community. The relationship within which is determined to a great extent by the mode of production. This economic structure constitutes the base structure of the society on which superstructures like law, religion, and morality are built to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. Within the economic structure itself the productive forces enjoy priority over relations of production. What triggers social change is the maturing of the contradictions within the economic structures: (I) conflict between new needs and old mode of production; (ii) conflict between the terms in relations of production; (iii) conflict between base and superstructure and (vi) conflict between

superstructures. Human beings themselves are the most important agents of change, human beings who are aware of the conflicts and interests can change the course of history.

2. Describe class struggle and its implications. In the Manifesto Marx says that history hitherto has been a history of class struggle. A class is a group of persons who stand in the same relation to property or to nonproperty, to the factors of production such as labour power and means of production. With the development of capitalism, the class struggle takes an acute form. Two basic classes oppose each other in the capitalist system: the owners of the means of production, or the capitalists, and the workers. When the workers have become aware of their loss, of their alienation, the inhuman situation in which they live and work, it will be possible for them to work for a radical transformation of the situation by a revolution. This revolution will be the prelude to the establishment of communism.

Check Your Progress 4

1. What is alienation? Alienation is a feeling and a belief that one is an alien to the society in which one finds himself or herself. For, alienation was rooted in human labour and the material world. That is, it is not an individual problem or state of mind, but is an objective, observable feature of the manner in which human labour is organized. Marx developed his theory of alienation to reveal the human activity that lies behind the seemingly impersonal forces dominating society. Alienation meant loss of control, specifically the loss of control over worker's labour power.

2. Describe the different aspects of economic alienation Marx considers human labour as one of the chief ways in which humans are distinguished from non-human animals. While labour is much more productive in capitalism than in earlier economic systems, capitalism thwarts, distorts, and limits human potential. There are four aspects to the

alienated labour. The worker is alienated: from products of one's own labour, from the process of production, from species and from other persons. The division of labour, wage labour and private property are expressions of alienation. In order to end alienation, it is necessary to abolish private property and wage labour. Marx believed that through a class struggle that would culminate in a revolution which leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, private property would be abolished and by implication, alienation. 3. What are the characteristics of communist society? The aim of Marxism is to bring about a classless society, a communist society free of alienation. The dictatorship of the proletariat and the nascent socialist society will be characterized by factors such as, the absence of private property the absence of division of labour the universalization of education the planned economy and the rational and just allocation of the resources of the society As socialism develops and alienation disappears one could expect the "withering away of the state" and creation of a society where the norm is "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need." The Communist society will be "An association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Manifesto

UNIT 2: BASIC THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY (NON-MARXIST)

STRUCTURE

2.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know about the Normative Approach
- To discuss the Institutional Approach
- To discuss the Behavioural Approach

1. To understand normative approach to political theory. 2. To comprehend institutional approach to political theory. 3. To grasp the major arguments of behavioural approach in relation with political theory.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the study of Social Sciences the approaches are extremely important because they help us in identifying the problems for our study and deciding on the appropriate data to be used. A care must however, be taken to differentiate between an approach and method, another term which is frequently used by the social scientists. It must be made clear that the two terms are not synonyms. Method can be defined as a particular manner or technique to carry out something. It suggests a

systematic course of action that helps procure trustworthy body of knowledge about a particular issue or phenomenon and draw conclusions thereon. There are quite a few methods that are applied in the study of social sciences such as deductive method, inductive method, comparative method, scientific method and so on. An approach, in contrast, is a broader term that takes hold of the method i.e. how to study or inquire along with bringing into focus the relevant data i.e. what to study for the purpose of understanding the particular phenomenon.

In the words of Vernon Van Dyke: "An approach consists of criteria of selection—criteria employed in selecting the problems or questions to consider and in selecting the data to bring to bear; it consists of standards governing the inclusion and exclusion of questions and data." Furthermore, distinguishing between a method and an approach Dyke indicates: "In brief, approaches consist of criteria for selecting problems and relevant data, whereas methods are procedures for getting and utilizing data." It must also be added that an approach brings along its method too. This cannot be always true about a method because a method is not usually committed to a particular approach. In other words an approach suggests its own method while the vice versa is not true. For instance, behavioural approach is linked to scientific method and normative approach has association with philosophical method.

In the classical approach to administration, Weberian model of bureaucracy finds a central place. Max Weber is the first thinker who has systematically studied the bureaucracy. He has provided a theoretical framework and basis for understanding bureaucracy. Max Weber's analysis influenced many modern writers on bureaucracy. Weber, apart from bureaucracy, wrote on various aspects of the society ranging from history, religion to legitimacy and domination. Weber was founder of modern sociology and a greatest scholar among the pioneers of administrative thought. He was one of the towering thinkers of the twentieth century. The Weberian ideal type bureaucracy continues to be the dominant paradigm in the public administration.

Max Weber (1864-1920) was born in western Germany. He studied law at the university of Heidelberg. He joined University of Berlin as an instructor in law. He wrote a number of papers on law, and social,

political and economic factors prevalent during that time. His major writings were, 'The Theory of Economic and Social Organisations', 'General Economic History', 'Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism' (1904). He studied law and economics and he became a specialist in the interpretation of religious doctrines and he was a notable biblical scholar. He had a thorough grasp of ancient Roman administration, medieval trading companies and the modern stock exchange. He became a specialist in comparative history of urban institutions. He also made a special study of social and psychological conditions of productivity in a West German textile mill. He studied methodology of social studies. Weber always preferred knowledge obtained through practical experience than library research. His writings reflect the social conditions of Germany of his time. He saw the decline of liberalism and threat to individual in the bureaucratisation of the society. Unification of Germany under Bismarck and elimination of liberal middle class movement convinced Weber that the great goal could be achieved through power policies. (Prasad. et.al. p.77).

Scientific management and theory of bureaucracy mark the first major developments in the theory of organisation. These theories were responding to the needs of industrial organisations. Theory of bureaucracy was needed to bring the efficiency in its functioning. As stated by Weber 'no special proof is necessary to show that military discipline is ideal model for the modern capitalist factory. (Clegg and Dunkerley, p.75). The example of most developed form of organisation, bureaucracy, the theory of which Weber found, is developed from the Prussian military forces, and which enterprises such as the British Railway Companies actually found in the ranks of the British Army, was to become the specific form of management of big business. Weber felt that emergence of modern bureaucratic organisation is 'demanded', he further says 'a peculiarity of modern culture', and specific of its technical and economic basis, demands the very 'calculability of results' (Clegg and Dunkerley, p.81). More specifically 'today it is primarily the capitalist market economy which demands the official business of the administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed as possible' (Clegg and Dunkerley, p.80.)

Bureaucratisation offers above all, optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specialising administration functioning according to purely objective considerations. (Clegg and Dunkerley, p.80). Above lines show that the Weber's theory of bureaucracy was a response to the demands of industrial capitalist economy, which required an efficient administration. While Taylor attempted to rationalise functions of modern factory, Weber made an attempt at the rationalisation of bureaucratic structures. Both of them emphasised on control and discipline in the working of organisations.

Weber never defined bureaucracy. He only described it as "an administrative body of appointed officials". (Prasad. et. al. p.80). He also described its characteristics. Bureaucracy includes explicitly appointed officials only leaving out the elected ones. Weber wrote a great deal about the place of the official in a modern society. For him, it has an increasingly important type of social role. As in the case of authority, Weber categorised bureaucracy in to (1) patrimonial bureaucracy found in traditional and charismatic authorities and (2) legal-rational bureaucracy found only in the legal type of authority. Weber identified certain features of legal-rational bureaucracy.

Features of Legal-Rational Bureaucracy

The model of legal-rational bureaucracy described by Weber has the following features: (1) Official business is conducted on a continuous, regulated basis, (2) An administrative agency functions in accordance with stipulated rules and is characterised by three interrelated attributes; (a) the powers and functions of each official is defined in terms of impersonal criteria, (b) the official is given matching authority to carry out his responsibility and (c) the means of compulsion at his disposal are strictly limited and the conditions under which their employment is legitimate are clearly defined, (3) Every official and every office is part of the hierarchy of authority. Higher officials or offices perform supervision and the lower officers and officials have the right to appeal, (4) Officials do not own the resources necessary for rendering the duties, but they are accountable for use of official resources. Official business and private affairs, official revenue and private income are strictly

separated, (5) Offices can not be appropriated by the incumbents as private property, and (6) Administration is conducted on the basis of written documents. (Prasad. et. al. p.81)

Features of Officials

Weber also discussed in detail, as a part of his model of bureaucracy, the features of officials. They are: (1) the staff members are personally free, observing only the impersonal duties of their offices, (2) they are appointed to an official position on the basis of the contract, (3) an official exercises authority delegated to him in accordance with impersonal rules, and his loyalty is expressed through faithful execution of his official duties, (4) his appointment and job placements depend upon his professional qualifications, (5) his administrative work is full time occupation, (6) his work is rewarded by regular salary and by prospects of career advancement, (7) there is a clear cut hierarchy of officials, and (8) he is subjected to a unified control and disciplinary system.

When we closely observe the above-mentioned features of bureaucracy we can identify certain important elements of Weberian model of bureaucracy. They are: 1. Impersonal Order 2. Rules 3. Sphere of Competence 4. Hierarchy 5. Separation of Personal and Public Ends 6. Written Documents 7. Monocratic Type.

Impersonal Order Weber emphasised that the official should perform their duties in an impersonal manner. The subordinates should follow both in the issuance of command and their obedience impersonal order. According to Merton, “authority, the power of control which derives from an acknowledged status, inheres in the office, not in the particular person who performs the official role”. (Prasad. et. al. p.82). It talks about the de-personalisation of relationship in the organisations.

Rules Rules are the basis for the functioning of the legal-rational authority. Officials are bound by the rules. The rules regulate the conduct of an office. Their rational application requires specialised training. In this regard Merton felt that adherence to rules originally conceived as a means, becomes an end in itself. Rules become more important than the goals of the organisation.

Sphere of Competence It involves a sphere of obligation to perform functions, which have been marked off as a part of a systematic division of labour. It also implies provision of the incumbent with the necessary authority to carry out the functions.

Hierarchy According to Weber every office and every official is a part of a hierarchy. Under this system the lower office functions under the control of higher office. He attaches greater importance to the principle of hierarchy in the organisation of office.

Separation of Personal and Public Ends Weber pleads for separation of officials from their ownership of the means of administration. Officials cannot use his office position for personal ends. The office property is separated from personal property; at the same time the official is accountable for the use of office property.

Written Documents Written documents are the heart of Weberian bureaucracy. All administrative acts, decisions and rules are recorded in writing. These documents make the administration accountable to the people and provide a ready reference for future action.

Monocratic Type It means certain functions performed by bureaucracy cannot be performed by any other organisation. They monopolise certain functions and only the authorised official can perform that function, makes them monocratic in nature.

For all types of authority, Weber wrote “the fact of the existence and continuing functioning of an administrative staff is vital. It is indeed, the existence of such activity which is usually meant by the term organisation”. (Bertram Gross, p.139). Weber considered pure or monocratic bureaucracy is the most rational form of administrative staff. He further felt that “it is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of discipline and in its reliability. It thus, makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of organisations and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of applications to all kinds of administrative tasks”. (Bertram Gross, p.139). For bureaucratic administration is, other things being equal, always, from a formal technical point of view, the most rational type. According to Weber “for

the needs of mass administration today, it is (bureaucracy) completely indispensable. The choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration". (Bertram Gross, p.140). Thus Weber believed that rational bureaucracy is technically superior and capable of attaining high degree of efficiency.

2.2 NORMATIVE APPROACH

Normative approach poses questions based on 'norms' or 'standards' in the study of social sciences with an aim to appraise values. Unlike the empirical approach that is concerned about 'what happened and why' the normative approach emphasises 'what should have happened'. It must, nonetheless, be underlined that these assumptions are not always valid because at times the two approaches might overlap. Occasionally, the normative approach may be based on empirical postulations to elicit how or what a particular situation should be or what the state of affairs in a country should have been. In addition to empirical assumptions, the normative approach also comprises the social value system or moral standards widely endorsed in a particular society on which it sets up its edifice of questions. For instance, if the issue of war is the major theme of inquiry, the normative approach may seek help from the empirical assumptions to explain the causes of war or the prospects of peace along with the basic normative question whether war as a means of resolving international disputes is justified or not. The normative approach highlights its inclination towards a specific arrangement of things or an order that emanates from a commitment to a moral duty or universal necessity. The undercurrent of the normative approach includes questions about the nature of man. Is the nature of man good, bad or a combination of both? Whether man is a rational being or irrationality overrides his actions? Is gender equality an absolute value or there exist basic gender differences that need consideration? These are some of the fundamental posers that influence the normative approach. Moreover, normative approach takes into account the views of history in the process of inquiry or drawing of conclusions in relation with a social phenomenon. For instance, a study based on the linear view of history usually assumes that the world is marching 9 towards a better and positive future. An entropic

view of history, on the other hand, presupposes that the world is constantly in the process of regression. A cyclic view of history assumes that nothing of substantive significance ever changes except persons at the top and the ways through which these persons get to the top. There are certain areas of social sciences that presuppose the normative approach in their analyses. For instance political philosophies or theories of political idealism cannot be comprehended without getting to know the norms or ethical standards of the philosophers concerned or the ideologues of the theories. It is pertinent to explain that normative statements are usually beyond empirical testing. They cannot be identified, explained or verified by our intellect faculty alone. At the most one can appreciate or deride the underlying norm or point of view of the philosopher or the ideologue. Take for instance the concept of justice. There are various theories, from Plato to Amartya Sen that make attempts to explain what justice is. For some justice is ‘treating equals equally and 'unequals' unequally’ or ‘justice is giving equal freedom and equal opportunity to all provided any departure from equal distribution will prove beneficial to the least advantaged’. These assumptions indicate different sets of value judgments of the philosophers concerned based on their moral principles but they fail the empirical tests of observation or verification. Quite often normative statements on a specific phenomenon not only differ from each other but they sometimes contradict each other. It is not, however, possible to use valueterms such as right or wrong in the evaluation of normative assumptions because they stand beyond the purview of empirical or scientific methodologies. They are true or false only in relation to the value systems they are embedded in. The recent advances in social sciences and even in exact sciences indicate that there cannot be an absolute truth in the field of social sciences or scientific principles as well. Quite a few scientific theories are true so long as they are repudiated by new theories. The most acceptable academic stance is that no theory or principle can be treated as the repository of absolute truth because the so-called scientific assumptions are also likely to be proved wrong. There are certain other assumptions, which are essentially normative but can also be proved valid empirically. Consider a statement like, ‘corruption ought to end in

order to make the functioning of the government transparent and pro-people.' This kind of statement, despite being a normative assumption, satisfies the empirical testing as well because on the basis of verifiable data about the working of governments across the world it can be proved that a political system having minimum corruption has a government that is adequately transparent and committed to the welfare of the people. The empirical data shows that the opposite is 10 true in case of widespread corruption in a political system. A normative approach underscores the probable course of action that may uphold an innate value, the primacy of which is an end in itself. For instance, if a normative statement establishes the preeminence of values such as truth, good or beautiful or any one of them, it has served its purpose. The most common criticism against the normative approach is that it is subjective whereas the empirical approach is objective. In view of a scholar, the studies based on normative approach, like political philosophy, reveal the fondness of the philosopher concerned about a value or a few values. A scholar may accept or reject the fondness of the philosopher for that set of values. There cannot, however, be a rational argument in the matter. This is, however, an extreme view. There are other experts who believe that a reasonably rewarding dialogue is possible between the adherents of normative and empirical schools. They point out that concepts such as freedom, equality and justice necessitate a dialogue between normative and empirical approaches. Another characteristic of the normative approach is that it is prescriptive whereas an empirical approach is descriptive. To put it plainly, the normative approach essentially concentrates on the conditions and standards that are created by human beings and that are likely to change depending on social requirements. An adherent of the normative approach can determine their moral validity and then suggest the right course of action. For instance, theories pertaining to the forms of government are likely to undergo changes with the changes in social conditions. Additionally, the moral value like legitimacy that justifies a particular form of government may possibly remain a constant but the forces lending legitimacy to the form of government might change. In the ancient and mediaeval times it was divinity, power or heredity that provides legitimacy to the form of

government; currently, people's support is the most acceptable criterion for the legitimacy of a government. It is true that at times normative approach vindicates the socio-political or religious bias of its adherent. For instance the prominent political philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle justified the institution of slavery on account of disparities between the intrinsic capabilities and natures of a slave and a freeman. Similar prejudices also prevailed in the matter of suppression of the position of woman. Their assumptions were obviously not based on empirical studies but emanated from the value system of those times. The advancements in the fields of social and biological sciences have now established that the assumptions of Plato and Aristotle were unfounded. Another criticism that is usually directed towards normative approach is that it fails to provide a reasonable criterion to determine what is wrong or what is right. It is a valid criticism and supporters of normative approach admit this shortcoming. They, however, point out that the empirical approach is a lopsided one because it disregards values and its adherents are not capable to distinguish between higher and lower values. The normative approach is, therefore, a very valuable approach particularly in social sciences. An argument in favour of normative approach does not necessarily mean refutation of the empirical approach. In fact, there is a need to recognise the validity and significance of various approaches in the study of social sciences.

Check Your Progress 1

1. How far normative approach helps in the comprehension of political theory?

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2. Critically examine normative approach to political theory.

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2.3 INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

As the name suggests, a thorough investigation of political institutions in order to study the discipline of political science is called the institutional approach. The approach is almost as old as the discipline of politics and most political scientists since the times of Aristotle have defined and restricted the scope of the discipline only to the study of state and government. In this respect a particular feature of the approach is that it does not usually make use of other social sciences such as philosophy, history, or law to analyse political phenomena. It, therefore, assigns an independent individuality to the organized inquiry of political science. Institutional approach allocates the fundamental status to the institution of state in the study of politics and its agency, the government along with its various organs such as legislature, executive, judiciary and bureaucracy are also identified for close scrutiny as important political institutions. There are also many other institutions such as political parties, trade unions, nongovernmental organisations, educational institutions, religious and cultural organisations etc. which may interest a scholar who is employing institutional approach if they directly or indirectly have some bearing on political processes. In this context it is necessary to know what an institution really is. An institution, by and large, can be defined as an established or organised society, an organisation, 12 corporation or an establishment especially of a public nature or whose working affects a community. An institution may be a foundation, a charitable institution, a sports club or a literary body. In the words of Vernon Van Dyke: “An institution is any persistent system of activities and expectations, or any stable pattern of group behaviour.” A typical feature of an institution is its offices, agencies and the personnel associated with it are arranged in hierarchy that means each office, agency or personal attached to it is assigned specific powers and functions. It also implies that the people or the community that are likely to be affected by the working of an institution expect that its offices, agencies or personnel should function in accordance with the respective powers and functions assigned to them. If we particularly look for the definition of a political institution then we get to know that a political institution is an organisation that creates, enforces and makes governmental policies pertaining to economy and social system. It also

provides for people's representation. The examples of such political institution include government and its various organs, political parties, trade unions and the courts. The term political institution may also denote the recognised structure of rules and principles within which it operates. Thus, institutional approach in the study of political science implies a detailed study of the government, its structures, and the body of rules within which it is required to operate and also a thorough examination of its various organs. Besides, the study of political parties, their structures, ideologies and functioning that have linkages with political processes forms a significant segment of institutional approach. Similar studies of other political institutions such as trade unions and civil society institutions are also part of the institutional approach. Aristotle who is also considered the father of traditional school of politics was the first who classified the governments as per the numerical strength of the rulers and the qualitative worth of their governance. Accordingly, he identified forms of governments as monarchy, aristocracy and polity applying the numerical as well as better governance criteria; also as tyranny, oligarchy and democracy using numerical as well as erosion of legitimacy of governance criteria. Though Aristotle's classification is no more valid, its study is imperative to comprehend the historical background of political theory. The modern classification of governments such as democracy or dictatorship, parliamentary or presidential and unitary or federal is not the sudden growth of our times. These forms of government owe a lot to archetypal kinds of government that had emerged in ancient Greece, Rome and some other ancient societies. The institutional approach includes the study of all forms of governments. Additionally the institutional approach also emphasises on the inquiry of levels of government 13 which means whether the levels of governance pertain to federal, state or local institutions. The approach also prescribes the analysis of the powers and functioning of the organs of government such as legislature, executive and judiciary. The institutional approach is more or less value-free in the sense that it is mainly concerned with the consideration of facts in relation to political institutions. This is a feature that is usually ascribed to a modern approach. In this respect, despite being a traditional

approach, the institutional approach not only radically differs from the normative and historical approaches but appears more like a modern approach. Nevertheless, political scientists refrain from including it in the category of modern approaches because it is exceedingly concerned about description rather than analysis of political phenomena. The experts have also enlisted some other shortcomings of this approach. They are as under: i) It is exclusively focused on political institutions. As a result, the individual, the primary actor in political process has been totally discounted in the institutional approach. It led to a situation that the study of voting behaviour and political preferences of an individual was ignored by those political scientists who advocated institutional approach in the study of politics; ii) in the area of international politics the adherents of institutional approach restrict their studies only to the investigation of international political institutions such as the United Nations and its allied agencies and completely ignore the subject-matter of international politics such as foreign policy, diplomacy, international law and so on; iii) since it is concerned with the study of only established political institutions, it totally ignores the consideration of other phenomena like violence, political movements and agitations, wars, revolution and the scourge of our times, terrorism, which certainly influence politics; iv) finally, it also overlooks the position and influence of informal groups that have an effect on the politics of almost all states. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that institutional approach is very significant because political institutions constitute the core segment of the scope of political science. It is unimaginable to ignore the study of political institutions in any meaningful inquiry of political phenomena. It should also be made clear that no single approach is adequate in itself for the study of any social science. It is true about institutional approach as well. It is only the combination of a few significant approaches that helps in a dispassionate study of political science and institutional is certainly one of the significant approaches.

Check Your Progress 2

1. Bring out the significance of institutional approach in the study of political theory.

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2. Critically discuss the institutional approach to political theory.

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2.4 BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH

Behaviouralism is one of the most significant modern approaches to the study of political science. A modern approach differs from a traditional one in precisely two ways: First, a modern approach is concerned mainly about establishing a separate identity of political science by emphasizing on the factual character of politics. Two, a modern approach makes an attempt to study politics in entirety, which means it pays little attention to the formal aspects of the discipline and brings into focus such other aspects that influence and also get influenced in the political processes. Behaviouralism is an approach in political science which seeks to provide an objective, quantified approach to explaining and predicting political behaviour. Its emergence in politics coincides with the rise of the behavioural social sciences that were given shape after the natural sciences. Behaviouralism is mainly concerned to examine the behaviour, actions, and acts of individuals rather than the characteristics of institutions such as legislatures, executives, and judiciaries. Behaviouralism underscores the systematic inquiry of all exclusive expression of political behaviour. Some scholars insist that behaviouralism implies the application of meticulous scientific and statistical methods in order to standardise means of investigation. It is also an exercise in ensuring a value-free study of the discipline of politics. it is usually argued that by the adherents of behavioural approach that political science should be studied in manner similar to the study of natural sciences. In this context, the supporters of behavioural approach insist that the main role of a political scientist is to collect and

analyse factual data in an objective manner. The major point of criticism against the traditional approaches has been that they have been deficient in applying scientific methods to the study of politics that has rendered its very claim to be a science at all. Therefore, the behaviouralists recommended the application of exacting methodology and empirical studies to make the discipline of political science a true social science. The behavioural approach has without doubt given 15 a totally ground-breaking purpose to the study of politics by taking it towards an inquiry based on research-supported verifiable data. The behaviouralists have challenged the realist and liberal approaches by labeling them traditional as they fail to substantiate their conclusion with verifiable facts. In order to understand political behaviour of individual the supporters of behavioural approach prescribe the methods like sampling, interviewing, scoring, scaling and statistical analysis. The behavioural approach came to be exceedingly favoured in the study of political science after the World War II. Nonetheless, it originated with the publication in 1908 of the works of two political scientists, Graham Wallas (Human Nature in Politics) and Arthur Bentley (The Process of Government). Both these political scientists preferred to underscored the informal political processes and diminished the significance of the study of political institutions in isolation. Wallas, moved by the new findings of modern psychology, strived to introduce similar realism in the study of political science. The major breakthrough provided by modern psychology was that an individual, after all, was not that much a rational being as the traditional political scientists and classical economists had tried to make him out. Consequently, he emphasised that, more often than not, an individual's political action were not given direction by rationality and self-interest. Wallas pointed out that human nature was a complex phenomenon and for an objective understanding of human nature suggested gathering and analysis of factual data of human behaviour. The other political scientist, Bentley was credited for inventing 'group approach' in the study of politics. He also prescribed that there should be a shift from description of political activity to the application of new tools of investigation. Bentley had sought greater inspiration from modern sociology that made him emphasise the role of the informal

groups such as pressure groups, elections and political opinion in political processes. Another significant political scientist who made valuable contribution to behavioural approach was Charles E Merriam, known as the founder of Chicago School. His objection to the traditional approaches to politics was the usual one i.e. they suffer from the absence of thorough scientific inquiry. He was also critical of the works of those historians who did not take into account the role of psychological, sociological and economic aspects of human existence. He vociferously advocated an inter-disciplinary approach to the study of political science, which would endow the discipline with a true scientific character. He favoured the use of quantitative techniques in the study of politics and encouraged political scientists to treat political behaviour as the cardinal issue in the studies. Since he was a resolute admirer of democracy, he strived to employ science to disseminate the message of democracy. He did not see any inconsistency to advance the cause of a specific form of government through an approach to politics. It was William B Munro, another supporter of modern approach who made it plain that it was improper for political science to encourage the spread of any specific form of government, democracy or otherwise. One more proponent of behavioural approach, G E G Catlin spoke of making politics a value-free social science in his notable work, Science and Method of Politics, published in 1927. For Catlin, the essence of politics is to be located in 'power' and in this respect he cautioned that in the analysis of power, no particular value-system should be taken into account. Catlin's idea that politics was essentially the study of power was later turned into a comprehensive study by Harold D Lasswell in the renowned work Politics: Who Gets What, When, How that came out in 1936. It is considered as one of the most meticulous studies of power. These were the most important attempts to transform politics into a scientific discipline prior to World War II. In the post-War period quite a few American political scientists such as David B Truman, Robert Dahl, Evron M Kirkpatrich, Heinz Eulau et al made outstanding contributions to behaviouralism that elaborated and expanded the extent of behavioural approach beyond the analysis of political behaviour. Therefore, it is pertinent to quote here the contemporary definition of behavioural

approach as provided by Geoffrey K Roberts in A Dictionary of Political Analysis, published in 1971: “Political behaviour, as an area of study within political science, is concerned with those aspects of human behaviour that take place within a state or other political community, for political purposes or with political motivation. Its focus is the individual person- as voter, leader, revolutionary, party member, opinion leader etc. rather than the group or the political system, but it necessarily takes account of the influences of the group on the individual’s behaviour, the constraints of the system on the individual’s opportunities for action, and the effects of the political culture on his attitude and political habits.” In view of this definition the political scientists who subscribe to behavioural approach investigate the psychological and sociological bearings on the behaviour of the individual in a political situation. Such an approach makes it imperative to make investigation of certain processes and political aspects such as political socialisation, political ideologies, political culture, political participation, political communication, leadership, decision making and also political violence. It goes without saying that the study of most of these processes demands an inter-disciplinary or multidisciplinary approach. Thus, in the post-War scenario behavioural approach went beyond the confines of the research of individualcentric political behaviour. In the contemporary sense it is identified with an array of points of reference, procedures and methods of 17 analysis. It was David Easton who set forth eight ‘intellectual foundation-stones’ of behavioural approach. They are:

1. Regularities: It refers to identifiable similarities in political behaviour which help generalisation and explanation of regularities in political theory.

2. Commitment to Verification: It necessitates that the soundness of theoretical statements must be subjected to verification tests with reference to relevant political behaviour.

3. Techniques: It calls for experimental attitude in matter of electing techniques. In other words political behaviour must be observed, recorded and then analysed.

4. Quantification: In order to make a precise expression of conclusions based on collected data it is necessary to quantify the recording of data wherever possible.

5. Values: The behavioural approach demands a clear distinction between ethical assessment and empirical explanations. The behaviouralists insist on this separation to make political inquiry as far as possible value-free or value-neutral.

6. Systemisation: It draws attention to establishing linkages between theory and research because research data without the support of theory is likely to become inconsequential while theory in the absence of verifiable data may become an exercise in futility.

7. Pure Science: It recommends postponing the attempts to convert politics into a pure science for the purpose of making it an applied science. It is necessary because on account of the study of political behaviour we can use the knowledge of politics to find practical solutions to the pressing problems of a polity.

8. Integration: It suggests integration of social sciences with their respective values in order to develop an all-inclusive outlook of human affairs. David Easton made attempts to make behavioural approach "analytic, not substantive, general rather than particular, and explanatory rather than ethical." In other words his intent was to make political theory capable of making evaluation of political behaviour without involving any ethical issue. It is often described as an exercise to distinguish between facts and values. Behaviouralism has been criticized by both conservative and radical political scientists for its so-called attempt to make the discipline value-free. For the conservative the

behavioural approach is a serious threat to the possibility of political philosophy.

According to Christian Bay, behaviouralism was nothing but a pseudo-political science because it did not represent 'genuine' political research. His major point of criticism was that behavioural approach attached too much importance to empiricism and overlooked normative and ethical examination of political science. The radical critics point out that it is not possible to study political science by separating of facts from values. Nonetheless, it must be stated that behavioural approach did provide a great deal of reliability to political inquiry in comparison with political generalisation. It has made it possible to make available dependable answers to political question by using systematic methods. In the opinion of Vernon Van Dyke: "The student who takes a behavioural approach is not likely to ask broad and vague questions like what caused the decline and fall of the Roman Empire…Nor is he likely to focus on ideologies and constitutions or law or upon the organizational structure of institutions." Behavioural approach accordingly is concerned more about micro-level political situations and shuns political generalisations.

Check Your Progress 3

1. How far behavioural approach helps in the study of political theory?

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2. Make a critical assessment of behavioural approach to political theory.

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2.5 LET US SUM UP

In the study of Social Sciences the approaches are extremely important because they help us in identifying the problems for our study and deciding on the appropriate data to be used. An approach is a broader term that takes hold of the method i.e. how to study or inquire along with

bringing into focus the relevant data i.e. what to study for the purpose of understanding the particular phenomenon. There are quite a few approaches that are employed in the study of political science. Normative approach poses questions based on 'norms' or 'standards' in the study of social sciences with an aim to appraise values. Unlike the empirical approach that is concerned about 'what 19 happened and why' the normative approach emphasises 'what should have happened'. As the name suggests, a thorough investigation of political institutions in order to study the discipline of political science is called the institutional approach. The approach is almost as old as the discipline of politics and most political scientists since the times of Aristotle have defined and restricted the scope of the discipline only to the study of state and government. In this respect a particular feature of the approach is that it does not usually make use of other social sciences such as philosophy, history, or law to analyse political phenomena. It, therefore, assigns an independent individuality to the organized inquiry of political science. Behaviouralism is an approach in political science which seeks to provide an objective, quantified approach to explaining and predicting political behaviour. Its emergence in politics coincides with the rise of the behavioural social sciences that were given shape after the natural sciences. Behaviouralism is mainly concerned to examine the behaviour, actions, and acts of individuals rather than the characteristics of institutions such as legislatures, executives, and judiciaries. Behaviouralism underscores the systematic inquiry of all exclusive expression of political behaviour. Some scholars insist that behaviouralism implies the application of meticulous scientific.

Weber while emphasising on the necessity of bureaucracy was aware of the fact that, the bureaucracy has inherent tendency of accumulation of power. The sources of this power could be seen in the special knowledge, which the official poses. In the course of his duties he acquired a great deal of concrete information much of it artificially restricted by ideas of confidentiality and secrecy. Nevertheless he was convinced that bureaucratisation was inevitable and that bureaucrats gained power. Weber resisted any identification of bureaucracy with rule by officials. In order to prevent the bureaucracy from acquiring powers Weber suggested

certain mechanism for limiting the scope of systems of authority in general and bureaucracy in particular. These mechanisms fall in to five major categories. The categories are: (1) collegiality, (2) separation of powers, (3)

2.6 KEY WORDS

Behaviouralism: Behaviouralism is an approach in political science that emerged in the 1930s in the United States. It represented a sharp break from previous approaches in emphasizing an objective, quantified approach to explain and predict political behavior.

2.7 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. How do you know about the Normative Approach?
2. Discuss the Institutional Approach.
3. Discuss the Behavioural Approach.
4. Bring out the significance of approaches in the study of political theory.
5. Discuss the importance of 'normative approach' in the study of politics.
6. Explain the impact of 'institutional approach' in the study of political theory.
7. Elucidate the features of behavioural approach and underscore its significance in the study of politics.

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2.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 2.2
2. See Section 2.3
3. See Section 2.4

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 2.5
2. See Section 2.6

Check Your Progress 3

1. See Section 2.7
2. See Section 2.8

UNIT 3: THE IDEA OF DISCOURSE IN POST-MARXIST AND CULTURAL STUDIES

STRUCTURE

3.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know the Discourse of Post-Marxism
- To know the Text of Cultural Studies
- To know the Problem with the Text
- To discuss the Institutional Articulation and Dissemination of Texts and Discourses
- To discuss Stuart Hall's Closure versus Post-Marxist Discourse.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Post-Marxism and cultural studies both explicitly engage with and take on the question of the political, of political engagement, and of ethical, political and university responsibility. Both are interested in intervention. But their relationship is far from simple, and the intellectual and political

costs of ignoring its complexity are high. This chapter will explain why. First, let us examine the usual view. In this, the importance of post-Marxist political theory for cultural studies is regularly affirmed (Morley and Chen 1996: 1–2; Hall 1996c: 40; Sparks 1996: 90–5; Daryl Slack 1996: 117–22). Rarely has anything like the reverse been suggested. However, the need for just such a revaluation, or inversion and subsequent displacement of this schema is great. The usual interpretation of the relationship between cultural studies and post-Marxism is regularly conveyed in works of or about cultural studies (it is rarely mentioned or acknowledged within post-Marxist scholarship), and it has several often problematic but nonetheless important dimensions. Jeremy Gilbert clarifies these, by noting firstly that: During the 1990s a number of essays by key figures speculated as to the desirability of explicitly designating 'post-Marxism' as a theoretical paradigm for 'cultural studies'. It might well be argued that this was always an unnecessary move, that both the de facto post-Marxism of Stuart Hall, along with all of those for whom 'cultural studies' only ever came into existence as a critique of Marxist economism, and the (closely-related) official 'post-Marxism' of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe had been so thoroughly absorbed by the mainstream of cultural studies that there was little point in bothering to formulate this position in any more explicit or elaborate fashion. (Gilbert 2001: 189) Gilbert acknowledges the historical, intellectual and political scope of the influence of Marxist theory for ('new') left wing political thinking in general, and cultural studies in particular. The implicit impetus to and logic of the constitution of both cultural studies and post-Marxism in this account is that they both come as a response to perceived problems in Marxist economic reductionism and Althusserian structuralism. According to Jennifer Daryl Slack, both cultural studies and post-Marxism amounted to the 'struggle to substitute the reduction that didn't work' – namely Marxist economic reductionism and structuralist theory's reductionism – 'with . . . something'. The problem with theories saturated in economic or structuralist determinism is that they are fatalistic or even anti-political in that they determine in advance that individuals, groups, agents, and indeed culture and politics in their entirety are epiphenomenal and inconsequential. This, says Daryl

Slack, pointed to the need to retheorize processes of determination. The work of cultural theorists in the 1970s and early 1980s, especially the work of Stuart Hall, opened up that space by drawing attention to what reductionist conceptions rendered inexplicable. It is as though a theoretical lacuna develops, a space struggling to be filled . . . In theorizing this space, a number of Marxist theorists are drawn on: most notably Althusser (who drew on Gramsci and Marx), Gramsci (who drew on Marx) and, of course, Marx. Its principal architects have been Laclau and Hall. (Daryl Slack 1996: 117) Daryl Slack finds it remarkable that 'in spite of the importance of Laclau's formulations, he has been excluded – as has Mouffe – from most of the popular histories of cultural studies' (Daryl Slack 1996: 120–1). This work will consider more fully this aspect of the peculiar relation of post-Marxism to cultural studies, and Daryl Slack's diagnosis of it, in the following chapter. But what is first to be emphasized here is the importance of the post-Marxist theory of Laclau and Mouffe for cultural studies. Morley and Chen, for instance, begin their 'Introduction' to Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies by reminding us that 'back in the mid-1980s, as an alternative to formalist and positivist paradigms in the humanities and social sciences, British cultural studies, and Stuart Hall's work in particular, began to make an impact across national borders, especially in the American academy' (Morley and Chen 1996: 1). Immediately after making this contextualising point, the very first point that they mention – the very first book, the very first problematic, and the very first orientating discussion within cultural studies – is Stuart Hall's discussion of Laclau and Mouffe's 'seminal book, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (a key statement of postmodern political theory)' (1). They conclude: 'When we look at it retrospectively', this engagement 'can be seen as a starting-point' (2), a constitutive cultural studies engagement with the 'postmodern' political theory of postMarxism. However, and quite problematically, Morley and Chen are prepared to deem this encounter something 'from which cultural studies moved on, through another round of configuration' (2). But Stuart Hall himself is not prepared to do this. For him, the problematic established by this encounter with post-Marxist political theory is constitutive, and hence ineradicable. Indeed, Morley

and Chen also deem Laclau and Mouffe's theory to be 'seminal', like Stuart Hall. But Hall insists on the need to maintain fidelity and reference to this 'starting-point', arguing: one cannot ignore Laclau and Mouffe's seminal work on the constitution of political subjects and their deconstruction of the notion that political subjectivities [were hitherto thought to] flow from the integrated ego, which is also the integrated speaker, the stable subject of enunciation. The discursive metaphor [central to post-Marxist theory] is thus extraordinarily rich and has massive political consequences. For instance, it allows cultural theorists to realize that what we call 'the self' is constituted out of and by difference, and remains contradictory, and that cultural forms are, similarly, in that way, never whole, never fully closed or 'sutured'. (Hall 1996d: 145) Hall even declares, 'if I had to put my finger on the one thing which constitutes the theoretical revolution of our time, I think that it lies in that metaphor' (145): the metaphor of 'discourse'. This work will keep returning to different dimensions of the possibilities, problems and problematics that 'the discursive metaphor' introduces for cultural and political studies. But at this stage what is important to note is that, for Hall, something that is seminal, generative, or constitutive – a starting-point – is not something from which one can simply move on. For Stuart Hall, then, the question of the political, of intervention and responsibility that comes to light in the cultural studies engagement or encounter with post-Marxism is not something that will – or should be permitted to – simply go away. This is why, after some qualifications and caveats, Hall maintains that he remains 'a post-Marxist and a post-structuralist, because those are the two discourses I feel most constantly engaged with. They are central to my formation and I don't believe in the endless, trendy recycling of one fashionable theorist after another, as if you can wear new theories like T-shirts' (Hall 1996d: 148–9). The problematic of post-Marxism is in fact central to cultural studies. Before delving deeper into post-Marxism 'proper' or the constitutive encounter of cultural studies with it, though, it might reasonably be asked: never mind post-Marxism, what's the problem with Marxism? Furthermore: if Marxism is or was such a problem, then why maintain any reference to it at all? As has already been seen, one prime problem with Marxism

relates to reductionism in its theory of determination. In other words, in Marxism, the determination of more or less everything is related to something 'essential' about classes and the economy, viewed as a closed system (Daly 2002). For both Hall and Laclau, among others, class essentialism and economism are unsatisfactory simplifications that cannot explain everything, and that are, accordingly, suspect. Nevertheless, their quests to re-theorise processes of determination more adequately are therefore marked by and hence retain a constitutive reference to Marxism. According to Hall, it was Laclau's rethinking of Marxism that offered a way out of Marxian dead-ends: 'Laclau', he argued, 'has demonstrated definitively the untenable nature of the proposition that classes, as such, are the subjects of fixed and ascribed class ideologies' (Hall 1996c: 40). Colin Sparks explains that 'Hall's road away from Marx lay through the writing of Laclau . . . Laclau provided a significant weakening of the rigours of the Althusserian version of Marxism ''from within'' '. The important feature here, according to Sparks, is that 'Laclau was concerned to produce a ''non-reductive'' theory of ideology and the mechanisms by which it functioned in society' (Sparks 1996: 89). So, by 'adopting the formulations of Laclau', Sparks concludes, 'it became possible' for Stuart Hall and cultural studies 'to give equal weight to each of the members of the ''holy trinity'' of race, class and gender' As post-Marxism is an explicitly political theory, it may come as a surprise to some to learn that the post-Marxist political theory of Laclau and Mouffe is perhaps more indebted to putatively literary theory, Continental philosophy, deconstruction and semiotics than to political theory 'proper'. But it was actually by applying deconstructive, literary theoretical, psychoanalytic and semiotic concepts and techniques to the analysis of the political that Laclau and Mouffe developed their self-proclaimed 'radical' version of Marxist political theory, which found its first thoroughgoing articulation in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). This work carried out a methodical historical critique and deconstruction of 'classical Marxism' (1985: 3), enabling them to claim to identify why classical Marxist theory could not predict, account for, nor adequately explain the behaviour of political struggles and socio-

political or economic classes. This failure, becoming increasingly apparent throughout the twentieth century, represented a severe challenge to both the (rhetorico-) political force and the intellectual validity and viability of Marxism; challenging its credibility as a political position and as an academically plausible paradigm. Even though many, including Robert J. C. Young, have rejected the need to call such Marxist theory post-Marxism, by arguing that 'after all, capitalism transforms itself often enough without becoming ''post-capitalism'' (and, it might be added, enough capitalist states have collapsed without it being subsequently assumed that this signals the end of capitalism)' (Young 2001: 7), nevertheless the apparent inaccuracies of Marxian predictions about the world have initiated something of a 'crisis' within Marxism itself. Its predictive and even descriptive failures ran entirely contrary to the claims that Marxism could be the objective science of history (2). So Laclau and Mouffe orientated their analysis by identifying a discrepancy between Marxism's claims about the socio-political world, on the one hand, and the 'reality' or observable development of actual societies, on the other (122). For, as 'objective science', Marxism aimed to predict the course history must necessarily take, culminating in the revolution of a universal class. In the face of the failure of this prediction, Marxism could most readily survive by recourse to a rearticulation of the emphasis of its claims; by moving away from claiming to be the declarations of an objective science (of the order: 'This will happen'), and changing to those of injunctions made in the name of an ethical programme (of the order: 'This should (be made to) happen') (Laclau 1996a: 66; Devenney 2004: 125). However, for Laclau and Mouffe (1985), any move which entails abandoning the idea of Marxism's apodicticity (absolute indisputability), and sees Marxism as merely ethical, was simply unsatisfactory – intellectually and politically (Laclau 1996a: 66–7).

3.2 BACKGROUND

The problematic of post-Marxism is in fact central to cultural studies. Before delving deeper into post-Marxism 'proper' or the constitutive encounter of cultural studies with it, though, it might reasonably be asked: never mind post-Marxism, what's the problem with Marxism?

Furthermore: if Marxism is or was such a problem, then why maintain any reference to it at all? As has already been seen, one prime problem with Marxism relates to reductionism in its theory of determination. In other words, in Marxism, the determination of more or less everything is related to something 'essential' about classes and the economy, viewed as a closed system (Daly 2002). For both Hall and Laclau, among others, class essentialism and economism are unsatisfactory simplifications that cannot explain everything, and that are, accordingly, suspect. Nevertheless, their quests to re-theorise processes of determination more adequately are therefore marked by and hence retain a constitutive reference to Marxism. According to Hall, it was Laclau's rethinking of Marxism that offered a way out of Marxian dead-ends: 'Laclau', he argued, 'has demonstrated definitively the untenable nature of the proposition that classes, as such, are the subjects of fixed and ascribed class ideologies' (Hall 1996c: 40). Colin Sparks explains that 'Hall's road away from Marx lay through the writing of Laclau . . . Laclau provided a significant weakening of the rigours of the Althusserian version of Marxism ''from within'' '. The important feature here, according to Sparks, is that 'Laclau was concerned to produce a ''non-reductive'' theory of ideology and the mechanisms by which it functioned in society' (Sparks 1996: 89). So, by 'adopting the formulations of Laclau', Sparks concludes, 'it became possible' for Stuart Hall and cultural studies 'to give equal weight to each of the members of the ''holy trinity'' of race, class and gender' As post-Marxism is an explicitly political theory, it may come as a surprise to some to learn that the post-Marxist political theory of Laclau and Mouffe is perhaps more indebted to putatively literary theory, Continental philosophy, deconstruction and semiotics than to political theory 'proper'. But it was actually by applying deconstructive, literary theoretical, psychoanalytic and semiotic concepts and techniques to the analysis of the political that Laclau and Mouffe developed their self-proclaimed 'radical' version of Marxist political theory, which found its first thoroughgoing articulation in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). This work carried out a methodical historical critique and deconstruction of 'classical Marxism' (1985: 3), enabling them to claim

to identify why classical Marxist theory could not predict, account for, nor adequately explain the behaviour of political struggles and socio-political or economic classes. This failure, becoming increasingly apparent throughout the twentieth century, represented a severe challenge to both the (rhetorico-) political force and the intellectual validity and viability of Marxism; challenging its credibility as a political position and as an academically plausible paradigm. Even though many, including Robert J. C. Young, have rejected the need to call such Marxist theory post-Marxism, by arguing that 'after all, capitalism transforms itself often enough without becoming ''post-capitalism'' (and, it might be added, enough capitalist states have collapsed without it being subsequently assumed that this signals the end of capitalism)' (Young 2001: 7), nevertheless the apparent inaccuracies of Marxian predictions about the world have initiated something of a 'crisis' within Marxism itself. Its predictive and even descriptive failures ran entirely contrary to the claims that Marxism could be the objective science of history (2). So Laclau and Mouffe orientated their analysis by identifying a discrepancy between Marxism's claims about the socio-political world, on the one hand, and the 'reality' or observable development of actual societies, on the other (122). For, as 'objective science', Marxism aimed to predict the course history must necessarily take, culminating in the revolution of a universal class. In the face of the failure of this prediction, Marxism could most readily survive by recourse to a rearticulation of the emphasis of its claims; by moving away from claiming to be the declarations of an objective science (of the order: 'This will happen'), and changing to those of injunctions made in the name of an ethical programme (of the order: 'This should (be made to) happen') (Laclau 1996a: 66; Devenney 2004: 125). However, for Laclau and Mouffe (1985), any move which entails abandoning the idea of Marxism's apodicticity (absolute indisputability), and sees Marxism as merely ethical, was simply unsatisfactory – intellectually and politically (Laclau 1996a: 66–7).

3.3 THE DISCOURSE OF POST-MARXISM

In the revolutionary situation, the event and its interpretation take place in the same context – that of the revolutionary situation itself. But the meaning of an event is open to the possibility/inevitability of being re-narrated in different contexts, so that it will mean – indeed, 'be' – something entirely different, elsewhere. In this example, though, they are concerned with the meaning of an event within the interpretive context of a revolutionary situation, and not with its meaning outside or after that situation. Later on, they consider the importance of the reiteration of an event's meaning into different discursive contexts, as a key moment of articulating a certain desired meaning to any event, so that its meaning becomes relatively fixed within the socio-political imaginary, thus enabling it to (tend to) work for the purposes of a certain political project. So, in a non-revolutionary situation, were a group of workers to strike for better pay or better working conditions, then that strike would not necessarily symbolize any general cause or struggle. In a revolutionary situation, in which an entire society has become polarised into two opposing camps (say, 'the people' versus the aristocracy or 'ancien re´gime', as of the French Revolution), then when a particular group strikes, it will symbolize the entire struggle, the entire plight of the people. In Laclau and Mouffe's terms, in such a situation or context, whatever the people do – however different each act is – it will be equivalent in status and meaning when considered in terms of the general struggle: it will be a symbol of and for it. For as long as the struggle persists, it will be immensely important to each side of the struggle to reiterate a certain meaning for these events, in order that, over time, and through the 'regularity in dispersion' of these reiterations, the meaning which best serves the cause will become consolidated and sedimented as 'true' in the mindset, or imaginary, of as many people as possible. The meanings which tend to become dominant in the social-political imaginary, and which work to strengthen a particular cause, political position, or power structure, will, in their terms, have become hegemonic, working to constitute, represent, and perpetuate the dominant hegemony or dominant hegemonic political position.

However, as the passage quoted above reveals, Laclau and Mouffe contend that any class unity that might occur – a unity in which

individuals see themselves as part of a class, and act as a class, in unity – will only be a symbolic identification, related to signification and not to some presumed innate properties of referents. Indeed, the so-called inherent properties of any referent are, in Laclau and Mouffe's terms, produced in and through signifying practices – practices which are inherently contingent and therefore immanently political. Indeed, Laclau (2005) argues that the true or most salient 'referents' of political ontology and political force are political demands rather than 'people' or 'groups', because it is through the work of the shared political demand that identities are constituted (Laclau 2005: 224). This means, in this case, that it is the work of symbolic signification that has the power to make or break the notion of 'class' as a valid political force. What this also means is that, in stark distinction to traditional Marxist theories of political action and transformation, it is quite possible that members of many different socio-economic classes can identify with the symbol of a political struggle, and become identifiable as a consciously unified group, struggling for a particular political transformation. 'Valid' political groups need not essentially consist of members of the same class. Nor are political groups total, complete, or 'natural': they are not 'naturally arising' (or ontological referents); rather they are produced within discourse and signification: the 'referent' is produced – meaning that political identities and groups are partial and provisional identifications with a cause. Unity will not be complete, total, or permanent. As soon as the cause (the political antagonism) is lost, won, or dissipates, the group will effectively cease to exist, as the identity of the group has no essence outside of the antagonism, around, against, and in terms of which it constructed itself. Thus, they argue, one should not identify political agency with named referents. A political identity will be formed in relation to a political issue (an antagonism); that identity is not the whole or entire identity of the person or persons who hold it, even though some political antagonisms persist to such an extent that the identities of certain people and groups will be dominated and overdetermined to a massive extent by these political antagonisms.

3.4 THE TEXT OF CULTURAL STUDIES

Strong criticisms of post-Marxism have come from within Marxist political theory itself, and these have been widely detailed (see, for instance, the summaries given by Lechte (1994: 191) and Sim (1998)). But one of the most challenging, yet widely unacknowledged critiques of post-Marxism actually comes from within the very field of literary, textual and cultural studies that post-Marxism mined heavily in its formation and development. As you will recall, post-Marxist political theory developed by way of recourse to literary theoretical and deconstructive techniques of textual analysis. Yet, in reading Laclau and Mouffe, the debt (Derrida 1994) that they owe to the theory of the text, as developed by Barthes, Derrida, Kristeva, Sollers, and so on, is given little attention. John Mowitt argues that this inattention, coupled with post-Marxism's championing of the notion of 'discourse' instead of 'text' (even though post-Marxism actually used the notion of 'text' to define what it means by 'discourse' (Mowitt 1992: 15)), constitutes a limitation of the radical political implications of the theory of the text, or of deconstruction – an innovation that was already, from the outset, profoundly political and subversive. It is therefore important to specify the core significance of the theory of the text, and why Mowitt insists that it has such a crucial status within cultural studies, and poses such a challenge to post-Marxism. On Mowitt's account, the importance of textuality or textualism on cultural analyses of all orders cannot perhaps be overstated.

The construal of objects of study as being textual – as being constructions whose identities, features, properties and characteristics are established through inter-textual reference of similarity and dissimilarity and through reciprocal relations with other objects, and whose meaning and status is at least influenced by con-text (the objects' contexts and the observers' contexts) – is a (broadly semiological) commonplace – in cultural studies, at least. However, the textual approach to cultural studies, argues Mowitt, should not stop at textualising the external object or field. Rather, what Mowitt sees as key here relates to the implications that the textual insight has for the understanding of the ways that disciplines themselves construct or establish their own objects of study. Crucial in the view that disciplinary fields are textual, 'textile', 'woven'

(1992: 98), complexly inter-imbricated, is the point that therefore the 'closure of [any] text can only be understood as a mutable effect of a social configuration that embraces language and its various actualizations, and not as an ontologically grounded formal property. In short, the closure of the text is coordinated with the socially constructed perception of its limits' (1992: 7–8). In other words, the textual approach must insist upon the contingency of constructions not only externally ('out there'), but also – and significantly – 'internally' ('in here'). It is because of this that Mowitt argues that 'the text thus appears as irreducibly entangled in disciplinary politics and not merely as the articulation of an effort to reorganize disciplinary boundaries . . . but as a critical practice seeking to problematize the cultural work effected by the disciplines' (14). Derrida calls this 'the law of the text in general': all interpretation 'is only produced by simultaneously proposing an institutional model, either by consolidating an existing one that enables the interpretation, or by constituting a new model to accord with it'. Therefore, in this view, all interpretation constitutes something of 'a new contract with an institution, between an institution and the dominant forces in society'. Interpretation is institutional: both institutionally constituted and operative within an institutional and ultimately political context (Derrida 1992a: 21–3). So, Mowitt's (Derridean, deconstructive) argument is that, in more than one register, 'textualism' is something that can seriously problematise post-Marxist 'discourse'. Indeed, Mowitt contends that 'the text emerges to name the alterity that simultaneously constitutes and subverts the context of disciplinary reason' (Mowitt 1992: 25). It only does this, however, to the extent that it is deployed to 'pose questions that bear on the institutional maintenance of the hermeneutical field as such – questions which quickly center upon the political problems of how institutions are constituted, reproduced, and transformed' (215; See also Weber 1987). If it is not deployed to pose questions about the establishment of the institutional maintenance of the hermeneutical field, however, then 'we gain access only to the comparatively homogeneous tissue of intertextual references that constitutes the hermeneutical field of a particular textual example': These are not concerns which come after the particular text in question or

which are properly ‘extrinsic’ to it – they are concerns which address the very definition of the textual artefact as an artefact. Insofar as the artefact is meaningful to a particular social group, it is because its members continue to support the disciplinary structures (many of which are not ‘merely’ academic) which read the artefact on their terms. (Mowitt 1992: 214–15). Mowitt’s contention, in this regard, is that post-Marxist discourse does not – at least, hasn’t yet, and perhaps cannot – do this as thoroughly or adequately as what he calls the ‘textual paradigm’. (This is otherwise known as deconstruction. Mowitt prefers to keep explicit reference to textuality because of the foregrounding effect this has on the work of the institutional construction of what he calls ‘disciplinary objects’. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 2). The argument here is once again that disciplinary paradigms play a primary role in constituting precisely what disciplines think they know, what they think that they can know, and orientate what they think they can or should do and the way they think they ought to do it. For Mowitt, the emergence of the concepts of the text and textuality through the work of intellectuals associated with the Tel Quel journal, particularly Derrida, Kristeva, Barthes, and Sollers, represent a vital ethico-political advance, in that ‘the text gives academic intellectuals on the Left a way to conceptualize the link between the struggle to make sense of a particular artefact, and the struggle to transform the general conditions under which that construction takes on its cultural value’ (220). In this, a thoroughgoing textual approach to knowledge establishment or production would be one obliged to ‘confront the problem of disciplinary power as such’ (219–20). What should be emphasised here is the sense in which Mowitt’s argument explicitly asserts ‘education’s role in the formation of cultural hegemony’. Indeed, one of his clearest calls is for academics to endeavour ‘to make education into an openly insurgent practice and break the hold that the vocational or professionally oriented disciplines have had on the commerce between the university and society’ (218).

3.5 THE PROBLEM WITH THE TEXT

Stuart Hall, for instance, does concur that ‘culture will always work through its textualities’; but asserts ‘at the same time that textuality is

never enough' (1992: 284). So it is important to establish what it is about textuality that Hall sees as never enough, and what it is that textuality is never enough for. Simply put, for Hall, the problem with the text relates to politics. In the most direct sense, the problem he discerns is that 'if we are concerned to maintain a politics it cannot be defined exclusively in terms of an infinite sliding of the signifier' (Hall 1996b: 258). In other words, Hall considers the text to constitute a – if not the (at least 'theoretical') – problem for cultural studies; a problem that devolves on the troublingly 'infinite' slipperiness introduced by the text. Of course, it is only if 'history and society are an infinite text' (Laclau 1980: 87), or in other words, if one already concedes that 'there is nothing outside of the text' (Derrida 1974: 158), that the problem arises of 'an infinite sliding of the signifier'. In other words, Stuart Hall simultaneously acknowledges the veracity of deconstruction, but also nevertheless resists it, viewing textuality ambivalently, as a curiously necessary but unstraightforward enabling and frustrating problem for cultural studies (or, indeed, in Derrida's sense, a 'dangerous supplement'). As will be seen in Chapter 2, Hall's peculiar simultaneous subscription to and resistance of deconstruction and textuality is not evidence of any confusion. It is rather that Hall wants the text to remain a problem rather than develop into a problematic, because, for Hall, the important problematic for cultural studies to engage with is first and foremost always to work out how to intervene consequentially into mobile political problems ('out there'). In other words, Hall sees it as important that cultural studies does not get too fixated on and involved with the theoretical question of the 'infinite sliding of the signifier' at the expense of involvement with real political problems. (In this regard, Hall has a strong pragmatic impulse, which relates him, at least 'sentimentally', to another of Laclau's erstwhile interlocutors, Richard Rorty. Indeed, because of post-Marxism's engagement with 'pragmatism', Rorty's position will soon be taken as an exemplary rendition of the impulse towards establishing a 'university responsibility' which does not digress into 'over-philosophication' and excessive theory, in Chapter 3.) As soon becomes apparent, Hall's chief criticism of Laclau relates precisely to the perception of a subordination in Laclau of a proper concern with political issues and an

excessive/digressive elevation of theoretical discussion about abstract political logics. Given Hall's ambivalence about textuality (and, by extension, about deconstruction), and given post-Marxism's use of deconstruction as its enabling gesture, as well as Laclau's definitional recourse to infinite textuality as a synonym of the form, character and logic of 'history and society' or 'culture', coupled with Mowitt's arguments about the text as offering an intellectual-political tool that not only challenges the post-Marxist paradigm but that might also be deployed politically, the text deserves further attention. It is worth remaining with Stuart Hall's indication of both the necessity of the textual and the problems for cultural studies that he sees lurking within textuality. He argues that: the refiguring of theory, made as a result of having to think questions of culture through the metaphors of language and textuality, represents a point beyond which cultural studies must now always necessarily locate itself. The metaphor of the discursive, of textuality, instantiates a necessary delay, a displacement, which I think is always implied in the concept of culture. If you work on culture, or if you've tried to work on some other really important things and you find yourself driven back to culture, if culture happens to be what seizes hold of your soul, you have to recognize that you will always be working in an area of displacement. There's always something decentred about the medium of culture, about language, textuality, and signification, which always escapes and evades the attempt to link it, directly and immediately, with other structures. And yet, at the same time, the shadow, the imprint, the trace, of those other formations, of the intertextuality of texts in their institutional positions, of texts as sources of power, of textuality as a site of representation and resistance, all of those questions can never be erased from cultural studies. (Hall 1992: 283–4) As with so much of his work, Hall's argument here is clearly saturated in deconstruction, representing cultural studies' understanding of 'culture' in language that is clearly indebted to Derridean deconstruction, and arguably to a Laclauian understanding of discourse. (However, unlike Mowitt, and in a way that actually supports Mowitt's argument, Hall somewhat conflates and collapses the textual and the discursive: for Hall, the 'metaphor of the discursive' is the same as that

'of textuality'.) In other words, as deconstructive as Hall's depiction of the textuality and/or discursive character of culture is, there nevertheless remains a hesitation, an invocation of a sense in which cultural studies is not simply deconstruction and should, or must, be more and other than deconstruction. But the claim that cultural studies must locate itself and operate somehow 'beyond' or 'after deconstruction' seems deeply problematic, especially when one understands culture the way Hall represents it here: namely, as something pointedly textual and in diffe´rance (deferral, difference, delay, displacement). Given that Hall's understanding of deconstruction (not to mention 'culture') is evidently far from naı¨ve, we should enquire as to where or what this 'beyond deconstruction', or 'beyond the textual' is that cultural studies should be. We should also work out how to make sense of Hall's simultaneous acknowledgement of cultural studies' deep and profound indebtedness to deconstruction, of its having to think questions of culture deconstructively, of textuality 'always' being 'implied in the concept of culture', with this assertion of the need for cultural studies necessarily to be 'beyond' deconstruction and textualism. As noted above, Hall's concern relates to politics; that 'if we are concerned to maintain a politics it cannot be defined exclusively in terms of an infinite sliding of the signifier' (Hall 1996b: 258).

This sense of 'cultural politics' – that is to say, the understanding that institutions, beliefs, practices, and arguably even our very subjectivities and identities are contingent and alterable, the insistence on the political character and consequences of cultural formations, and the understanding that, as Hall puts it, 'culture will always work through its textualities' (1996b: 271) – clarifies why connections are claimed between the political (in this extended 'discursive' sense) and culture, and why representatives of cultural studies and deconstruction often feel themselves to be doing something political. This may strike many as either delusional (as in 'but it's merely academic!') or controversial (as in 'academia should not be politically motivated or tendentious!'). But it is based on an understanding of cultural, political, and social reality as discursive and hegemonic, meaning that even the 'merely academic' is an active part of the circuits, networks, relays and forces of culture

(perhaps particularly in 'making meaning'), and is therefore always already politically consequential. This is the cultural studies (and) post-Marxist answer to Marxian reductionism and determinism, of course. It also means that everything, including academia, is to be construed as inescapably politically motivated and tendentious (however 'unconscious' this may be). In this view, reality is at once material and textual, as Hall intimates, or as Laclau and Mouffe express it, discursive: constituted in both material and textual ways.

Jameson's problems with textuality therefore also relate to politics, connecting with Hall's problems with deconstruction and textual understandings, as apparently being unable to maintain a politics, or as being 'incapable of either generating or sustaining a critical ideology'. So the question is what it is that seems to make deconstruction both so appropriate and so inappropriate, both necessary and insufficient, for cultural studies and for post-Marxism, intellectually and politically speaking. This question is particularly important if cultural studies is indeed construed as 'a practice which aims to make a difference in the world' (Hall 1992: 278). In this respect, then, the archive of explicitly deconstructive thought, deriving from the Tel Quel group (Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva, Sollers) who rigorously theorised and provided the now familiar, ubiquitous, and arguably indispensable concepts of text, textuality, intertextuality, and so on, seems to offer something singularly appropriate to Hall's and cultural studies' very conceptualisation of culture and the political.

To argue that textuality is never enough is far from a straightforward call to 'return to reality' or to return to 'real political practice', as if there were a clear-cut choice between theory and practice, or a clear division between academic work and political work. Indeed, to conceive of culture and politics as complex discursive formations implies rejecting such distinctions as facile simplifications. (However, the theory/practice schema is not an easy metaphysical binary to step out of, as will be argued in Chapter 3.) Instead, what is at stake here might be clarified by making a distinction, between 'politics' and 'the political' (Beardsworth 1996). In terms of this distinction, one could say that everything is contingent and alterable (the political), and that cultural studies desires to

alter it, to intervene (politics). Thus, anything new or different, anything which might alter a state of affairs, might itself be or become 'political'.2 But, invoking the possibility of politicality is not good enough when one's concerns and aspirations are interventional, specific, pressingly present and real (whatever they may be). Maintenance of this 'metaphysical' desire could represent one difference between deconstruction and cultural studies, if cultural studies is something that understands culture and politics deconstructively but nevertheless desires the very thing that it understands to be 'constitutively impossible'. That is to say, for Hall, what is definitional of cultural studies 'as a project' is the aim of definite, precise, certain, fully present and knowable, unmediated interventional power and agency in the present of the institutional terrain of culture and society. This desire is 'impossible' and 'metaphysical' because the institutional terrain of culture and society is never fully present, constitutively mediated, in deferral, relay, and referral (diffe´rance), prone to the 'slippage of signification' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) and dissemination (Derrida 1981).

In this regard, deconstruction, as (strategic) infinite demand for justice, is another name for the radical democratic element of the project of post-Marxism, as well as arguably being very closely related to cultural studies' much-invoked openness to alterity. (It is for this reason that Joanna Zylinska, for instance, argues that 'a sense of duty and responsibility has always constituted an inherent part of the cultural studies project' (Zylinska 2001: 177).) But such justifications notwithstanding, the Jamesonian objection keeps returning, which runs as follows: because capitalism itself might be construed as a radical form of 'deconstruction', therefore deconstruction might be a symptom of capitalism. In this spirit, Hardt and Negri famously argue that the dominant form of power today is itself deconstructive and anti-essentialist. Power 'itself', they say, chants along with anti-essentialists and post-modernists, 'Long live difference! Down with essentialist binaries!' (2000: 139) 'Power', they contend, 'has evacuated the bastion [that anti-essentialist intellectuals] are attacking and has circled round to their rear to join them in the assault in the name of difference' (2000: 138. See also Bewes 2001: 92).

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. How do you know the Discourse of Post-Marxism?

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2. How do you know the Text of Cultural Studies?

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3. How to know the Problem with the Text?

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3.6 THE INSTITUTIONAL ARTICULATION AND DISSEMINATION OF TEXTS AND DISCOURSES

It is important to emphasise the often tacit but nevertheless significantly and clearly shared agreement among the post-Marxists Laclau and Mouffe, and Hall, Mowitt, Derrida, and beyond, about the interlinked institutional character of culture, society and politics and the conviction that institutions such as the university have a position and doubtless a role, or multiple roles, within hegemony and hegemonic politics (Readings 1996; Peters 2001). The shared conviction is of the ethico-political importance and consequentiality of university practices of the production of knowledge; that knowledge may affect institutional and ultimately ethico-political cultural practice more widely (Mowitt 1992: 27). Thus, the stakes devolve on what academic disciplines and practices do, how they do it, and how this relates, links, connects, or is articulated with other scenes. Thus a key concern should be that of establishing what disciplinary activity is to be, what it is articulated with, how and in what ways. For, what is an academic discipline or academic subject anyway?

What is its hegemonic 'position', and what are its 'structural' limits, or what is the logic of its constitution within the university institution, itself within hegemony? This, the final section of this chapter, will explore these questions, but will do so – crucially, yet perhaps surprisingly – not primarily through reference to empirical examples (for which, see instead Readings 1996; Kilroy et al. 2004; Rutherford 2005); but rather by examining the deconstructive logic of dissemination, as proposed by Derrida in the book (or 'text') of that name (Derrida 1981), and as discussed by other deconstructive thinkers. The reason for taking this perhaps peculiar detour through an apparently 'quasi-transcendental' moment in Derridean deconstruction is double: it is at once to reemphasise, performatively, the institutional articulation of text and discourse within hegemony, and to propose, again performatively, one way in which Derrida's supposedly 'philosophical' readings of even the texts of ancient philosophy reveal and cast new light on political-institutional questions.

To begin a deconstructive reading of cultural studies in terms of dissemination, it can first be noted that it is clearly like other proper academic subjects at least in that it putatively 'takes' external objects as its focus of study. It speaks of and for them (in what might be construed as something of an unethical opening of the ethical (Derrida 1995a: 67)). Arguably, it must always study 'other things', things 'out there' – even if the theory of the text immediately problematises and complexifies this – because to be an academic subject proper could be said to require as much. Textuality notwithstanding – or indeed, even as a consequence of the adherence to textuality as that which 'emerges to name the alterity that simultaneously constitutes and subverts the context of disciplinary reason' (Mowitt 1992: 25) – the specificity of cultural studies is said (by cultural studies, at least) to devolve on an openness to other topics. In one familiar respect, cultural studies is said to study objects hitherto excluded or not accorded any worth as objects of attention within the academy (popular culture, subcultural practices, marginalised and excluded identities, 'trivia', etc.). In another, related, respect, it is said to at least seek to revalue and to reappraise the knowledge that circulates as knowledge within other already institutionally legitimated subjects,

disciplines and public discourses (Young 1999: 3–16; During 1993; Storey 1994; 1996). Both of these procedures might, of course, count as valid and important interventions; because, on the one hand, studying the different is to bring into visibility things that had hitherto lacked representation, and, on the other hand, critiquing extant knowledge can again bring into visibility excluded differends, and thereby in turn come to influence or modify the production of knowledge about these things – knowledge that, as deconstruction, cultural studies, and post-Marxism all agree, must in some sense affect institutional and political cultural practices (Mowitt 1992: 27). However, any such effort or orientation could be construed as making a difference, as 'counting', only if it, as it were, made any difference: only if it came to be counted – or could be made to count. Arditi and Valentine's (1999) concept of 'polemicization' is important here; for it proposes a logic whereby relevance is established only through a rhetorico-political struggle. In other words, to evoke one of Spivak's important questions, the vital question here is who will listen (Spivak 1993: 194)? What consequences will that listening have? As cultural studies predominantly takes place within or around the university context of the interdisciplinary arts and humanities, one should not ignore this scene, this location, and should evaluate its status as a political locus or site of potential antagonism. For the scene in which any interventions of cultural studies are to be staged, regardless of what anyone thinks they should be, is irreducibly related to the university, before and after any other form of publicity, publication or mediation.3 This is because it is the university, primarily, that confers any authority or legitimacy onto the identity and voice of cultural studies that it may have (although the subject itself will always make appeal to some little other object which also called it into being, as if in response to the question 'how can you/we, the university, have excluded this?').

In effect, disciplinary activity performatively mimes itself into existence and identity according to an interpretation not only of what it should do, but also an interpretation of what it should be like (Derrida 1981: 75; 1997: 7). For any subject must establish its identity through the double strategy of a polemical distancing or differencing and affirmative affiliation ('I am like this and not like that') which betrays, again, that

disciplinary knowledge itself and paradigm formation is double and 'out of joint' (Derrida 1981: 15, 19; Mowitt 1992: 40–1), relying on an inauguration which has nothing to do with 'it itself', but which presupposes and conditionally imposes what it will, should, or must be (like), and will, should, or must know (like). Echoing Derrida, this is the same as to say that the inauguration of cultural studies is not a cultural studies event (Derrida 1992: 29–30). As Mieke Bal proposes, it is all too easy for 'new' disciplines to unwittingly smuggle and to fail to interrogate or critically revise extant 'traditional' values and protocols into their own constitution (Bal 2003). In Derrida's (1981 and 1992) sense, cultural studies is a university modification, albeit also constituted and compromised by that something other, that figuration of something 'outside' the university: its objects of study. It must 'respect' them both. Its loyalties are divided, constitutively compromised, by a polemos with and an eros for the university and its knowledge (for, otherwise, why insist on being insinuated therein?), and an eros or cathexis with something other, that it must distance itself from in order to do justice to, and also therefore to transgress, by moving 'away' from that thing, not being with it 'properly', of it or as it. But this poleros (as Derrida (1998a) has termed it) is dissymmetrical: preference always goes to the institution (Derrida 1997: 7, 17, 19–20). It is important to reiterate that preference always (also) goes to the institution. But it is equally important to hasten to add that this is nothing to lament, for it actually enables a reconceptualisation of the character of academic, intellectual, political practice. Namely, that a primary object of cultural studies must always also be the supposedly secondary matter of the university institution. Now, increasingly, thinkers within cultural studies are explicitly coming to construe cultural studies as a – if not the – place to think the university, to make sense of the university and its relationship to culture, politics and society, locally and globally (Hall 2002; Wortham 1999). Rather than simply repeating such undeniably important arguments here, it seems necessary to address the issue not only of how cultural studies 'knows itself' (in both senses: i.e., the way it perceives objects and the way it thinks of itself), but also the issue of how cultural studies is itself known. In this regard, cultural studies is perhaps most often referred to as

'interdisciplinary'.5 Indeed, in the essay 'Cultural studies and its theoretical legacies' (1992) that has also informed this chapter, Stuart Hall clearly insists on the need for cultural studies to be excessive, in the sense of not retreating from any limits, borders or boundaries. Now, a deconstructive comprehension of multiplicity and excess – even and especially an excess of propriety such as this one advocated by Hall – is one that construes it as inevitably introducing alterity (Godzich 1987: 157). Derrida argues that ultimately 'a monster of fidelity [becomes] the most perverse infidel' (1987: 24); that too much fidelity becomes a form of infidelity or transgression. (The impossibility of unequivocal self-identity is perhaps among the key insights of deconstruction.) Indeed, if this is true for 'excessive' attention to any one thing, then it must clearly become even more palpable in the case of interdisciplinary activity. This is to say, in the eyes of supposedly 'single' disciplines, interdisciplines will appear to be less and other than 'proper' disciplines. For 'proper' mastery or 'proper comprehension' cannot and must not 'comprehend' too many things, or fold too many things together, too much (Derrida 1981: 159).

3.7 STUART HALL'S CLOSURE VERSUS POST-MARXIST DISCOURSE

Stuart Hall largely subscribes to the post-Marxist deconstruction of Marxism's class essentialism, economic reductionism and determinism; attesting that 'I think, for example, it's possible to get a long way by talking about what is sometimes called the ''economic'' as operating discursively' (Hall 1996d: 145). His key problem with Laclauian post-Marxism, though, is this: The question is, can one, does one, follow that argument to the point that there is nothing to practice but its discursive aspect? I think that's what [Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985)] does. It is a sustained philosophical effort, really, to conceptualize all practices as nothing but discourses, and all historical agents as discursively constituted subjectivities, to talk about positionalities but never positions, and only to look at the way concrete individuals can be interpellated in different subject positions. The book is thus a bold attempt to discover what a politics of such a theory might be.

All of that I think is important . . . I like Laclau when he's struggling to find a way out of reductionism and beginning to reconceptualize Marxist categories in the discursive mode . . . But in [Hegemony], there is no reason why anything is or isn't potentially articulatable with anything. The critique of reductionism has apparently resulted in the notion of society as a totally open discursive field. I would put it polemically in the following form: [Hegemony and Socialist Strategy] thinks that the world, social practice, is language, whereas I want to say that the social operates like a language. (Hall 1996d: 146) So, although Hall sees the work of Laclau and Mouffe as being 'quite heroic' (148) in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, nevertheless he feels that there are several problems with their approach. All of these problems are said to relate to political consequence, and all relate to Hall's perception of discourse theory's 'textuality', or 'textualism'. The first problem boils down to what Colin Sparks calls Laclau and Mouffe's definitive and 'radical break' from 'any notion of determination' (Sparks 1996: 91) in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. For, Laclau and Mouffe's conclusions about determination are that: It is not the case that the field of the economy is a self-regulated space subject to endogenous laws; nor does there exist a constitutive principle for social agents which can be fixed in an ultimate class core; nor are class positions the necessary location of historical interests . . . even for Gramsci, the ultimate core of the hegemonic subject's identity is constituted at a point external to the space it articulates: the logic of hegemony does not unfold all its deconstructive effects on the theoretical terrain of classical Marxism. We have witnessed, however, the fall of this last redoubt of class reductionism, insofar as the very unity and homogeneity of class subjects has split into a set of precariously integrated positions which, once the thesis of the neutral character of the productive forces is abandoned, cannot be referred to any necessary point of future unification. The logic of hegemony, as a logic of articulation and contingency, has come to determine the very identity of hegemonic subjects. (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 85; also quoted by Sparks 1996: 91) As Sparks points out, in the face of this, Stuart Hall 'has expressed hesitations about following this logic through to its conclusion' (91). Indeed 'Hall wished to continue to

argue for the continuing relevance of the idea of determination' (95). Daryl Slack paraphrases Hall's problem: with the post-Marxist concept of discourse it becomes too 'easy to leave behind any notion that anything exists outside of discourse.

The problems, however embryonic, that are discernable within Laclau and Mouffe, Hall argues, are actually very serious because their work is and will continue to be influential: ironically, their avowedly politicised political theory produces the possibility that future work (by others, at least) may easily cease to be politicised, in various ways, but particularly in losing an awareness and attention to the effects of the economy (however 'discursively' construed). Hall's concern is that 'discourse analysis' might all too easily become totally disarticulated either from any sense of economico-political determination (however complexly reconceived) or from a post-Marxist or leftist political position. His concern is that post-Marxist discourse analysis lets us 'off the hook' vis-a`-vis political responsibility. Such a disarticulation of discourse analysis from attending to 'historical forces' risks becoming what Hall calls 'a reductionism upward, rather than a reductionism downward, as economism was' (Hall 1996d: 146). Indeed, according to Daryl Slack, Hall views Laclau's insistently theoretical and philosophical tendency to engage in 'producing the concrete philosophically' rather than through historical analysis to be a tendency that in foregrounding theory actually has a reciprocal and negative 'backgrounding effect on the very politics that played such a crucial role in Laclau's work to begin with' (Daryl Slack 1996: 120). Indeed, such a divergence of orientation and interest can arguably be clearly discerned when Laclau argues for instance that once we are aware of the discursive constitution of identities and agencies we therefore should 'move from purely sociologistic and descriptive account[s] of the concrete agents involved in hegemonic operations to a formal analysis of the logics involved' (Laclau 2000: 53). This is quite a different kind of work to Hall's advocated 'adding, adding, adding, adding, the different levels of determination'. On the contrary, Laclau contends that We gain very little, once identities are conceived as complexly articulated collective wills, by referring to them through simple designations such as classes, ethnic groups and so on,

which are at best names for transient points of stabilization. The really important task is to understand the logics of their constitution and dissolution, as well as the formal determinations of the spaces in which they interrelate. (Laclau 2000: 53) For Hall, this is precisely not the 'really important task'. For him, what is important is the 'conjunctural analysis' of the moment. As Sparks reminds us, 'the analysis of the historical moment is the subject of Hall's only major work published during the 1980s', and although 'the theoretical point of reference which Hall used to argue for this position [on Thatcherism] is explicitly drawn from Laclau' (Sparks 1996: 95), the interest lies in understanding the conjunctural moment and working out how to intervene, rather than merely seeking out some perhaps universal logic of conjunctural formation. Thus, for Daryl Slack, 'Hall's model of strategic intervention is not then limited to a kind of theoretically-driven Derridean deconstruction of difference and the construction of discursive possibility, but a theoreticallyinformed practice of rearticulating relations among the social forces that constitute articulated structures in specific historical conjunctures' (Daryl Slack 1996: 122). The problem with the post-Marxist discursive approach, then, is not only that, according to Hall, it sees 'nothing to practice but its discursive aspect' (Hall 1996d: 146), but also that it sees the 'really important task' of politicised intellectuals to be purely logical, formalising, and analytical. The problem or challenge, then, is to determine the status of this orientation, an orientation that claims that the need 'to understand the logics' is the task of the politicised intellectual. Perhaps there are good reasons and justifications for arguing that a proper or more rigorously thoroughgoing, exhaustive and complete cultural studies project should – 'logically' – constitute itself as distinctly different in orientation from the discourse analysis approach of Laclau and Mouffe.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

4. Discuss the Institutional Articulation and Dissemination of Texts and Discourses.

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5. Discuss Stuart Hall's Closure versus Post-Marxist Discourse.

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3.8 LET US SUM UP

In order to further clarify what is meant by this, one of Stuart Hall's primary criticisms of Laclauian post-Marxism should be returned to, and read in the light of the attention that Mowitt gives to the question of the disciplinary object and the paradigm. To reiterate the Hallian criticism, then: Hall asks whether it is possible to accept the alleged post-Marxist claim that 'there is nothing to practice but its discursive aspect' (Hall 1996d: 146). Daryl Slack argues that, contrary to the post-Marxists, what is distinctive about Hall is that he insists 'on the specificity of practices in different kinds of relations to discourse' (Daryl Slack 1996: 122), and that Laclau remains valuable only if he is read 'without privileging the discursive' (121). Herein consists the disagreement between Hall and Laclau. Again, it is akin to a disagreement in Rancie`re's (1999) sense: namely, both parties to it are using the same word, and arguing about its status, but they mean different things by it. For Laclau, there is nothing outside of the discursive, because this names the logic of all constitution. For Hall, there is more to 'practice' than its discursive aspect, because the 'discursive aspect' in itself does not refer to anything specific, and in talking about it one is not talking about anything specific. It seems to refer to everything, but it thereby refers to nothing, and – worse – actually seems to exonerate the cultural analyst from doing any specific analyses of specific 'determinant forces'. Hall's problem, then, lies in the reductivity of the post-Marxist paradigm in which, in Mowitt's words, 'discourse is typically used, as is the case with Laclau, to characterise both the medium and the nature of sociality. Insofar as society is interpretable, it presents itself as an ensemble of discourses.

What all anti-essentialist, post-foundationalist or constructivist thinking (such as that dominant within and characteristic of cultural studies and post-Marxism) has in common is some version of the premise (or axiom) that humans have, in Mowitt's words, a 'deep constitutability' (Mowitt 2002: 87; Laclau 1999). To perceive the contingency of subject formation means to conceive of identity not as innate but as a socio-political 'achievement'. So, the form and 'content' of subjects, as socio-political products, will always (constitutively) be contaminated or supplemented by a context or contingency that means it is undecidable whether subjects could be said to be 'free', and whether 'free decisions' can be made. As deconstructive work regularly points out: any putative 'decision' might always possibly not have been a decision (implying as this does a certain 'madness' or radically undetermined freedom), as it can only be apprehended retrospectively and could always be interpreted as having been merely a programmed part of a calculable process. Did I, for example, 'decide freely' to write this book, or was my sense of freedom something of a fantasy, given that writing it was something determined or overdetermined by my 'context'? When I or anyone seeks to evaluate the status of an event and to enquire whether it was a free decision or a programmatic inevitability, it might always be possible to construct a narrative or an account that arrives at either decision ('Doing this was decided spontaneously and through free will' or 'Doing this was the inevitable result of the context'). As Hall might say, what are the determining forces at work in this or that conjuncture? Deconstructive reading shows them to be undecidable, and suggests that any decision arrived at is itself the end product of a contingent evaluation, which means that, first, even real events are 'textual' when looked at in any sense; second, it is ultimately impossible to know whether our interpretation is correct (for what is analytically relevant, and what is not?); third, it is impossible to establish what is a free decision and what is overdetermined or pre-programmed; and, fourth, it becomes unclear whether our own act of interpretation is itself a free act, or whether we ourselves are ensnared in a determining structure. (See Chapter 3 for a further discussion of decision.)

3.9 KEY WORDS

Discourse: Discourse denotes written and spoken communications: In semantics and discourse analysis: Discourse is a conceptual generalization of conversation within each modality and context of communication

Articulation: The field of articulatory phonetics is a subfield of phonetics that studies articulation and ways that humans produce speech. Articulatory phoneticians explain how humans produce speech sounds via the interaction of different physiological structures.

Dissemination: To disseminate, in the field of communication, means to broadcast a message to the public without direct feedback from the audience.

3.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. How do you know the Discourse of Post-Marxism?
2. How do you know the Text of Cultural Studies?
3. How to know the Problem with the Text?
4. Discuss the Institutional Articulation and Dissemination of Texts and Discourses
5. Discuss Stuart Hall's Closure versus Post-Marxist Discourse.

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3.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 3.3
2. See Section 3.4
3. See Section 3.5

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 3.6
2. See Section 3.7

UNIT 4: THE STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF IDEOLOGIES: "END OF HISTORY" OR IDEOLOGY WITHOUT END?

STRUCTURE

4.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To discuss the Structural Theory of Politics
- To describe Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities
- To know Role of Ideologies

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that "peace" seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world. Most of these analyses lack any larger conceptual framework for distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in world history, and are predictably superficial. If Mr. Gorbachev were ousted from the Kremlin or a new Ayatollah proclaimed the millennium from a desolate Middle Eastern capital, these

same commentators would scramble to announce the rebirth of a new era of conflict. And yet, all of these people sense dimly that there is some larger process at work, a process that gives coherence and order to the daily headlines. The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war. But the century that began full of selfconfidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism. The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. In the past decade, there have been unmistakable changes in the intellectual climate of the world's two largest communist countries, and the beginnings of significant reform movements in both. But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics and it can be seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants' markets and color television sets now omnipresent throughout China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran. What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affair's yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in. the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run. To understand how this is so, we must first consider some theoretical issues concerning the nature of historical change.

The end of history is not an original one. Its best known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical development was a purposeful one determined by the interplay of material forces, and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions. But the concept of history as a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end was borrowed by Marx from his great German predecessor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. For better or worse, much of Hegel's historicism has become part of our contemporary intellectual baggage. The notion that mankind has progressed through a series of primitive stages of consciousness on his path to the present, and that these stages corresponded to concrete forms of social organization, such as tribal, slave-owning, theocratic, and finally democratic-egalitarian societies, has become inseparable from the modern understanding of man. Hegel was the first philosopher to speak the language of modern social science, insofar as man for him was the product of his concrete historical and social environment and not, as earlier natural right theorists would have it, a collection of more or less fixed "natural" attributes. The mastery and transformation of man's natural environment through the application of science and technology was originally not a Marxist concept, but a Hegelian one. Unlike later historicists whose historical relativism degenerated into relativism tout court, however, Hegel believed that history culminated in an absolute moment - a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious. It is Hegel's misfortune to be known now primarily as Marx's precursor; and it is our misfortune that few of us are familiar with Hegel's work from direct study, but only as it has been filtered through the distorting lens of Marxism. In France, however, there has been an effort to save Hegel from his Marxist interpreters and to resurrect him as the philosopher who most correctly speaks to our time. Among those modern French interpreters of Hegel, the greatest was certainly Alexandre Kojève, a brilliant Russian émigré who taught a highly influential series of seminars in Paris in the 1930s at the Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes. 1 While largely unknown in the United States, Kojève had a major impact on the intellectual life of the continent. Among his students

ranged such future luminaries as Jean-Paul Sartre on the Left and Raymond Aron on the Right; postwar existentialism borrowed many of its basic categories from Hegel via Kojève. Kojève sought to resurrect the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Mind, the Hegel who proclaimed history to be at an end in 1806. For as early as this Hegel saw in Napoleon's defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena the victory of the ideals of the French Revolution, and the imminent universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality. Kojève, far from rejecting Hegel in light of the turbulent events of the next century and a half, insisted that the latter had been essentially correct. The Battle of Jena marked the end of history because it was at that point that the vanguard of humanity (a term quite familiar to Marxists) actualized the principles of the French Revolution. While there was considerable work to be done after 1806 - abolishing slavery and the slave trade, extending the franchise to workers, women, blacks, and other racial minorities, etc. - the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon. The two world wars in this century and their attendant revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending those principles spatially, such that the various provinces of human civilization were brought up to the level of its most advanced outposts, and of forcing those societies in Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully. The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed. For Kojève, this so-called "universal homogenous state" found real-life embodiment in the countries of postwar Western Europe - precisely those flabby, prosperous, self-satisfied, inward-looking, weak-willed states whose grandest project was nothing more heroic than the creation of the Common Market.3 But this was only to be expected. For human history and the conflict that characterized it was based on the existence of "contradictions": primitive man's quest for mutual recognition, the dialectic of the master and slave, the transformation and mastery of nature, the struggle for the universal recognition of rights, and the dichotomy between proletarian and capitalist. But in the universal

homogenous state, all prior contradictions are resolved and all human needs are satisfied. There is no 3 Kojève alternatively identified the end of history with the postwar "American way of life," toward which he thought the Soviet Union was moving as well. struggle or conflict over "large" issues, and consequently no need for generals or statesmen; what remains is primarily economic activity. And indeed, Kojève's life was consistent with his teaching. Believing that there was no more work for philosophers as well, since Hegel (correctly understood) had already achieved absolute knowledge, Kojève left teaching after the war and spent the remainder of his life working as a bureaucrat in the European Economic Community, until his death in 1968. To his contemporaries at midcentury, Kojève's proclamation of the end of history must have seemed like the typical eccentric solipsism of a French intellectual, coming as it did on the heels of World War II and at the very height of the Cold War. To comprehend how Kojève could have been so audacious as to assert that history has ended, we must first of all understand the meaning of Hegelian idealism.

For Hegel, the contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human consciousness, i.e. on the level of ideas4 - not the trivial election year proposals of American politicians, but ideas in the sense of large unifying world views that might best be understood under the rubric of ideology. Ideology in this sense is not restricted to the secular and explicit political doctrines we usually associate with the term, but can include religion, culture, and the complex of moral values underlying any society as well. Hegel's view of the relationship between the ideal and the real or material worlds was an extremely complicated one, beginning with the fact that for him the distinction between the two was only apparent.5 He did not believe that the real world conformed or could be made to conform to ideological preconceptions of philosophy professors in any simpleminded way, or that the "material" world could not impinge on the ideal. Indeed, Hegel the professor was temporarily thrown out of work as a result of a very material event, the Battle of Jena. But while Hegel's writing and thinking could be stopped by a bullet from the material world, the hand on the trigger of the gun was motivated in turn by the ideas of liberty and equality that had driven the French

Revolution. For Hegel, all human behavior in the material world, and hence all human history, is rooted in a prior state of consciousness - an idea similar to the one expressed by John Maynard Keynes when he said that the views of men of affairs were usually derived from defunct economists and academic scribblers of earlier generations. This consciousness may not be explicit and self-aware, as are modern political doctrines, but may rather take the form of religion or simple cultural or moral habits. And yet this realm of consciousness in the long run necessarily becomes manifest in the material world, indeed creates the material world in its own image. Consciousness is cause and not effect, and can develop autonomously from the material world; hence the real subtext underlying the apparent jumble of current events is the history of ideology. Hegel's idealism has fared poorly at the hands of later thinkers. Marx reversed the priority of the real and the ideal completely, relegating the entire realm of consciousness - religion, art, culture, philosophy itself - to a "superstructure" that was determined entirely by the prevailing material mode of production. Yet another unfortunate legacy of Marxism is our tendency to retreat into materialist or utilitarian explanations of political or historical phenomena, and our disinclination to believe in the autonomous power of ideas. A recent example of this is Paul Kennedy's hugely successful The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, which ascribes the decline of great powers to simple economic overextension. Obviously, this is true on some level: an empire whose economy is barely above the level of subsistence cannot bankrupt its treasury indefinitely. But whether a highly productive modern industrial society chooses to spend 3 or 7 percent of its GNP on defense rather than consumption is entirely a matter of that society's political priorities, which are in turn determined in the realm of consciousness. The materialist bias of modern thought is characteristic not only of people on the Left who may be sympathetic to Marxism, but of many passionate anti-Marxists as well. Indeed, there is on the Right what one might label the Wall Street Journal school of deterministic materialism that discounts the importance of ideology and culture and sees man as essentially a rational, profitmaximizing individual. It is precisely this kind of individual and his pursuit of material incentives that is posited as the

basis for economic life as such in economic textbooks. One small example will illustrate the problematic character of such materialist views. Max Weber begins his famous book, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, by noting the different economic performance of Protestant and Catholic communities throughout Europe and America, summed up in the proverb that Protestants eat well while Catholics sleep well. Weber notes that according to any economic theory that posited man as a rational profit-maximizer, raising the piece-work rate should increase labor productivity. But in fact, in many traditional peasant communities, raising the piece-work rate actually had the opposite effect of lowering labor productivity: at the higher rate, a peasant accustomed to earning two and one-half marks per day found he could earn the same amount by working less, and did so because he valued leisure more than income. The choices of leisure over income, or of the militaristic life of the Spartan hoplite over the wealth of the Athenian trader, or even the ascetic life of the early capitalist entrepreneur over that of a traditional leisured aristocrat, cannot possibly be explained by the impersonal working of material forces, but come preeminently out of the sphere of consciousness - what we have labeled here broadly as ideology. And indeed, a central theme of Weber's work was to prove that contrary to Marx, the material mode of production, far from being the "base," was itself a "superstructure" with roots in religion and culture, and that to understand the emergence of modern capitalism and the profit motive one had to study their antecedents in the realm of the spirit. As we look around the contemporary world, the poverty of materialist theories of economic development is all too apparent. The Wall Street Journal school of deterministic materialism habitually points to the stunning economic success of Asia in the past few decades as evidence of the viability of free market economics, with the implication that all societies would see similar development were they simply to allow their populations to pursue their material self-interest freely. Surely free markets and stable political systems are a necessary precondition to capitalist economic growth. But just as surely the cultural heritage of those Far Eastern societies, the ethic of work and saving and family, a religious heritage that does not, like Islam, place restrictions on certain

forms of economic behavior, and other deeply ingrained moral qualities, are equally important in explaining their economic performance. And yet the intellectual weight of materialism is such that not a single respectable contemporary theory of economic development addresses consciousness and culture seriously as the matrix within which economic behavior is formed.

4.2 BACKGROUND

Ideologies can be seen as cognitive structures with legitimizing functions. There is no principled or very clear demarcation between them and other knowledge structures, although there clearly are differences. In the old understanding ideology was seen in terms of some kind of representation. There was something behind the ideology, and the ideology made this 'something' reappear. The erosion of the concept of representation during last decades has concurred with the erosion of the concept of ideology. This is not to say that ideologies have disappeared. The language of globalization and the ideas of clashes of civilizations are sufficient evidence of the role of ideologies, in the form of master narratives, with totalizing ambitions or pretensions of being the explanation of the world. However, the analysis of ideologies has become much more complex. Instead of taking ideologies as pre-given they must be critically deconstructed and contextualized. Their emergence must be historicized and their appearance must be understood much more in terms of opposition, discontinuities and contradictions, internally as well as externally, than in terms of cohesion and continuity.

4.3 STRUCTURAL THEORY OF POLITICS

The structural-functional approach is derived from earlier uses of functionalism and systems models in anthropology, sociology, biology, and political science. Structural functionalism became popular around 1960 when it became clear that ways of studying U.S. and European politics were not useful in studying newly independent countries, and that a new approach was needed. Structural-functionalism assumes that a

bounded (nation-state) system exists, and studies structures in terms of their function(s) within the system. For structural functionalists the question to be answered is what does a structure (guerrilla movement, political party, election, etc.) do within the political system (of country x)? The goal is to find out what something actually does in a political system, as opposed to what it is supposed to do. Thus, structural functionalists would not waste time studying constitutions in Third World countries if they found that the constitutions [structures] had little impact on political reality.

Almond claimed that certain political functions existed in all political systems. On the input side he listed these **functions** as: **political socialization, political interest articulation, political interest aggregation, and political communication**. Listed as **outputs** were **rule-making, rule implementation, and rule adjudication**. Other basic functions of all political systems included the conversion process, basic pattern maintenance, and various capabilities (distributive, symbolic, etc.). Structural functionalists argued that all political systems, including Third World systems, could most fruitfully be studied and compared on the basis of how differing structures performed these functions in the various political system.

Structural functionalism is based on a systems model. Conceptually, the political process can be depicted as follows:



For analytical purposes the political system is considered to be the nation-state, and the environment is composed of the interactions of

economic, social, and political variables and events, both domestic and external. The idea is that there are a number of actors in the national political system (political parties, bureaucracies, the military, etc.) and that the actions of all these actors affect each other as well as the system. The political analyst must determine the importance of these actors in a particular political system. This is done by analyzing the functions performed by the various actors. Any changes in the system also affect all the actors. The feedback mechanisms allow for constantly changing inputs, as actors react to outputs.

Structural functionalists, like systems analysts, have a bias toward systemic equilibrium, (ie toward stability). Such a bias tends to make this approach conservative, as stability, or evolutionary change, is preferred [and more easily analyzed], to radical, or revolutionary change. A problem which arises with this system-based model is that the nation-state's boundaries are often permeable in the real world, rather than being the neatly bounded nation-state conceptualized by structural functionalists. In other words, in the real world it is usually difficult to state exactly what the boundaries are, leading to some conceptual difficulties. For example, some international actors are only intermittent, such as the U.S. when it intervenes directly in Haitian or Panamanian politics. Should U.S. military forces be considered a part of the Panamanian or Haitian political systems?

STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM AND HISTORICAL SEQUENCES OF CRISES

The structural functional approach provides a useful framework for categorizing and comparing data, but has been criticized as being essentially static. It was not very useful for analyzing or predicting change; the issue of why, how, when, and in what direction, political development occurs. This issue of development, or change, is, of course, crucial for the Third World.

In response to criticisms, structural functionalists looked at history and concluded that political development takes place when an existing political system is unable to cope with problems or challenges confronting it without further structural differentiation or cultural

secularization. Success at meeting such challenges constitutes political development. By challenges, Almond meant changes in the size, content, and frequency of inputs (especially demands) for the system. For structural functionalists:

Political Development is defined as increased structural differentiation and increased cultural secularization.

Structural functionalists argued that, historically, there have been **four major challenges** to political systems, and that the challenges have occurred in the following sequence (in the West).

1. penetration and integration (state-building)

2. loyalty and commitment (nation-building)

3. participation

4. distribution

(Perhaps a **fifth, international penetration**, should be added to the list. The agents of international penetration would include: other nations, international organizations, multinational corporations, prominent individuals, ideological movements, guerrillas, militaries, and technological sources such as radio broadcasts.)

In Europe the challenges occurred separately, and were handled one at a time. Thus, the problem of state-building (road construction, tax system, boundaries)) was usually solved before the problem of nation-building (transferring of primary political loyalty to the national ruler, and away from the local or regional leader) became acute. The challenge of participation was solved by the gradual extension of the vote and political rights to non-propertied people, trade unionists, all males, and finally, to women. The problem of distribution is still a challenge. The question of how to divide up the goods of society has not yet been fully solved, although there seems to be a movement in the direction of more equality in distribution.

The Third World is experiencing a fundamentally different pattern of challenge occurrence. **In the Third World the challenges are occurring simultaneously.**

In many cases "solutions" to historic systemic challenges in the West have been accompanied by violence and strong systemic resistance. (Extension of participation rights to workers; U.S. Civil Rights

movement of 1960s) In Third World nations all the challenges are occurring simultaneously, and demands for solutions are putting severe pressure on national political systems. From a structural functionalist point of view, the amount of violence and instability sometimes observed in Third World politics should, therefore, come as no surprise.

Basic Concepts Defined:

We have already analysed in details the general systems theory as propounded by David Easton which is also called Easton model. But Easton is not the only political scientist who can be credited with being associated with this model or concept. In fact there are a number of political scientists who are actively associated with general systems theory and one of them is Gabriel Almond who died in 2003 at the age of 91. Almond's model is popularly known to the students of political science as structural functionalism.

It is so called because Almond has explained his views keeping these structures of political system in mind. He has, in fact, stressed that every political system has some structures and these structures perform certain functions meant for it. In his noted work The Politics of the Developing Areas Almond has drawn our attention to an interesting issue. He says that though there are differences between developed and developing countries so far as structures are concerned, the structures perform almost similar functions.

What is structure? Here the word structure is used in a sense different from sociological sense. Structure means institutions. Every political system has several institutions such as political party, legislature, executive, judiciary, etc. Almond claims that all these were previously called institutions. But he has changed the nomenclature.

Why has he changed the names? The reason forwarded by Easton is that he wants to adopt concepts and categories which will be suitable for analysing political systems which are radically different from each other. So he wants to adopt such terms as will enable him to analyse and compare all (or at least major) political systems.

His innovative terms do not end with structure. He uses political system instead of state. In his opinion the term state is mainly a legal concept.

But political system includes many other ideas besides legality. Almond further says that "power" is a legal term and for that reason he cautiously avoids the use of the term state.

The concept function can conveniently be used. Even the word "function" is more comprehensive. He also prefers role to office. In this way Almond has made strenuous efforts to acquaint his readers with the new concepts and he has expressed his intention of doing this.

Elaborating his intention Almond has said: "the search for new concepts is not an ad hoc matter. It reflects an underlying drift towards a new and coherent way of thinking about and studying politics that is implied in such slogans as behavioural approach…… We are not simply adding terms to an old vocabulary, but rather are in the process of developing or adapting a new one".

Almond claims that the new terms do not constitute a corpus of conceptual vocabulary but they indicate a new dimension of the nature of political science. He wants to revolutionise the system and study of political science. Almonds' conceptualisation process has really revolutionised the political science in general and comparative politics in particular.

Why Structural Functionalism?

In structural functionalism the structures of the political system (such as political parties, interest groups, legislatures, executives, bureaucracies and courts) are not clearly defined and properly patterned and yet inspite of this their importance is immense. In the opinion of Stephen Wasby, "In structural-functional analysis, one determines the important structures and then attempts to trace out the functions of these structures". In every political system there are certain structures and these cannot be confused with each other. So far as the functions are concerned there is certain amount of overlapping among the function of the structures. But this overlapping should not be over-emphasised.

This is a very common picture of every political system. The structural functionalism enables us to have a clear conception about the role of the various structures. This is essential at least for two purposes. One is a student of political science will be able to compare various political systems.

The second is, the student will be able to assess the various aspects of the political system. From the structural-functionalism we come to know about the operational process of the political system. In the concept structural functionalism the students must know both the structures and the functions.

Origin of Structural Functionalism:

Davies and Lewis in their noted work writes: "structural functional analysis can be said to have originated in the biological and mechanical sciences. Within the social sciences it was first used in anthropology and was later developed and refined as a mode of sociological analysis, predominantly by Talcott Parsons". For clarity and smoothness of thought and analysis we want to make a very brief survey of the origin.

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) is treated as "an inheritor of a long French tradition of social thought".

Durkheim elaborately analysed the basic structure of society, their various parts, different social systems and he did this in an organismic outlook. Society, according to Durkheim, is to be viewed as an entity. There are several parts of any society and all of them are well-connected. The parts perform their allotted duties but the parts are not completely independent on each other. He also viewed that the systems or the parts of the society are quite normal divisions and the functions which they perform are also normal.

Two renowned anthropologists Bronislaw and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown were heavily influenced by the organicism of Durkheim. Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) believed that the concept of function applied to human society is based on an analogy between social life and organic life.

Radcliffe-Brown's views have been summarised by Turner in the following manner:

(1) One necessary condition for survival of a society is minimal integration of its parts.

(2) The term function refers to those processes that maintain this necessary integration.

(3) In each society structural features can be shown to contribute to the maintenance of necessary solidarity. In this way, briefly stated,

Radcliffe-Brown has offered us a picture of structural functional feature of any system especially social system.

Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1947) is another sociologist who introduced structural functionalism to the study of society. He has divided the society into three system levels: the biological, the social-structural and symbolic.

Turner writes: "At each of these levels one can discern basic needs or survival requisites that must be met if biological health, social structural integrity and cultural unity are to exist. These system levels constitute a hierarchy with biological systems at bottom. He stressed that the way in which needs are met in one system level sets constraints on how they are met at the next level in the hierarchy".

Talcott Parsons:

The structural functionalism has also been elaborated by Talcott Parsons who "was most probably the most dominant theorist of his time. It is unlikely that any one theoretical approach will so dominate sociological theory again". This assessment of Turner about Parsons is not without any reason.

In the fields of sociology and structural functionalism the contribution of Parsons is still gratefully remembered by the students of sociology and political science. Parsons has pointed out four important prerequisites of structural functionalism and these we can treat as the main functions of structural functionalism.

These are adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latency. Adaptation involves the problem of securing from the environment sufficient facilities and then distributing these facilities through-out the system. Goal attainment denotes the problems of establishing priorities among system goals and mobilising system resources for their attainment. Integration refers to the problem of coordinating and maintaining viable interrelationships among system units.

Latency implies two related problems—one is pattern maintenance and the other is tension management. There are many actors in the social system and how they play their role that requires to be ascertained. In every system there arises tension and conflict and all these should be

managed. In any system there are many subsystems and all these functions are performed by them.

Characteristics of Political System:

Mention has been made that Almond's analysis has built-up a huge structure of general systems theory and he has thrown light on the subject from different angle.

According to Almond all the political systems have in common four main charac-teristics. He has also admitted that there may be minor variations in some of the characteristics but the main theme remains unaltered.

The characteristics are:

(1) There are simple and complex political systems in different parts of the globe. The industrialised matured societies of the West have complex political structures where as the developing countries of the Third World have simple structures. Almond's point is that all the political systems have political structures.

Even the simplest political systems have political structures which may be compared with the developed structures of the West. Almond has admitted that the comparison between two types of structures may not be completely relevant but they can be compared. Moreover, -the emergence of the new state systems in the Third World encouraged Almond to devise a technique that will be helpful for comparison. Here lies the credit of Almond.

2. There may be differences between the systems and structures but all the systems perform almost same political functions. For the purpose of comparative analysis the frequency of the performance can be studied.

3. The political structures may be specialised, non-specialised or may be primitive. But thorough study of the various aspects has revealed that the structures are multi-functional which means that though the functions of a particular structure have been specifically stated, in practice the structure performs other functions.

For example, the chief function of the court is to adjudicate, but in practice it performs legislative functions. In the same way the legislative wing of the government has been found to act like a court of law. In liberal democracies the pressure groups participate in the legislative function. In both democratic and authoritarian systems the multi-functional character of structure is found.

4. All political systems are mixed systems in the cultural sense. The culture of any political system is the mixture of modern and traditional cultures. From the study of the cultures of various political systems Almond has found that there cannot exist any all-modern and all-primitive cultures. Even the cultures of primitive political systems are partially moulded by the developed cultures of the West.

Of course there may be difference of predominance of any particular culture on the cultural aspects of another system. For example, during the British rule Indian society and culture were influenced by British culture. But at the same time the British culture and society could not keep itself away from Indian culture.

However, the percentage of mixture may be different in both cases. There are also stages in the process of assimilation. These are the four main characteristics of all the political systems and by finding out the characteristics Almond has made attempt to generalise the political systems.

Functions of Political Systems:

The chief objective of Almond was to make a comparative study of the major political systems and for that purpose what he has done ultimately became the foundation of general systems theory/analysis. For the purposes of comparison Gabriel Almond has divided the functions of political system into two broad categories—Input functions and output functions.

Easton and Almond have borrowed the terms—input and output from economics for the purpose of analysing the functions and behaviour of political systems and their different structures. This approach helps comparison considerably.

The input functions are:

1. Political socialisation and recruitment.

2. Interest articulation

3. Interest aggregation

4. Political communication.

The output functions are:

1. Rule making

2. Rule adjudication

3. Rule application.

If we focus our attention to these two types of functions performed by political systems we shall find that the input functions are generally done by the non-governmental organisations and agencies which include pressure groups, interest groups, parties, educational institutions. The government has very little part to play in the input functions.

While performing the input functions the agencies have little scope to violate the common law and existing legal and constitutional structure. But if the agencies have in mind the idea of changing the existing structure, they can do otherwise.

Input Functions:

(i) Political Socialisation and Recruitment:

The first input function of the political system is political socialisation and recruitment. One expert of political socialisation calls it "a continuous learning process involving both emotional learning and manifest political indoctrination". Through the process if political socialisation people gradually adjust themselves with the political

system. “Political system” defines Almond “is the process of induction into the political culture. Its end product is a set of attitudes—cognitions, value standards and feelings —towards the political system, its various roles and role incumbents”.

In developed political systems of the West schools, churches, political parties and other voluntary organisations generally play the leading role in socialising the people. The socialisation process is not very much prominent in the Third World states but the very existence can never be denied. As society gradually develops the process of socialisation also proceeds.

From the study of political system Almond has come to know that socialisation may be latent and manifest. When the transmission of values, ideas, thoughts, feelings etc takes place in a direct way, it may be called manifest socialisation. Latent political socialisation does not take place directly.

The values, thoughts, ideas, feelings of one system are influenced by those of other systems. Both latent and manifest socialisation work simultaneously in any political system and both are important. In order to revolutionise the people’s thought and outlook the latent method is resorted to.

When the boundaries of political systems are not clearly demarcated the differences among the different cultures are found to be insignificant. In that situation political socialisation fails to assume a clear shape. But when the boundaries are well-settled the impact of one culture falls upon the culture of another political system and vice versa. In this way the political socialisation advances.

Defining political recruitment Almond says: “Political recruitment function takes up where the general political socialisation function leaves off. It recruits members of the society out of particular subcultures, religious communities, statuses, classes, ethnic communities and the-like and inducts them into specialised roles of the political system, trains them in approapriate skills, provides them with political cognitive maps, values, expectations and affects”.

The definition is self-explanatory. Here also the non-governmental orgnisations such as political parties, groups etc. recruit persons and train

them to perform specific functions. The purpose of political recruitment is to train the general public to make them suitable for the political system.

The objective of both political socialisation and recruitment is to ensure the stability of the political system. If any external force threatens the political system the citizens, on their part, can resist it and socialisation makes it possible. Plato suggested a scheme of education for the ideal state whose purpose was to train the citizens to make them suitable for ideal state. It is also socialisation.

(ii) Interest Articulation:

The second important input function of political systems is interest articulation. In every political system, specifically pluralist political system, citizens claim the fulfilment of their demands or materialisation of interests.

But there is a big gap between the raising of demands and their realisation. Demands must be placed before the competent authority in an articulated form and they must pass through proper channel. So we find that both the articulation of demands and their placement are vital.

From the analysis of Almond we come to know that the interest articulation is a complicated and broad concept. Many agencies are involved in this function.

Almond has pointed out four such agencies:

(1) Institutional interest groups.

(2) Non- associational interest groups,

(3) Anomic interest groups and

(4) Associational interest groups.

Institutional interest groups generally consist of legislatures, executives, bureaucra-cies etc. These institutional interest groups articulate interests

(of their own) in various ways and they exert pressure upon the authority for the realisation of interests.

The institutional interest group is a formally organised group and consists of professional persons. Particularly the bureaucracy in various ways creates pressure upon the authority for the fulfilment of their demands and the authority is forced to act accordingly.

There are non-associational interest groups. People form associations or groups out of their sociable character. Man is by nature a social animal. But non-associational interest groups are formed on the basis of different grounds. Such groups are formed by persons of the same religious, ethnic or family, community. Affinity develops among the people of the same religion, ethnic group, or kinship.

The members of the non-associational groups complain about their non-delegation to the legislature, or the non-fulfilment of their legitimate demands. The presence of non-associational interest groups is very common in developing societies because of the great attachment of people to religion, kinship, caste etc.

It has been found that these groups or subgroups fight together against the authority and on political consideration the authority of the political system is forced to comply with their demands.

In almost all political systems riots or militant demonstrations frequently erupt and these are led by men who want to snatch away few privileges from the political system. These groups are called anomic interest group. These groups have no permanent structure or organisations. On certain important political or social or economic issues they spontaneously form agitation or lead demonstrations.

Emphasising their role Almond says that the anomic groups besides articulating interests also perform adjudication functions, rule application function such as to free the prisoners and communication function which means communicating the news to various anomic interest groups.

Finally we shall deal with associational groups. Such groups are formed by the trade unions, businessmen, industrialists or professional groups and persons. The articulation of interest by such groups is quite prominent in all political systems. Trade unions create pressure upon the

industries or authority in support of their demands and if necessary launch agitation.

This form of technique to articulate interest is not only common but also very effective. In democratic countries the right to form association and through it to process is an important right and workers and professional groups taking this opportunity agitate for realisation of demands.

In the opinion of Almond: "The performance of the interest articulation function may be manifest or latent, specific or diffuse, general or particular, instrumental or affective in style".

Sometimes the groups or agitators place specific demands before the authority such as revision of pay scale or lessening of working hour etc. This is called manifest interest articulation. If the groups demand in indirect or ambiguous ways and do not demand specific solution and do not place clear formulations it may be called latent interest articulation.

The failure of the political system forces the people to demand that the present political system should be changed. Capitalism is to be replaced by socialism. The demands may be of general type such as poor people should be given more financial relief and rich people ought to be taxed more. In all these forms, interest articulation takes place.

(iii) Interest Aggregation:

Interest aggregation is the third function of the political system. In our analysis of the second function we have noted that various organisations, groups and agencies as well as political parties raise demands and grievances in an articulated form. Now the problem is mere placing of demands or problems is not sufficient for their translation into fruitful policies. For that reason the issue of interest aggregation arises.

Various demands and claims are to be aggregated into a consolidated form and after that the political system takes action. "Aggregation may be accomplished by means of the formulation of general policies in which interests are combined, accommodated or otherwise taken account of or by means of recruitment of political personnel, more or less committed to a particular pattern of policy".

The political system cannot take separate steps or adopt measures for each set of demands and claims. Naturally a general policy is formulated

which covers all demands and claims. Almond's specification of interest articulation and interest aggregation does not always work in all systems. In developed political systems these two are clearly demarcated but not in less developed systems.

In democratic countries the process of interest articulation and interest aggregation are different because the voluntary organisations demand-to the government on behalf of the common people and these are passed through different channels to the authority. But in authoritarian system of administration or in tribal society both the functions are performed by same person.

(iv) Political Communication Function:

So far we have noted the three different functions of political system—political socialisation, interest articulation and interest aggregation. These three functions are performed by means of political communication. All sorts of interests are articulated through communication and, again, they are aggregated by means of communication. Naturally, without communication the political system will not be in a position to discharge any function.

In every political system there must exist a network of elaborate communication system and it must have enough autonomy to work independently. We can treat it as an important precondition and it is essential for successful functioning of the political system. All the organisations must have freedom to articulate interests, these, after being aggregated, must be communicated to the relevant authority.

Since in authoritarian systems there is no elaborate and effective network of political communication a political system is generally characterised by the political communication function. "Thus it is essential in characterising a political system to analyse the performance of the communication function. Just because of the fact that all the political functions are performed by means of communications political communication is the crucial boundary-maintenance function." In one area or subsystem claims are made and it is transmitted to another subsystem through communication.

The success of the input functions of the political system to a large extent, depends upon the efficient and independent network of communication. But is unfortunate that such a network is not always available in all systems. Governments are inclined to control communication.

Output Functions:

Output functions of political system include—rule making, rule application and rule adjudication. Gabriel Almond and many others have made thorough study about the output functions of various political systems and he has concluded that the output functions or the governmental functions are not uniform in all political systems.

In liberal democracies such as United States, Britain, France, Canada etc. the govern-mental functions bear striking similarities. But in the newly independent states of the Third World these functions assume different nature. This is mainly due to the nature of their political systems.

Edward Shills in the Political Development of the New States has divided the new states into the following categories:

1. One category is political democracy. In political democracies legislature, executive and judiciary are comparatively autonomous and their functions are different. The parties and groups also enjoy sufficient freedom in discharge of their functions.

2. There are tutelary democracies in some countries. The characteristic feature of such democracies is there is the combination of the formal forms of democracy and the structural forms of democracy. Elites have gained ascendancy over other groups and classes. In such democracies the legislature and judiciary are not allowed to enjoy full autonomy and authority.

In fact, power is concentrated in the executive and bureaucracy. Executive and the bureaucracy are controlled by elites. The formal structure is maintained.

3. Modernising oligarchies are characterised by powerful bureaucracy. Also, army has a tremendous influence in the administration of state. Top-ranking army officers and bureaucrats control the administration. In

such types of political systems emphasis on economic development is laid.

4. Totalitarian oligarchic systems are found in some countries. The entire state administration is controlled by ruling elite, top bureaucrats, party bosses and leaders. 'Common people or the rank and file of the party has no say in the policy formulation and implementation. It has been maintained that is former Soviet Union and other communist states totalitarian oligarchy existed.

5. There is, finally, traditional oligarchy. Hereditary or dynastic monarchy falls in this category. Relatives and henchmen of monarchy are generally recruited to the posts of top bureaucracy. In fact, these persons fully control the state administration in the name of the king. The structures of government in ancient India and European countries belonged to this category. Ordinary people had no access to power and authority. The priests and relatives of king enjoyed power.

The common forms of political system found in the Third World states are tutelary democracy, modernising oligarchy and traditional oligarchy. The three governmental functions are not clearly defined which exists in political democracies. Such democratic systems prevail in Japan, Israel, and Turkey etc.

Adaptation and Change:

The core idea of Almond's structural functionalism is how the structures of the political system function and how (through the functions and other ways) adjusts with other systems as well as with the environment surrounding it. This, like Easton's analysis, lays the foundation of general system analysis.

It has been held by Almond and many others that behind the building up of a general system there is the very crucial role of adaptation and change. The two, of course, cannot be effectively separated. If the political system adjusts (or adapts) itself with the new challenges emanating from the environment, then that means that the political system has succeeded is adapting with the outer conditions which we call the environment.

Again, change travels with the adjustment or adaptation. Adaptation means make suitable for a new use or purpose. When a political system is faced with new circumstances, it cannot outright neglect or reject them. So it tries to accommodate itself with the new situation. Moreover, in a democratic set up, it is not an easy task to neglect the new situation because the citizens might have support or weakness for these.

Naturally, the political system will gradually adjust itself with the challenges. This adaptation or adjustment brings about change in the political system. The change is inevitable because in an open system the political system cannot keep itself aloof from other systems. Thus adaptation and change are linked.

We thus find that Almond's theory of general system is also a theory of political change. Because of the influence of outer factors the political system is impelled to adapt itself with them and this finally causes change. This change may be qualitative or quantitative. But the fact remains that in both Easton's and Almond's general systems analysis there is both adaptation and change.

Almond's theory of political change denotes: "those transactions between political system and its environment that affect changes in general system performance". The traditional political scientists did not deal with the concept of political change so elaborately. Their main concern was the functions of institutions.

Almond calls this adaptation or adjustment conversion process. The demands or claims coming from other systems or from the environment do not remain unattended. Today or tomorrow they are converted into decisions or policies. The demands, claims and supports for these are called inputs and the decisions/policies are called outputs. This is the conversion process. Inputs are converted into outputs. The conversion takes place through feedback.

But the conversion depends upon the capabilities of the political system. Here capabilities indicate the ability of the political system to receive the demands and claims (which are called inputs) and to act accordingly (which means to implement them). The question of the augmentation of capability is also a pertinent issue.

For this purpose it is essential on the part of the political system to proceed the work of political socialisation and political recruitment. This will help the political system to create a support base for the existing system. “Thus” Almond asserts, “capabilities analysis is the method by which the empirical investigation of political system is undertaken. It links the deductive analysis with the reality”.

How does the change take place? It is the function of political system to respond to the demands, claims and supports and this finally leads to change.

Almond identifies three different sources from which these originate:

(1) The elites and their associates and affiliated groups.

(2) Numerous social groups and organisations which are active in the society and the environment.

(3) Finally, within the political system the demands may originate. Whatever may the sources of demands be, the political system, for convenience, should respond. It is mainly due to the fact that if the political system deliberately neglects the demands some sort of political turmoil will disturb the political system. So, for the sake of stability of political system, it is really incumbent for it to take care of demands and to do something so that stability is not disturbed.

Almond’s system analysis also throws light on the stability and, along with it, the balance or equilibrium. Both Easton and Almond were concerned with the stability of the political system. This stability largely depends on the equilibrium position or the balance between inputs and outputs.

Explaining Almond’s views, Davies and Lewis have made the following observation: “A political system is stable when the flow of inputs and outputs is such that inputs are converted in a way that does not result in any strains (emphasis added) being imposed on the systemic capacity to respond to them) for such strains may have led the structure of the system itself to suffer basic changes”.

Both Easton and Almond have greatly emphasised the stability of political system and this they have done purposely. Their purpose was to counteract the advance of Marxism. Their intention was to prove that liberalism was superior to Marxism.

Easton, Almond and several other exponents apprehended that Marxism would destabilize the American system, and for that reason they vigorously argued that the self-regulatory mechanism of capitalism had the ability to resist any attack on it and restore (if it is at all disturbed) equilibrium or stability.

Hence we find that the stability, equilibrium, balance etc. are specially coined terms to denote the nature and function of political system. We have already noted that Easton and Almond were concerned about the rapid progress of Marxism and they built up a theoretical structure which would be capable to resist any external onslaught.

They believed that the capitalist system possesses certain self-regulatory mechanisms by which can defend itself. The internal system or arrangement can combat any recalcitrant elements/forces. In order to strengthen their stand both Easton and Almond have strenuously advocated the general systems theory.

An Evaluation:

Structural functionalism strongly advocated and minutely elaborated by Gabriel Almond suffers from a number of shortcomings some of which are:

1. The critics are of opinion that Almond borrowed the chief elements and aspects of his structural functionalism mainly from sociology and specifically from Parsons —the most noted sociologist of the second-half of the twentieth century. The problem is the term and concepts having abundant relevance in sociology may not have the same in political science.

But Almond's structural functionalism has done it and because of this the sociological terms applied in political science do not carry with them proper meaning and importance. The critics are of the view that this method of analysis makes the subject cumbersome.

For example, he has used “system” and “interactions” which have been borrowed from anthropology. But the import of the two terms in political system is unlikely to be same and the entire analysis appears to be confused.

2. Defining political system Almond says that interaction is to be found in all independent societies that is in order to be a system there shall be interactions among various parts or subsystems of independent societies. Now critics say that what is exactly meant by “independent” is not clear from Almond’s definition. Are the societies free from foreign domination? If it so means then should we say that a system does not exist in societies controlled by foreign power? We cannot form a definite reply.

Hence the ambiguity overcasts the definition of Almond. It would have been better if he had clarified his stand. We are, however, of opinion that Almond uses the term independent in general sense. A society will be called independent if it enjoys power to take decision.

3. Some critics are of the view that he has thrown very little light on the structural aspects of political systems. He has given them new nomenclatures. He calls state a political system, institutions, structures etc. But by giving new names he has not been able to change the character and functions of political system/state.

The units remain the same and there do not occur changes in functions, behaviour etc. We can say that the structural functionalism of Almond can, at best, be called a new attempt to view politics/states. It can be called a model and not more than that.

4. Numerous factors operate behind the interaction among the system. But it is unfortunate that he has not drawn our attention to these factors. We believe that for a comprehensive analysis and for the purpose of general systems theory all these are to be brought into active consideration. Otherwise, the general systems theory will remain incomplete.

5. The gravest charge against Almond is he has, in a clandestine way, supported the existing structure of the capitalist system. He wants to establish that the capitalist system, through its management and self-regulatory mechanism, can defend itself. It is a better system in comparison with other systems.

6. In spite of all these criticisms one might say that Almond's model (structural functionalism) is the most suitable one for comparative analyses and we come to know from his writings that he modelled this aiming at a comparative analysis. We think that his purpose has been served. With the help of structural functionalism we can easily compare the different political systems. Not only this, his model will help us compare the various systems systematically and methodologically.

7. In this age of globalisation his model has a clear and overriding importance. Because of the tremendous impact of globalisation the world has become too small. Almost all the countries of this world have come closer and no state can claim that it is outside the influence of other states. Naturally, the influence of one or more states is bound to fall on the activities and systems of other states.

In the light of this we can say that Almond's theory has special significance. The political, cultural, economic and other elements, today, can very easily create impact upon different states. This influence is never a one-way traffic.

The result is that the structural functionalism of Almond has received new dimensions in this age of globalisation. Particularly the capitalist states of the West are, in different ways, influencing and dominating the states of the Third World. We must take note of it.

8. There is no denying the fact that the General Systems Theory has opened the new vistas of comparative politics. Though Aristotle is considered by many as the originator of comparative politics, the credit of expanding its base and periphery should go to Almond. To do justice to Almond, one must say that it is Almond who has modernised and popularised the concept of comparative politics.

9. It is true that the main purpose of Almond and his supporters was to corner the advance of Marxism. But simultaneously it is also true that he has strengthened the foundation of liberalism.

10. Some critics object to the use of terms borrowed from other disciplines but only this method has enhanced the acceptability and reliability of political science.

4.4 POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: ITS STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS, AND ELECTIVE AFFINITIES

Ideology has re-emerged as an important topic of inquiry among social, personality, and political psychologists. In this review, we examine recent theory and research concerning the structure, contents, and functions of ideological belief systems. We begin by defining the construct and placing it in historical and philosophical context. We then examine different perspectives on how many (and what types of) dimensions individuals use to organize their political opinions. We investigate (a) how and to what extent individuals acquire the discursive contents associated with various ideologies, and (b) the social-psychological functions that these ideologies serve for those who adopt them. Our review highlights "elective affinities" between situational and dispositional needs of individuals and groups and the structure and contents of specific ideologies. Finally, we consider the consequences of ideology, especially with respect to attitudes, evaluations, and processes of system justification.

4.5 ROLE OF IDEOLOGIES

The role of ideology in international relations can be hardly over emphasized. It is an element of National Power. In fact, the true nature of a policy followed by a nation is always concealed under ideological justifications and rationalizations. U.S. President Nixon’s New Peace Policy was in reality a policy of ‘Divide and be Strong’ between the erstwhile USSR and China.

"Ideology refers to the particular ideologies which are used by nations for securing the goals of their national interests. These are in the form of simple, legal or ethical or biological principles such as justice, equality, fraternity or natural struggle in relations"- Karl Manneheim.

Ideology influences the choice of the goals and objectives of national interest as well as the means for securing these goals. The general ideologies of liberal democracy and communism acted as important factors of the cold war foreign policies of the USA and Erstwhile USSR, and hence of international relations.

In fact, each nation uses a number of particular ideologies or ideological principles as well as a general ideology for explaining and justifying its actions and policies in international relations. As such, the study of behaviour of nations in international relations requires an evaluation of the role of ideology.

What is Ideology?

Ideology is a set of ideas that seeks to explain some or all aspects of reality, lays down values and preferences in respect of both ends and means, and includes a programme of action for the attainment of the defined ends.

Definition:

(1) "Ideology is a body of ideas concerning economic, social and political values and goals which posit action programmes for attaining these goals."—Padelford and Lincoln

(2) "Ideology is a cluster of ideas about life, society or government, which originates, in most cases, as consciously advocated dogmatically asserted social, political or religious slogans or battle-cries and which through continuous usage and preaching's gradually become the characteristic beliefs or dogmas of a particular group, party, or nationality." —Richard Snyder and Hubert Wilson

(3) "An ideology is a system of abstract ideas held by an individual (or group) which purports to explain reality, expresses value goals, and contains programmes of action for the rejection or attainment of the kind of social order in which its proponents believe the goals can best be realized." —Charles P. Schleicher

(4) “Ideology is a set of ideas that purports to give meaning to the past, to explain the present and to prognosticate the future.” —Richard W. Sterling

In other words Ideology is a set of ideas or principles which seek to explain a phenomenon in a particular way as well as either to support or reject a particular socio- economic-politico-cultural order.

Types of Ideologies:

In the context of international politics, ideology does not mean only a general ideology involving a set of ideas and offering a particular definite view of the world. In International Politics, as Karl Manneheim observes, “ideology refers to the particular ideologies which are used by nations for securing the goals of their national interests. These are in the form of simple, legal or ethical or biological principles such as justice, equality, fraternity or natural struggle in relations.”

These are in the form of conscious disguises for covering the real nature of political relations and policies. Words are twisted or construed and interpreted narrowly. Situations are distorted and conclusions are drawn in such a way as may dupe others, e.g. deception, violation of moral codes, law and conventions.

Karl Mannheim names these as ‘Particular Ideologies’, which are used by nations to criticize and reject the views of the opponents and to justify their own ideas and perceptions. Such ideologies are used as means for exercising power.

“Ideologies in the context of power are a cover to hide the real nature of the objectives of foreign policy.”

“Ideologies are a cover to conceal the true nature of political actions. It is the very nature of politics to compel the actor on the political scene to use ideologies in order to disguise the immediate goals of this action.” —**Morgenthau**

Nations use a number of particular ideologies for covering or hiding the real nature of their foreign policies, more particularly the real nature of the goals that their foreign policies seek to attain.

Role of Ideology in International Relations:

The role of ideology in international relations can be analyzed in two parts:

(i) The role of general ideologies as an element of state's behaviour and

(ii) The role of particular ideologies in foreign policy-making and implementation.

I. Role of General Ideologies:

In our times, the ideologies of Liberalism and Communism have been the two main general ideologies playing an important role in influencing the behaviour of states in international relations.

(a) What is the Ideology of Liberalism?

Ever since the seventeenth century, the ideology of Liberalism has been the foundation stone of western social, economic and political systems. In the 20th century it came to be developed as a doctrine of 'Liberal Democracy', 'Democratic Capitalism' and even 'Modern Liberalism'.

The ideology of liberalism affirms full faith in the rights, liberty and individuality of the individual as the supreme values. It advocates policies and actions designed to safeguard and promote these values. The state is expected to have as less control over the individual as possible. It regards free competition, free trade and freedom of choice as the three cardinal principles of a free and happy society and the key to progress.

It strongly opposes the ideologies of Totalitarianism, Fascism, Nazism and Communism as dangerous and totally destructive ideologies which kill individual initiative, enterprise and freedom. Liberalism rejects the idea of total state control or even excessive state control over the individual. The USA and other western powers used this ideology in the era of Cold War for criticizing the policies of the communist USSR.

(b) What is the Ideology of Communism?

The ideology of Communism is the veritable opposite of Liberalism. Based upon the philosophy of Marxism—Leninism, it regards equality more important than liberty. It gives primacy to the economic factors of social relations and regards them as the determinants of all behaviour—social, political, cultural etc.

It classifies states as rich or capitalist states and the poor or non-capitalist states. It seeks to end the class division between the rich and the poor—the bourgeois and the proletariat. It identifies itself with the working

class and advocates an economic and political system controlled by the proletariat. It regards state as an instrument of exploitation in the hands of the rich whereby they exploit the poor. Hence, it stands for a classless and stateless society.

The ideology of communism strongly opposes capitalism along with its system of 'bourgeois democracy'. It opposes free trade and open competition as the greatest enemies of the interests of man. These are regarded as the instruments of inequality and exploitation in social relations. In the sphere of international relations it is used to condemn and reject as evil the policies and actions of the capitalist states. These are criticized as imperialist states.

However after the collapse of the communist regimes in the USSR and all other socialist states, even the communists now look with favour the ideological principles of democratisation, decentralisation, liberalisation, market economy, free trade and competition. China is a communist country but it now follows the ideology of economic liberalisation and describes this as 'Market Socialism.'

General Ideologies and International Relations:

1. Ideological Divisions among Nations:

Western powers—the USA, the U.K. and almost all the Western European countries, are the staunch supporters of Liberalism. Their relations with other countries are governed by the consideration as to whether the country with whom relations are to be conducted is a liberal democratic state or a communist-totalitarian state.

Between 1945-90 these countries regarded the spread of communism as the biggest danger to humankind and hence advocated the consolidation of democratic countries against the communist countries. The cold war (1945- 90) between the USA and the erstwhile USSR was also an ideological war. The USA tried both to strengthen the democratic forces in the world and to weaken and isolate the communist countries, particularly the erstwhile USSR.

Likewise, the erstwhile USSR and other (erstwhile) communist countries tried to consolidate their position in the world. They tried to secure the spread of communism to other countries. They regarded communism as the panacea for all ills of capitalistic liberalism and hence, strongly

advocated the need for the unity of the workers of all the countries for overthrowing the evil of capitalistic imperialism. The idea of Ideological unity acted as a fundamental factor in the consolidation of Eastern European nations and the erstwhile USSR into the Warsaw Pact (1955-90).

The history of 1945-90 international relations can also be analyzed as a history of conflict between the liberal democratic alliances—NATO and SEATO and the communist alliance— the Warsaw Pact. The ideological opposition between West and East constituted an important factor of international relations of 1945-90 period. During these years the conflict between ideologies of liberalism and communism acted a factor of international relations.

2. Limited Use of General Ideologies by the Nations for securing their National Goals:

The general ideologies are mostly used for window dressing the power goals of the nations. This is evident from the fact that despite being the strongest champion of liberalism, the USA does not hesitate to have the best of relations with several totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and military dictatorships (like Pakistan), to the detriment of the interests of the world's largest working democracy i.e. India.

Again, the USA continues to follow the policy of cultivating relations with Communist China and at the same time continues to follow its policy of supporting Liberalism and Human Rights. Likewise, no state is now prepared to let ideological differences come in the way of cultivating relations with other nations.

As such general ideologies are factors of international relations of our times, but are not the determinants of the behaviour of the states in the international environment. These influence the course of relations among nations only in a limited way.

II. Role of Particular Ideologies:

Contemporary times clearly reflect the role that several particular ideologies have been playing in International Politics.

Morgenthau refers to three such typical ideologies of the foreign policy:

1. Ideology of Status Quo

2. Ideology of Imperialism, and

3. Ambiguous Ideologies.

1. Ideology of Status Quo:

Nations seeking the preservation of the existing power positions pursue the policy of status quo. The principle that guides the outlook in this respect is "what exists must have something in its favour, otherwise it would not exist." The policies of states like Switzerland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden can be defined on the basis of status quo.

These nations pursue the policies which tend to justify the power which these nations already have. A status quo policy has got certain moral legitimacy. It gives some legitimacy to their positions and role in international relations. Ideology of status quo is opposed to the ideology of imperialism because imperialism, by its very nature, always favors to overthrow the status quo. As the ideology of peace and International Law rests upon the desire for peace, so in reality this policy also turns out to be an ideology of status quo.

2. Ideology of Imperialism:

A policy that seeks to alter the status quo or a given power distribution is regarded as imperialist policy. The policy of imperialism is always in need of some justification for altering the existing territorial arrangement. This policy must prove that the status quo which it desires to overthrow is not necessary. It bases its case on moral grounds and on natural law i.e., the law as it should be.

Thus, Nazi Germany based its demand for the revision of the status quo of the Treaty of Versailles mainly on the principle of equality which the Treaty of Versailles was said to have violated. The demand for the colonies and revision of the unilateral disarmament provisions of the heavy were derived from the very principle. Ideology of Imperialism is used by a nation for justifying its policy of expanding its national power beyond its borders for economic, strategic and political gains.

Ideology of imperialism, which in itself involves several ideological principles seek to overthrow the status quo on the basis of natural law i.e. the law as it should be. It a tries to do so by raising ideological slogans such as "the White Man's Burden, " "the National Mission ", "A

Christian Duty". "Struggle for Survival and Rule of the Fittest" "Rule of the higher over the lower" and so on.

Napoleon swept over Europe under the slogan of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Under the influence of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, the ideologies of imperialism preferred biological arguments in support of the goal of ruling alien populations.

The philosophy of Darwin and Spencer and the principle of survival of the fittest were transformed into the doctrines of military superiority of strong nations. Fascism and Nazism came out of this biological argument in revolutionary terms. The imperialist countries try to justify the extension of their empires over backward countries through a host of 'moral ideologies' and on the principles of natural evolution which basically support imperialism in international relations.

3. Ambiguous Ideologies or the Ideologies of Anti-imperialism:

For securing their desired goals, many nations use such particular ideologies as are quite vague and ambiguous. But these carry an appeal to the heart and head and thus help them to secure their desired objectives in international relations. These ambiguous ideologies are popularly called the ideologies of anti- imperialism, since all of these seek to denounce the actions of their opponents as 'imperialist actions'.

Three Ambiguous Ideologies:

(a) The Ideology of National Self-determination;

(b) The Ideology of the United Nations; and

(c) The Ideology of Peace.

3(a) The Ideology of National Self-determination:

This ideology was used by Woodrow Wilson for justifying the liberation of Central and East European nations from foreign domination. On the basis of this principle, German minorities of Czechoslovakia and Poland tried to undermine the national existence of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Later on, this ideology was used by Hitler for justifying his policy of territorial expansionism. National self-determination in the form of ethnic self- determinism has recently witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

3(b) The Ideology of the United Nations:

The principles and objectives of international relations as contained in the Charter of the United Nations are used by almost all the nations for justifying their policies and actions. Almost every international agreement of treaty begins with such words “In the spirit of the United Nations” or “In keeping with the principles contained in the U.N. Charter”.

The Charter of United Nations is used to justify national policies and decisions. All nations endeavor to pose themselves as the champions of the UN Charter and ideology and frequently quote these in support of their policies and actions. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council always quote the U.N. Charter for maintaining their superior status and hence advocate status quo as laid down by it. They are not really willing to admit new permanent members in the UN Security Council.

Similarly, almost all other nations use the Charter as an ideological weapon for criticizing the opponents and for justifying their own policies as policies of international peace, cooperation and goodwill. Peace agreements in respect of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Bosina, Angola etc. were based on the basis of the ideology of the UN Charter.

3(c) The Ideology of Peace:

The ideology of peace is used by a nation for criticizing the policies of other nations as anti-peace policies. War is an evil and an illegal instrument of international relations. Presently, war is feared and abhorred by the people in general because of its totally destructive character. This fear of war has directly favoured the love for peace as the ideal of international relations. Hence, nations always talk of peace and justify their policies as policies aimed at peace.

The policies of the opponents are criticized as policies ignoring the interests of world peace. Even when a nation is engaged in a military action or is intervening in the affairs of another state, it attempts to explain and justify its actions as a necessary course for strengthening the cause of durable peace and stability in international relations. This was done by the USA during the Gulf War 1991 and continues to be done so even now in the 21st century (Iraq and Afghanistan wars).

Hence, this ideology is used by nations for concealing the true nature of the policies they pursue behind a mask of pronounced peaceful intentions and for attracting the support of people and goodwill from every corner of the world.

4. Ideology of Human Rights:

Currently several nations, particularly the USA and European states have been using the ideology of Human Rights for criticizing the policies of other nations as well as for influencing other nations in favour of their policies.

5. Other Ideologies:

Pakistan has been using the ideology of national self-determination and freedom struggle for justifying its support for terrorists operating against the people of India, particularly in the Indian province of J&K. It however, uses anti-Talibanism for justifying its policy of supporting US actions in Afghanistan which also involves its decision to provide military (logistic) support to the US operations in Afghanistan. The USA has used the principle of non-proliferation for justifying its decision to attack and occupy Iraq.

These are the major particular ideologies which are popularly used by nations for covering the real intentions of their foreign policies and actions. These are used as instruments for criticizing the policies of others as well as four projecting their policies as just and justified decisions.

To sum up we can say, ideology plays an important role in international relations. It is used by a nation for justifying its own policies as well as for criticizing and rejecting the policies of other nations, particularly opponents. Ideologies are cloaks used by the nations for hiding their real intentions which include the intention to maintain and increase their power in international relations. Each foreign policy uses a number of particular ideologies as ideological weapons of defence as well as offence.

Further, ideologies in international relations are a source of both cooperation and conflict. Nations with similar ideological orientations are very often in a position to cooperate with each other. On the other

hand ideological differences, almost always, act as a source of strain on relations among nations.

"Ideologies are futile source of international conflict and they greatly complicate the task of peaceful solution of all conflicts." —Palmer and Perkins

All this, however does not mean that ideology is the determinant of international relations. It is only one of the factors that influence the course and content of international relations. In contemporary times ideologies provide to the states some of the tools, concepts and terms for communicating their ideas and for carrying out actions in international relations," Ideologies are used by nations for explaining and justifying their policies and actions.

Even in this era of ideological unipolarism, particular ideologies' continue to provide to the decision-makers of each nation-state of the world, a basis for the formulation, expression, justification and securing of goals of their national interests. Ideology in international relations is a factor both of national power and foreign policy. However, now 'interests' have been emerging as more formidable factors of international relations than ideologies. In fact the role of ideology has been getting more and more eclipsed.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss the Structural Theory of Politics.

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2. Describe Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities.

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3. What do you know Role of Ideologies?

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4.6 LET US SUM UP

Structural functionalism, or simply functionalism, is "a framework for building theory that sees society as a complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and stability".

This approach looks at society through a macro-level orientation, which is a broad focus on the social structures that shape society as a whole, and believes that society has evolved like organisms. This approach looks at both social structure and social functions. Functionalism addresses society as a whole in terms of the function of its constituent elements; namely norms, customs, traditions, and institutions.

A common analogy, popularized by Herbert Spencer, presents these parts of society as "organs" that work toward the proper functioning of the "body" as a whole. In the most basic terms, it simply emphasizes "the effort to impute, as rigorously as possible, to each feature, custom, or practice, its effect on the functioning of a supposedly stable, cohesive system". For Talcott Parsons, "structural-functionalism" came to describe a particular stage in the methodological development of social science, rather than a specific school of thought

4.7 KEY WORDS

Structural: A structure is an arrangement and organization of interrelated elements in a material object or system, or the object or system so organized. Material structures include man-made objects such as buildings and machines and natural objects such as biological organisms, minerals and chemicals

Ideology: An ideology is a set of normative beliefs and values that a person or other entity has for non-epistemic reasons. These rely on basic assumptions about reality that may or may not have any factual basis.

4.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Discuss the Structural Theory of Politics.
2. Describe Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities.
3. What do you know Role of Ideologies?

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4.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 4.2
2. See Section 4.3
3. See Section 4.4

UNIT 5: MODERN IDEOLOGIES: LIBERALISM: CLASSICAL

STRUCTURE

5.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- What is Liberalism?
- Characteristics of Liberalism
- Rise of Liberalism
- Ideology of Classical Liberalism -Views on Man, Society, Economy and State

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Liberalism is the dominant ideology of the present-day Western world. The history of England, Western Europe and America for the last 300 years is closely associated with the evolution and development of liberal through. Liberalism was the product of the climate of opinion that emerged at the time of the Renaissance and Reformation in Europe. As an ideology and a way of life, 'it reflected the economic, social and political aspirations of the rising middle class which later on became the capitalist class'. In the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, when the

feudal system was cracking up, a new political system was taking its place. The establishment of the absolute nation-states in England and Europe gave birth to a kind of political system in which the authority of the Icing was absolute. The beginning of liberalism was a protest against the hierarchical and privileged authority and monarchy -a protest which involved every aspect of life. The main slogan of the protest was freedom - freedom from every authority which is capable of acting capriciously and arbitrarily along with freedom of the individual to develop all of his potentialities as a human being endowed with reason. To achieve the liberty of the individual and to challenge the authority of the state, liberalism demanded liberty in every field of life: intellectual, social, religious, cultural, political and economic etc. The central problem with which these liberties were concerned is the relationship between the individual and the state. The negative or the classical aspect of liberalism remained dominant for a very long tieme. The initial aim of liberalism was more destructive than constructive; its purpose was not to elucidate positive aims of civilization, but to remove hindrances in the path of the development of the individual. Till the later half of the 19th century, it was a progressive ideology fighting against cruelty, superstitions, intolerance and arbitrary governments. It fought for the rights of inan and of nations. During the last hundred years, it had to face the challenges of other ideologies and political movements such as democracy, Marxism, socialism and fascism. It absorbed democracy and socializing to a great extent in the name of the welfare state, fought fascism tooth and nail but could not overcome Marxism. In the mid-twentieth century, in the face of Marxism, it became an ideology of status quo, defensive and conservative, even counter revolutionary, out of touch with and usually hostile to the radical and revolutionary movements of the day, However, with the fall of the socialist regimes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the withering away of socialist ideology, classical liberalizing (in its new avatar of libertarianism) is once again becoming the dominant ideology of the contemporary world.

5.2 WHAT IS LIBERALISM?

Liberalism is too dynamic and flexible a concept to be contained in a precise definition. Right from its inception, it has been continuously changing, adding some thing and discarding the other. As Alblaster writes, 'liberalism should be seen not as a fixed at-id absolute term, as a collection of unchanging inoral and political values belt as a specific historical movement of ideas in the modern era that began with Renaissance and Reformation. It has undergone many changes and requires a historical rather than a static type of analysis.' Similarly, Laski writes, 'it (Liberalism) is not easy to describe, much less to define, for it is hardly less a habit of mind than a body of doctrine'. To quote Haelter, 'Liberalism has become so common a term in the vocabulary of politics that it is a brave n1an who will try to give it a precise definition. It is a view of the individual, of the state, and of the relations between them'. Almost the same view is expressed by Grimes, 'liberalism is not a static creed or dogma, for dogmatism provides its own restraint is rather a tentative attitude towards social problems which stresses the role of reason and Human ingenuity liberal is in looks ahead with a flexible approach, seeking to make future better for more people, as conservatism loots back, aiming mainly to preserve the attainment of the past.' Although the liberal ideas are about 300 years old, the word 'liberalism' did not corner into use till the beginning of the nineteenth century. According to Richard Wellheim, 'lihzralisrr is the belief in the value of liberty of the individual'. According to Sartori, 'very simply, libel-alism is the theory and practice of individual liberty, juridical, defence and the cor~stitutional state'. Bullock and Silock emphasize the belief in freedom and conscience as the twin foundations of liberalisln. Grime writes, 'It represents a system of ideas that aim at the realization of the pluralist society, favouring diversity of politics, economics, religion other: cultural life. It seeks in its simplest sense to advance the freedom of nan it seeks to increase individuality of man by increasing his area of choice and decision.' Similarly, Laski writes, 'liberalizing implies a passion for liberty; and that the passion may be compelling it requires a power to be tolerant; even skeptical about opinion and tendencies you hold to be dangerous which is one of the rarest human qualities'. EIallowell defines liberalist as 'the emboclncnt of the deliland for facedown in every sphere

of life - intellectual, social, religious, political 2nd economic'. Schapiro talks of liberalism as an attitude of life - skeptical, experimental, rational and free. According to Icoerner, 'liberalisln begins and ends with the ideals of individual freedom, individual human rights and individual human happiness. These remain central to the crced whatever may be the economic and political arrangements of liberal democracy society'. According to Heatcr, 'liberty is the of liberalism. For the liberal, it is tile individual who counts, not society at large or segment of it, for only by placing priority the rights of the individual can freedom be ensured'. Andrew Hacker in his book Political Theory has distinguished four types of liberalism: namely, utopian liberalism, force market liberalism, democratic liberalism, and reformist liberalism. On the whole, according, liberalism stands for

i) free life as the prime pursuit of politics,
ii) state's task is to eschew coercion and to encourage the conditions for this free life.

Similarly, Barbara Goodwin in her book Using Political Ideas, lists the following ingredients of liberalism:

i) managing free, rational, self- improving and autonornous,
ii) government is based on consent and contract,
iii) constitutionalism and the rule of law,
iv) freedom as choice which includes the right to choose government from among different representatives,
v) equality of opportunity,
vi) social justice based upon merit, and
vii) Tolerance. In short, liberalism has a narrow and a broad perspective. At a narrow level, it is seen from political and economic points of view, whereas at the broader level, it is like a mental attitude that attempts in the light of its presuppositions to analyses and integrates the varied intellectual, moral, religious, social, economic and political relationships of human beings. At the social level, it stands for secularism, freedom in relation to

religion and norality. It lays stress on the value of free individual conscious of his capacity for self-expression and unfettered development of his personality. At the economic level, it ilriplies the ideal of free trade coupled with internal freedom of production. At the political level, it stands for political liberty and the right to property, constitutional limired government, protection of the rights of the individual and anti-authoritarianism.

5.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF LIBERALISM

From the above discussion, it is now clear that liberalism is not merely a political concept, but also a socio-economic, cultural and ethical concept. It can be understood through certain characteristics evolved during its long history. Jol~n allowedly has pinpointed {he following characteristics of classical l iber a I' ~sln:

i) a belief in the absolute value of human personality and spiritual equality of the individual;
ii) a belief in the autonomy of the individual will;
iii) a belief in the essential rationality and goodness of man;
iv) a belief in certain inalienable rights of the individual, particularly, the rights of life, liberty and property;
v) that state comes into existence by mutual consent for the purpose of protection of rights;
vi) that the relationship between the state and the individual is a contractual one;
vii) that social control cask best be secured by law rather than command;
viii) individual freedom in all spellers life - political, economic, social, intellectual and religious;
ix) the government that governs the least is the best;
x) a belief that truth is accessible to man's natural reason.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1) What is Liberalism?

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2) Discuss the Characteristics of Liberalism.

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5.4 RISE OF LIBERALISM

Liberalism as a whole was a massive movement net it that made itself felt in all the countries of Western Europe and in America, but its characteristic development took place in England. It was also strong in I-lolland and Spain. Jn Germany, the liberal philosophy remained for the most part academic. In France liberalist far more than in England, tended to be the social philosophy of a class, rather aristocratic in its attitude towards the masses, and mainly critical in fiction since it could hardly aspire to carry through a national policy, Political liberalism here arose as a protest against tyranny, but the writing class movement which was radical and socialist ill its and which also incorporated the Marxist through of class struggle was a great hindrance to the liberal doctrine taking deep roots in France. Only in England, which through the nineteenth century was the most highly industrialized country in the world, did liberalist achieve the status at once of a national philosophy and national policy. It provided the principles for an orderly and peaceful transition, first to complete freedom for industry and the cnfianchisement of the middle class and ultimately, to the enfranchisement of the working class and their protection against the most serious hazards of industry. For the proper study of liberalism, it is customary to divide it into two periods known as 'classical or negative liberalism and 'welfare or positive liberalism'. This unit, we shall study classical liberalism. The division is necessary because in its initial stage, liberalism presented itself as a philosophy of the rising middle class, but in its later stage, it developed

into a philosophy of a national community whose ideal was to protect and conserve the interests of all classes. Classical liberalism was the product of the revolutionary era. It championed the cause of the newly emerging bourgeoisie against absolute monarchical and feudal aristocracy. It was highly individualistic. Individual and social interests were seen as contradictory. On the other hand, the distinctive feature of welfare liberalism was recognition of the reality and the value of social and community interests (along with individual interests). Its attempt was not only to conserve political and civil liberties which individualism of the early era had embodied, but also to adapt thein to the progressive changes brought about by industrialism and nationalism. Now, let us have a look at classical liberalism.

5.5 IDEOLOGY OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM -VIEWS ON MAN, SOCIETY, ECONOMY AND STATE

Classical liberalism is called by different names like negative liberalism, individualistic liberalism, laissez jhie liberalism, free market liberal ism, integral liberal ism, original liberalism etc. The modern period began with the 16th century. During this period, against the socioeconomic, political and cultural system of the medieval period, Renaissance and Reformation movements emerged, scientific and technological advances took place, a new economic class -which was later called the capitalist class - came into being; in the political sphere, instead of feudal states, new nation-state emerged, and changes were seen in all the spheres of social system. In such an atmosphere, a new philosophy - that of classical liberalism - emerged which found expression in the writings of various thinkers. Prominent among whom were Thomas lobbies, John Locke, Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Bentham, James Mill, J.S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Will iarn Senior and Thomas Paine. The social structure of the middle ages was based on the hereditary principle of feud a liberalism. The particular feature of which was that everybody had a master above him: the peasant had the landlord, the landlord liad the feudal lord, the feudal lord had the king, the Icing had the Pope, and the Pope had Christ above. The Reformation Movement broke the authority of the church.

The revival of conimel-ce and the creation of new forms Sweahh began to cl~allenge the ascendancy of the nobility and the demand for political and social reforms that would i~liprove their status and their business, freedom from restrictions such as the medieval notion of just price, from the condemriatiorz of lending and borrowing money at interest, and from taxes that constituted barriers to free trade. The rise and growth of towns and of a new social class, revival of literature and art, birth of f nod ern science and philosophy and the rise oi' large centralized states created a new epoch. The mediaeval ages were based on the privileges of a few in which individual liberty, rights, equality etc. were totally absent. The birth of the modern period starts with the protest against this absolute and privileged authority, a kind of protest which was prevalent in all spheres of life and which challenged all the restrictions and emphasized the autonomy of the individual, his liberty and his rationality. 'The protest expressed itself in the form o;F seci~larisln against religious fundamentalism, free market capitalism the field of economics, a government based upon consent in the field of politics, and individualizing and hunzanism in the field of sociology. Liberalisnz is associated with those progressive ideas which accotupanied the gradual breakdown of traditional social hierarchies. Historically, it was a modernizing force. It was opposed to what was traditional and feudal and friendly to the new emerging social order of bourgeois society. Born in opposition to the world dominated by monarchy, aristocracy and Christianity, liberalisin opposed the arbitrary powes'of the kings and privileges of the nobility based upon birth. It questioned the whole tradition of a society in which Inan had a fixed station in eye. By contrast, it favoured an open ~meritocracy where every energetic individual could rise to respectability and success liberalisnl believed in a contractual and competitive society and a free market economic order. It favoured free thinking, rationalism and speculative mode of thought. It believe in change, dynamism, growth, mobility, accumulation and competition Classical liberalism (emphasized the autonomous individual. The idea that man is a master less man was an entidy novel conception. It considered marl as selfish, egoistic, alienated but at the same tinle rational. It had faith in the absolute walue and worth and spiritual

equality of individual's. It believed that individuality can be increqsed by increasing the choice of nzan and towards this end, external restraint slzould be minitiial. It maintained that the individual is the basis of all socio-econoniic and political systems. Man was considered as the measure of everything. It believed t;llat man was endowed with certain inalienable natural rights based ilpon the law of nature; prominent among these were the rights to life, liberty and property .- tlze rights wl~icli were not dependent upon the mercy of the state or society, but were inherent in the personality aftlle individual. At the core of classical liberalis~n was the liberty of the individual - liberty from every form of authority which acts arbitrarily and capriciously, and liberty in all spheres of human life, But what is important to note is that liberty here was viewed as a negative thing i.e. liberty as absence of restrrzintu. Only the individual knows what is best for him. For the development of his pcrsoizalit.y, he reqi~ires ckrtain freedoms from arbitrary authorities which act against his will. It was liberty both from the society and from the state. It was 'liberty fiorn' and not "liberty to'. tlobbes describes it as the 'silence of laws'. Berlin defines it as 'abse~lce of coercion'. Milton Friedman tenns it as 'absence of coercion of mall by state, society or his fellowmen'. Flew defines it as absence 0.f 'social and legal constraints'. According to Nozic, it is a natural right to 'self-ownerqhip'. Again, absence of restraints had very wide meaning. Restraints could be political, econotnic, civil, personal etc. The purpose of law was not to take away liberty, but to regulate it. Law and liberty were considered anti-thetical. Since tlze individual was talcen as a unit and tlze single human being as a natural urzit, classicaI liberalis~n viewed society not as a natural, but an crrtificial institution. It was seen as being co~nposed of atom lilce auto~~omous iridividuals with wills and interests peculiar to themselves. Society was an artificial institution meant to serve certain interests of the individuals. It was a11 aggregate of individuals, a collection, a crowd wlzere each was pursi~i~lg his own self interest. Hobbes compared society with a sack ofcorn. 'They are associate, yet separate. Bentl~atn also viewed society as a fictitious body, with 110 interest of its own. apart from the interests of members co~nposing it. It was considered a creation ofthe individual will based upon contract and a

means to enrich ' itzdividual ends'. Macpherson lzas termed this view of society as a 'free market society', a meeting place of self-interested individuals, a society based upoil free will, colnpetition and contract. A good society was that which guaralzteed t11e liberty ofthe individual to maximize the self and its freedom of action. Society was a means with individual "as'an end; it had no necessary unity, no separate interest and existence of its own apart from the individual interests. It was a free or open society. The eco~iomic theory of classical liberalistn found expression in a new 'science of political econoniy'. Originated in France by a group of thinl individual psychology. It believed that if the individual is left alone to follow his own enlightened self-interest, economic prosperity would result The perfect institution for the e.xchange of goods and services was tlle market. The niarket perfectly embodied the new economic individualism. Market relations abolished the traditional constraints on fieedom 'to raise and invest capital, to fund loan and earn interest, sell property and reap profit, hire and fire labour'. The state was not suited to the management of economic affairs. As Adam Smith wrote 'no two cl~aracterseem more inconsistent than those of trader and sovereign'. Similarly, Bentham also believed in the self-regulating uncontrolledecono~ny in which the state had virtually no role to play. In the name of utilitarianisin, he derpanded free trade, fi-eedorn of occupation, unrestricted competition, inviolable private property and other individualist reforms. Thus, in the economic sphere, liberalism gave the pure econon~ic theory of capitalist advance and the theory served we1 I the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. As Laski writes, 'the wllole ethos of capitalisl~i, in a word, is its effort to fsee the owner of the instruments of production fro111 the need to obey rules which inhibit his full exploitation of them. The rise of liberalism is the rise oFa doctrine which seelcs to justify the operation ofthat ethos'. At the political level, liberalism sought to erect a theory of state based tip011 the subjective clainls of the individual rather than upon objective rcality. The only basis of civil society which early classical liberalism could conceive was contract or an agreement bctween the individual and the statc. The contract theory had three inter-related elements: i) the state is not created by Cod, but is the creation of ~i~an, ii) it is not a natural

institution, but an artificial institutio~l and iii) the basis ofthe state and political obligation is the consent ol'the individuals. Classical liberalisin did not regard the state as a natural, nccessity arising out of man's needs and social nature with it purj3ose transcending the s~ib.jc.ctive wills of tlze individual, but us un artil'iciril institutio~~ Oased upon1 the cgoistic nature ol'man. 'The state comes irkto existence by mutual consent for the sole ptrrpose of p~+esel.vi~lg and protecting the rights ofthe individual s~nd tl~c relationsl~il-, bctween the state and the individual is a contmctuitl one. When the terms of the contract are violated, individuals not only have the riglit, but also tlic respotlsibility tu revolt and establish a rrew government. Through the notion of consent, liberalistn tried to sz~feguard the rights and liberties of the people and check the arbitrariness ofthe rulers. Consent was also ~iladc aprecondition of the state, because liberalism believed that tile authority of the state was a restraint LIPOII individual freedom and it should be checked as far as possible. lnspite of being the crcation of man, classical liberalism saw the state in purely negative Lerms. It was termed as a necessary evil. It was necessary because only it coi~ld provide law, order, security of life and property, but it was an evil also because it was an enemy ofhuman liberty. Since liberalism considered the rights and liberties of the individual as sacred, any increase in the functions of the state was seen as a decrease in the liberty of the individrral. Hence, the state was seen as having n negative fitnction; to provide security of life and property and Ieavc the individual lYee to pursue llis good in his own way The philosophy ofthe state as a necessasy evil and the self- regulating econo~np left a very limited role for the government. T'lie liberal slogan was 'that government is the best which governs the least'. To illustrate this point further, Ada111 Smith restricted the fu~ictions of the state to: i) 'protect the society from violelice and invasion, ii) protect every lne~nber of society f'som injustice and oppression of every other member and iii) to erect and maintain certain p~iblil: worlcs and certain public institutions'in which the individual may not be interested because it wo~lld be unprofitable'. Similarly, Willian~ Senior wrote "the esse~itial business of government is to afford defence, to protect the comn~unity against foreign and dolnestic violence and fraud'. Bentliam reduced the

task of the government to security and fseedom. Another writer Thomas Paine said 'while society in any state is a blessing, government even in its best state is but a necessary evil'. Herbert Spencer advocated the doctrine of s~~rvival of the fittest and pleaded that the state should have a minimum role in the socio- economic sphere. As a political theory, liberalism can be traced to the political thought of Thomas Hobbes, but its clear expression was found in the thought of John Locke. Locke declared that no one can be subjected to the political power of another without his own consent. For him, freedom meant fi-eedom from the state. State and government were deemed as restrictive institutions. Locke propounded a theory of natural rights - of life, liberty and property- for the protection of which the state comes into being. He conceived rights as prior to the state. The basis ofthe state is a contract which the ruler or the ruled can get rid of. Government is the result of individual will, civil society is sovereign and the state is an artificial institution created for certain specific ends like order, security, protection of the rights of life, liberty and property. State was given a very limited sphere of action, namely, eslablishrnent of law and order, suppression of violence, protection of rights and property. The American and French revolutions of the eighteenth century were largely influenced by liberal ideology. Like Locke, Thomas Paine also denied that the state has unlimited absolute power and asserted the political liberty ofthe co~ntnunity and the defence ofthe individual against the possible tyranny ofthe monarch. Si~nilarly, Montesquieu endeavottredlto do for France what Locke had done for England in the seventeenth century as a liberal; his first concenl was individual freedom and he endeavoured to discover checks on political authority by means of which it might be secured. To this end, lie developed a theory of the separation of powers which had a far reaching influe~~ce. The nineteenth centilry produced a group ofwriters called philosophical radicals like Bentham, Janies Mill and J.S. Mill. The doctrine they propounded is known as 'Utilitarianis~n' wliicli dominated liberal thought for more than half a century. Utilitarianism provided a new theoretical foundation to.li beral ism. It was based upon the theory of hedonism. It means that all Inen seek pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasl~re is the only thing desirable in and for itself. Wealth,

position. power, health and even virtue itself is desired ~~ierely as a means to the t~lti~nate end of pleasure. What gives pleasure is utility and is desirable and what gives pain does not have utility and is avoided. In his opening paragraph of his Introdiiction lo the Principles of Morals and Legi.slrrliol7, Benthati1 wrote. Wat~tre has placed niankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain atid pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to detenliine what we shall doY. However, all happiness being impossible, man lnust seek the greatest happiness in terms of quantity. Similarly, the greatest happiness of all the people being impossible, we must seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Bentham applied the pririciple and nzethods of utility to the spheres of'law, politics and the state. For Bentliam. state is an instrument deviscci by nIan to satisfy his desires and reflects his will. The sole justification for it is that it provides peace, order, security and helps them to satisfy these desires. It is a nleans to promote happiness ofthe individual. Utility in the context of the state is expressed thro~igh law. It is law wliicli unites people together and pirts them on the road of utility. Benthaln considered law as an importnnt instr~~tnent or expression of ~~tility and regarded legislation as the only device tllro~~gh wliicll i~tility coitld be attained. Hence, he considered the state as a law making body because it is only through law that the state rewards or punishes so as to increase happiness and decrease pain. The pirrpose of law is to regulate the motive ofself- interest. Mere lnorality is not si~fficient nncl i~nlcss law comes into operation, bad things cannot be out of place. Benthall1 believed in the co~nmand theory of law and regarded it as the coni~nand of the sovereign. The sovereign is the source of law. All inen are equal in the eyes of law and all have equal rights as regards the prolnotion of happiness. But inspite of the fact tliat the state is an instrument to promote happiness of the individ~aal, the character of the state, according to Bentliam, remains negative. Believing that men are moved by their self interest and everybody is the best judge of his pleasure or pain. Bentham carme to the conclusion tliat the 'main function ofthe state was to remove all the institutional restrictions on the kce action of the individual.. . the purpose of the state is not to fbster and promote but only to restrain them from indulging in activities wliich

affect the general l~appiness by punishing them'. To increase the national wealth, ri~eans,of si~bsistence and enjoyment, tlze general rule is that to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest ntrrnber, 'nothing should be done or attempted by the government'. Rcntl~ain reduced the f~~nctions of the stale only to security and freedom. In other words, to promote the happiness of the individual, the state is a negative institution; sim~~ltaneously, along-with conceiving the state, as an instrument of promoting security and licedoni'. Bentliam foremw the need and aspirations of the nod ern den~ocratic state. I-ie prcferreci the detnocratic tbrm of' government because a represetltative democracy was more likely to secure the greatest happiness ofthe greatest number by,ado'pting constit~itional devices like suffrage, annual parliaments, vote by ballot, election of prime ~ninister by the parliament and the appointment of civil servants thro~~gh competitive exatninations. Also, he favo~~red the unicameral legislature, vote by secret ballot, recaIl of p~~lslic officials, civil and criminal code and prison refornis. TI~ese contributions went a long way in the develop~l~cnt of the liberal perspective of the state. 'The tradition ofclassical liberalism was further exte~ided by Bentham's pupil J.S. Mi31. Mill's essay 011 Libcrlj? (1859) which has long been held to be the finest and the most moving essay on liberty is a powerfirl and a11 eloquel~t plea for liberty of thoi~ght, liberty of exprssion and liberty of action not merely against the interfcrcnce of the state, but also against the pressure of society, public opinion and conventions in the affairs of the individual. The liberty he sought to defend was the liberty ofthe individual to develop, enrich and expand his personality. As such it is not surprising that he pleads that the individual should be lei1 free to realize his own intcrest the way he likes, provided he does not interfere with the si~nilar freedom of others. He defines liberty as 'pursuing our own good in our owti way so long as wc do not attempt to dcprivc others ol'their or impede their efforts to obtain it'. So defined liberty is a rneans to an end, the cnd being one's own good. I-le firrther writes 'the only part ofthe conduct ofany onc for which he is a~nenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part w1iicl.r merely concerns himself, his independence is, of' right, absolute. Over himself, over his body and niind, the individual is sovereign.. .the only purpose for which power can

be rightfully exercised, over any rnembcr of the civilized comln~~nity against his will is to preveiit harm to otlters'. Mill divided the activities of the individual into two parts: self-regarding and other-regarding. The self-regarding action niay include those 11iatters which affect the individual himself, having no concern with others. While the individual was to be free in doing those things which affected I~i~nselfalone, his independence was restricted in tlipse caseswhich had a bearing on others. Society has 110 right to use force or conipitlsion in regard to matters which affect the individual alone arid have no concern with others. In tlic self-regarding functions, Mill incli~ded (i) the inward domain of consciousness demanding liberty of conscience in the most coniprel~ensive sense, I iberty ofthought and feeling; absolute fi-eedorn ofopinion and sentiment on all subjects practical or speculative, scientific moral or tl~eological; (ii) liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing a plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing things without impedirile~its from other fellow creatures so long as they do not harm others, (iii) liberty of combi~iaeion among individuals; freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others. On the whole, Mill's argument'rested upon a negative concept of freedom. He objected to social control over what he regarded as the self -regarding activities ofthe individual because he regarded all restraints as evil. According to him, the individual is not responsible to society for liis (action, in so far as they concern the interests of no person other than himself. He believed that social progress depended upon giving to each individual the fullest opportunity for the fiee development of liis personality. I-le was convinced tliat human personality can develop and expand only in an atmospl~ere of freedom. From it, it necessarily follows that fiecdoln consists in the absence of restraints, the best thing for the individ~~al is that he should be: left to ptli.sue his good it1 his own way. Although the artificial division between selll regarding and otller-regarding filnctions of the individual was not accepted by the latter gencnltion of liberal writers like Citeen, Hoblio~..~se, Lindsay, Laski etc, the importance of Mill lies i1.r his en~phasis on the fact that social and political progress depended largely on the potentialities of the individual and his free choice. Mill was fully convinced that any increase in the power of the

state - irrespective of its form - was anti-thetical to the liberty of the individ~~alnd the most valuable element in 11uman life was spontaneous choice, anything wIiic11, is done by a conipulsory power diminishes the scope of that choice and this infringes upon liberty. Similarly, llis plea for freedom of speech, tliotlght and expression becanie fi~ndan~el~tal tenets of' libcral philosophy. We can conclude this discussion on classical liberalism by rlie views of L.'T'. Elobouse. In his book Liberalism, Hobhouse pointed out certain basic principles sf' liberalism. According to him, these principles were evolved as a consequence of the struggle of the rising middle class against feudal ism, aristoclats and clergymen. In short, these principleswere: i) Personal liberty: the essence of liberalisni lies in individual liberty. This doctrine covered scveral rights and duties of the individual. It was to secure freedom of speech, discussion, writing, freedom of thought and faith. The Aluerican Declaration of Independence, the El~glisl~ Rill of Rights and the I-labeas Corpus Act, the petition of rights were all meant to secure these freedoms. Personal liberty also meant that there should be no discrilnination on grounds of caste, coiour, creed, sex, race and economic position. ii) Civil liberty: according to this principle, the government nus st be conducted not by the.arbitrary will of any one individual or class but by law. 'This was necessary to counteract the evil of oppression of the Icings or feudal lords and churchmen. Milton's libertarian doctrine declared that all hurna~i beings are by nature born fiee and endowed with reason and the riglit to work.out their own destiny arid that the rulers must ~xescise their authority under the restraints of law. Similar was the declaration of Jefferson that 'all men are elldowed by their Creator witli certain inalienable rights to secure far which governtnents are instituted' arid which appears substantially as an expression of the first principle of 1 iberalis~n; iii) Econornic liberty: it nieant that the individual shot~ld I~ave the right to property and contact. This fieeci tlic individual from econornic restraints and economic liberty for classical liberalisln was the acceptance of the pol icy of laissez faire which meant tliat the state should intervene as little as possible in the econornic affairs; iv) Political liberty and popular sovereignty: they mean that all inen SIIO'UI~ have rigl~ts and all milst be enabled to enjoy equal

opportunities. These two concepts were described by Mobl>oi~se as the crown and glory of liberalism. The doctrine of popular sovereignty was stressed by the Declaration of Independence in .America. It Inearit sovereigtity of the people, it vested in then1 the supreme power of political decision and action. Concepts of political freedom and popular sovereignty led to mafiy far reaching consequences and formation of principles such as universal suffrage, direct election of public officials, public accountability ofgovernors, annual parliaments, subordination ofthe executive to the legislature; v) and last but not the least, classical liberalism also included domestic freedom, administrative and racial liberty and international liberty. It was opposed to. the use of force instrument of national policy or. It was primarily because capitalism needed peace and international cooperation for the free flow of goods from one country to another and hence, it pleaded for the removal of all political and other barriers which stood in the way of sufficient exploitation of world resources.

Criticism

The political philosophy of liberalism has been a subject of criticisin at the hands of its advocates as well as its opponents; by the former on account of their pole~nical interpretations and by the latter, on account ol'their indictment of the premises of individualism. The curious thing about the philosophy of liberalism is that it lias been denounced, rejected, revised and defended by leading writers. For example, Laski who criticized the values of the 'bourgeois class' and yet laid empliasis on the virtues of freedom and tolerance. Likewise, Michael Oakeshott comniented that 'a philosophy of crude and uncritical individualism is, in fact, inconsistent with social democracy.' Some important points of criticism of classical liberalis~n are as follows:

i) An Amorphous Ideology Both as a doctrine and as a movement, liberalism is amorphous ideology liberalism is commonly used by everyone; who talk in public for every divergent and contradictory purpose. As Bottomore writes, 'one can remain liberal and before, and the other refrain liberal and be ugclin, a vast range of contradictory political propositions'. The business man and the labor leader, the general

and the soldier, the subsidized farmer and the watchmaker all speak iri terms of liberalism, defending their interests and making their demands. Similarly, Bullock and Shock write that no student of modem political philosophic would reasonably deny the name of liberal to any of the Inell represented in this connection, yet each of them, Fox and Bentham, Richard Cobden and Lloyd John Russell. Macaulay and, Herbert Spencer and T.I-I.Green, Gladstone and Lloyd George, Mill and Keynes held views widely different in some respect from those of others. Arid these differences are differetlces not only of policies and prograniriies - those are no re easily explained, but also of principle, for exnrnple of the role ofthe state, the vexed question of lirisseqfiri~~e. This means that as a public policy, liberalisrii is without a colorant policy, that its goals have been ~iiade so f'oniial and abstract as to provide no clear riioral standard, that in its terms genuine conflict of interests, classes, parties and ideals can no longer be stated clearly. Used virtwally by all, it lacks political, floral arid intellectual clarity. This very'lack of clarity is exploited by all intcrests. It calls its indecision as open-mindedness, its absence of moral criterion as tolerance, arid lbrniality (or political irrelevance) of criteria as 'bi.oadly speaking'.

ii) Wrong View of Man and Society The liberal view of n~an and society lias also been criticized. Although the liberal view oi liuman nntiire lias clia~~ged in the twentieth cet~tury, nevertheless, it considers man as egoistic. lonely, separate fkoni the society, possessive and concerned with the fulfilment of his selfish interests. Conscq~~ently, the society was also seen as an aggregate of individuals, an artificial institution with no organic unity of its own, and the function of politics being the conversion of irldividual and group conflicts into cooperation, harmony and unity other words, society is 110 more than a jungle where animals roam in the garb of men. The socialist ideology completely rejected this notion of man and society. It argued that inan is dependent upon others not only for material needs, but also for cultural and spiritual needs. Socialism viewed man as a social, cooperative being and held the view that the nature of man cannot be studied apart from the society in which be lives. For example, Owen called it unethical, Box termed it unnatural, Marx called it animal like; Mao called it poison, Morris called it hell.

Liberalisni has iao corivinciizg view of the structure ofsociety as a whole other than the now vague notion af it as sonle kind of a big balance in which all social classes wok for the common good. It has no form sense of history of our times nor of our generation's place within that history.

iii) Philosophy of the Capitalist Class Notwithstanding the highly flexible character of the principles of liberalism, it cannot be denied that it remaincd the philosophy of the capitalist class and continues to retain its 'bourgeois' character. Liberalizing has been the firm ideology of one class inside one epoch - the urban entrepreneurial middle class which later on became the industrial capitalist class. It has been the economic philosophy of capitalism and its basic purpose has been the maintenance of socio-political arrangements necessary for capitalist economic relations. Critics point out that its welfare mastics have been incidental to its fundamental purpose of protecting and promoting the interests of the capitalist class. According to Laski, liberalism has always seen the poor, as if they became poor because of their own mistakes. Classical liberalism always played the fact that property also brings with it the power to rule over men and things. Although it gives the right to property at a universal level, yet at a practical level, the right is enjoyed only by a minority. The attitude of liberalism towards the poor, trade union activities, education, health, housing, social security is witness to the fact that in the ultimate analysis, all questions are related to profit. The whole economy is geared to the production for profit for the owners of the means of production, however, regulated and controlled the economy may be by the state. As Laski wrote we must, if we are to be honest, admit that liberalism for which Hobllouse battled so bravely has suffered an eclipse as startling and as complete as that which attended the doctrine of the divine right of the kings after the revolution of 1688. 'The main reason for this was that liberalism became an instrument in the hands of the privileged class to retain its rights.

v) Negative Concept of State criticism commonly passed on this kind of liberalism was that it neglected institutions and their historical growth and that, it worked with a falsely schematic conception of human nature and motives. It had no positive conception of social good and that its egoistic individualism and it look with suspicion on the validity of any

such conceptions, at a time when the total welfare of the community was becoming a principal object of concern. Its weakness as a political philosophy was that its theory of government was almost wholly negative at a time when it was becoming inevitable that the government should assume a larger responsibility for general welfare. That early political economy was fulfil of contradictions was well explained by Karl Marx, who turned its arguments to n quite different purpose. Ricardo had emphasized that the interests of the landlord were antagonistic to that of both labour and capital. Karl Marx said that it was equally true that the interests of the capitalists were antagonistic to that of the working class because whatever share of the product went to profit was drawn from the wages of the workers. If the landlord could extract rent because lie monopolized land, the capitalist in an industrialized economy non no policed the means of production and the profits are a kind of surplus value or the economic rent. In fact, negative liberalism provided Marx with a ready picture of the exploitation of labor. Liberal economist thought that the system they were describing was natural, whereas Marx explained that it was rooted in history and ascribed the exploitation to the capitalist system. Similarly, Laski also said later on: 'the purpose of capitalist was to free the owners of the means of production from all those constraints which hampered the complete economic exploitation'. Its concepts of human nature, society, social harmony economy and state began to be challenged by the mid-nineteenth century, as a result of which it changed to welfare liberation. To criticize liberalism is not to belittle its historical importance and contribution. During the past 400 years, liberalism has given naan humanistic and democratic ideas and almost all the issues of modern western philosophy have been connected with liberalizing in one way or the other. It has been the mainstream of western socio-economic and political philosophy. Liberalism has given progressive slogans like liberty, equality, eternity, natural and inalienable rights of man, democracy, development of human personality etc. and it has vigorously fought against the orthodoxies represented by monarchy, papacy and the feudal socio-economic order. In the beginning, as the philosophy of the revolutionary bourgeoisie class, liberalism guided many revolutionary struggles, against the feudal order. Its economic

philosophy played an important role in the industrial development of the west, its social philosophy Eielped in the establishment of an open market society, its political philosophy paved the way for liberal democracy, its ethical philosophy led to the triumph of individualism~, and its promoted secularism in all walks of social life. Classical liberalism freed that individual from traditional authorities and the state, and maintained that political power is the trust of the people. However, during the later half of the 19th century, a number of contradictions care to emerge in the face of Marxist challenge and gradually; classical liberalism was replaced by welfare (or positive) liberalism. But we continue to need liberalism, though it may not be enough. The drift towards authoritarian and the decay in civil liberties, the increase in police powers and the curtailment of ringlets are developments underlying the fragility of liberal achievements even in its traditional heartlands and make a time commitment to the best of liberal values and institutions all the more necessary.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

3) Discuss the Rise of Liberalism.

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4) Ideology of Classical Liberalism -Views on Man, Society, Economy and State.

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5.6 LET US SUM UP

Liberalism is the dominant ideology of the present-day western world. It was that: product of the climate of opinion that merged in the context of renaissance, reformation and industrial revolution in England and

Eurasia. Classical liberalism has been enriched by a host of thinkers, prominent among who are Thomas I-Iobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Malthus, Richardo, Bentliam, James Mill, Herbert Spencer, William Senior and Tliornas Paine. Classical liberalism had faith in the absolute value and worth and spiritual equality of the individual. It believed in the masterless individual, in the autonomy of the individual will and the rationality and goodness of the: individual.

The individual must have freedom in all spheres: political, social, cultural, economic, moral intellectual, spiritual etc. Freedom meant absence of restraints or freedom from all such authorities which could act arbitrarily or capriciously, It believed in the inalienable rights of the individual. Jt cherished the rights of life, liberty and property as natural rights, riot at the mercy of either state or society It supported free economy, free trade, contract, exchange and competition. It opposed state interference in the economy; It considered the state as an artificial institution. It is the creation of man and is based upon social contract. The relationship between the state and the individual is contractual and if the state violates the contract, revolution against the state (government) is the duty ofthe individual, The state, in spite of being the creation of man, is, necessarily an evil; its role is purely negative i.e. to maintain law and order, protect the rights of the individual and leave the individual free 'to pursue his own good in his own way'.

5.7 KEY WORDS

Liberalism: Liberalism is a political and moral philosophy based on liberty, consent of the governed and equality before the law.

Society: A society is a group of individuals involved in persistent social interaction, or a large social group sharing the same spacial or social territory, typically subject to the same political authority and dominant cultural expectations

5.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain the concept and characteristics of liberalism.
2. Discuss the rise of liberalism.

3. Critically examine free market liberalism.
4. Discuss classical liberalism.
5. What is Liberalism?
6. Discuss the Characteristics of Liberalism
7. Discuss the Rise of Liberalism
8. Ideology of Classical Liberalism -Views on Man, Society, Economy and State

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5.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 5.2
2. See Section 5.3

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 5.4
2. See Section 5.5

UNIT 6: LIBERALISM: MODERN AND NEO-LIBERLISM

STRUCTURE

6.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know Historical review
- To discuss Appraisal of neoliberalism theory of state
- To discuss Neo-liberal Approach to the Study of International Relations
- To know Concept of World Order
- To highlight Concept of Globalism
- To Search for Liberal-institutional Mechanisms
- To discuss the Theory of Communication
- To know the Theory of Conflict-resolution

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Theories of the state: Neoliberal

The philosophy of neoliberalism is usually considered as a modern alternate of classical economic liberalism. It is centred on a conviction in the self-regulating capacity of the market, and correlatively the need to restrict the scope of action of the state. These twin principles highlight two features of this ideological tradition: the antinomies of state and market on the one hand, and of politics and economics as their respective spheres of operation on the other.

Neoliberal thinkers desired to limit government, but the consequence of their policies has been a huge development in the power of the state. Liberalising the financial system left banks free to speculate, and they did so with reckless eagerness. The result was a build-up of toxic assets that endangered the entire banking system. The government was enforced to step in to save the system from self-destruction, but only at the cost of becoming itself hugely indebted. Consequently, the state has a greater stake in the financial system than it did in the time of Clement Attlee. Yet the government is unwilling to use its power, even to curb the gross bonuses that bankers are awarding themselves from public funds. The neoliberal financial government may have collapsed, but politicians continue to defer to the authority of the market. The role of the state in neoliberal theory is sensibly easy to describe. The practice of neoliberalization has developed in such a way as to depart significantly from the template that theory provides.

Neoliberalism was evolved by the German scholar Alexander Rüstow in 1938 at the Colloque Walter Lippmann (Neilson L and Harris B, 2008). The conference defined the concept of neoliberalism as involving "the priority of the price mechanism, free enterprise, the system of competition, and a strong and impartial state". To be "neoliberal" meant supporting a modern economic policy with state intervention (Javier Martínez, Alvaro Díaz, 1996). Neoliberal state interventionism brought a clash with the opposite laissez-faire camp of classical liberals, such as Ludwig von Mises (Jorg Guido Hulsman, 2012). Though, modern scholars tend to identify Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Ayn

Rand as the most important theorists of neoliberalism. Most researchers in the 1950s and 1960s assumed neoliberalism as referring to the social market economy and its principal economic theorists such as Eucken, Ropke, Rüstow, and Müller-Armack. Although, Hayek had intellectual bonds to the German neoliberals, his name was only occasionally mentioned in unification with neoliberalism during this period due to his more pro-free market stance.

Neoliberalism offered a dogma based on the inexorable truths of modern economics. However, despite its scientific trimmings, modern economics is not a scientific discipline but the rigorous explanation of a very specific social theory, which has become so extremely entrenched in western thought as to have established itself as no more than common sense, despite the fact that its fundamental assumptions are patently illogical. The basics of modern economics, and of the philosophy of neoliberalism explained by Adam Smith in his great work, The Wealth of Nations. Over the past two centuries, Smith's opinions have been formalised and developed with greater analytical rigour, but the fundamental assumptions sustaining neoliberalism remain those proposed by Adam Smith.

Adam Smith set the foundations of neo-liberalism with his argument that free exchange was a transaction from which both parties necessarily benefited, since nobody would willingly engage in an exchange from which they would emerge worse off. As Milton Friedman indicated, neoliberalism rests on the "elementary proposition that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed" (Friedman, 1962, p. 55). Subsequently, any restriction on the freedom of trade will reduce well-being by repudiating individuals the opportunity to improve their situation. Furthermore, Smith debated, the expansion of the market permitted increasing specialisation and so the development of the division of labour. The benefits gained through exchange were not advantages gained by one party at the expense of another. Exchange was the means by which the advantages gained through the increased division of labour were shared between the two parties to the exchange. The immediate implication of Smith's squabble is that any obstacles to the

freedom of exchange limit the development of the division of labour and so the growth of the wealth of the nation and the affluence of each and every one of its inhabitants.

During the past twenty years, the concept of neoliberalism has become widespread in some political and academic discussions. Numerous authors have even advocated that neoliberalism is the dominant ideology shaping our world today and that people live in an age of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is a revitalisation of liberalism. This description proposes that liberalism, as a political ideology has been absent from political debates and policy-making for a period of time, only to emerge in more recent times in a revived form. It advises that liberalism has undergone a process of initial growth, intermediary decline, and finally a recent transformation. Alternatively, neoliberalism might be visualized as a distinct philosophy. In this interpretation, neoliberalism would share some historical roots and some of the basic vocabulary with liberalism in general. This interpretation puts neoliberalism in the same category as American neo-conservatism, which is an ideology or political persuasion somewhat similar to and yet evidently different from much conventional conservative thought, and often hardly recognisable as a sincerely conservative ideology (Fukuyama 2006).

Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005:1) stated that “we live in the age of neoliberalism”. Along with the other authors of the book, Neoliberalism, A Critical Reader, they share the quite common, but not necessarily factually accurate, view that power and wealth are, to an ever increasing degree, concentrated within transnational corporations and elite groups, as a result of the practical implementation of an economic and political ideology they identify as neoliberalism. They further describe neoliberalism as “the dominant ideology shaping our world today”. But in spite of its supposedly overshadowing importance, Saad-Filho and Johnston explored “impossible to define neoliberalism purely theoretically”. Its foundations can be traced back to the classical liberalism supported by Adam Smith, and to the specific conception of man and society on which he founds his economic theories (Clarke 2005). In this perspective, neoliberalism is thought of as an entirely new paradigm for economic theory and policy-making the ideology behind

the most recent stage in the development of capitalist society and at the same time a revitalisation of the economic theories of Smith and his intellectual heirs in the nineteenth century. This argument is continued by Palley (2005), who debates that a great reversal has taken place, where neoliberalism has replaced the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes (1936) and his followers.

Keynesianism, as it came to be called, was the dominant theoretical framework in economics and economic policy-making in the period between 1945 and 1970, but was then substituted by a more monetarist approach enthused by the theories and research of Milton Friedman (Friedman and Schwartz 1963). After that, it is believed that neoliberalism, i.e. monetarism and related theories, has dominated macroeconomic policy-making, as indicated by the tendency towards less severe state regulations on the economy, and greater emphasis on stability in economic policy instead of Keynesian goals such as full employment and the alleviation of hopeless poverty.

Munck (2005) upheld that the possibility of a self-regulating market is a core assumption in classical liberalism, and an important belief among neoliberals as well. Proper allocation of resources is significant purpose of an economic system, and the most efficient way to allocate resources goes through market mechanisms which Munck defines as neoliberal economic theories. Acts of intervention in the economy from government agencies are almost always disagreeable because intervention can weaken the logic of the marketplace, and thus reduce economic productivity. According to Munck, as the dominant philosophy shaping world today, neoliberalism wields great power over contemporary debates concerning improvements of international trade and the public sector. One is forced, either to take up a position against neoliberal reforms, or else contribute to their diffusion and entrenchment.

Liberalism, also known as pluralism, projects a different image of world politics as compared to Realism. However, much like Realism, it too has a rather long tradition. There are many strands of liberalism but some of the common themes that run through the liberal thinking are that human beings are perfectible, that democracy is necessary for that perfectibility to develop, and that ideas do matter. Unlike the Realists, the liberals have

enormous belief in hutnan progress and the faculty of reason that each individual is endowed with. Accordingly, liberals reject the Realist notion that war is the natural condition of world politics. They also question the idea that the state is the main actor on the world political stage; although they do not deny that it is important. But they do see inclinational corporations, transnational actors such as terrorist groups, and international organisations as central actors in some issue-areas of world politics. In relations between states, liberals stress the possibilities for cooperation, and the key issue becomes devising international settings in which cooperation can be best achieved. The picture of world politics that results from the liberal view thus is of a complex system of bargaining between many different types of actors. Military force is still important but the liberal agenda is not as restricted as is the Realist one. Liberals see national interest in many more than military terms, and stress the importance of economic, environmental, and technological issues.

6.2 HISTORICAL REVIEW

Modern literature advocates that neoliberalism is a new phenomenon, recorded usage of the term stretches back to end of the nineteenth century when it appeared in an article by the well-known French economist and central ideologue of the cooperative movement, Charles Gide (1898). In his article, which is mainly a polemic against the so-called neoliberal, Italian economist Maffeo Pantaleoni (1898), Gide suggests later usage of the term, where it is generally thought that neoliberalism is a reoccurrence to the classical liberal economic theories of Adam Smith and his followers. After Gide, others also adopted his concept, and usage is unpredictable, as different authors seem to accentuate different aspects of liberalism, when they define more recent contributions to liberal theory as neoliberal (Merriam 1938). The first book discover, which used the term neoliberalism in its title, is Jacques Cros's doctoral thesis, "Le néo-libéralisme' et la révision du libéralisme" (Cros 1950). To Cros, neoliberalism is the political creed which resulted from a few efforts at reviving classical liberalism in the period immediately before and during World War II, by political theorists such

as Wilhelm Röpke (1944; 1945) and Friedrich von Hayek (Hayek et al. 1935).

Main debate of Cros is that these neoliberals have sought to redefine liberalism by reverting to a more right-wing or laissez-faire stance on economic policy issues, compared to the modern, egalitarian of Beveridge and Keynes. Cros generally approve these neoliberals for speaking out against totalitarianism at a time when only few people did so, especially among intellectuals. He remains doubtful to their central thesis, common to most classical liberals, that individual liberty depends on there being a free-market economy, where the state has willingly given up its ability to control the economy for the good of society as a whole, or the interests of its own citizens.

After Cros, the concept of neoliberalism was used only infrequently, and then mainly to describe the situation in Germany, where it was occasionally used as a label for the ideology behind West Germany's social market economy for which Ropke and other so-called ordoliberals served as central sources of inspiration (Friedrich 1955). Particularly, it is the German social theorist and Catholic theologian Edgar Nawroth (1961; 1962) who attempts, building in part on Cros, to focus his analyses of the political and economic developments of the Federal Republic around a concept of Neoliberalismus.

In Nawroth's studies, attempt was made by the first two West German Chancellors, Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard, to combine a market economy with liberal democracy and some elements of Catholic social teachings which are labelled as neoliberalism and as a third way between fascism and communism. Nawroth remains sceptical to this rather eclectic ideology, and he is especially concerned by his insight that the open market economy motivates people to become acquisitive and self-centred, and hampering their moral development and abating the internal solidarity of German society. Briefly, Nawroth's highly conservative critique of West German neoliberalism inaugurates a new tradition of using the term critically, even if he uses it to define an economic system which usually lacked the doctrinaire rigidity often related with neoliberalism in the critical literature in recent times.

Concept of neoliberalism described by Cros and Nawroth was gradually expanded to the rest of the world. In the decade of
1990, it gained the prevalence. It can be witnessed in the early stages of this movement in an article by the Belgian-American philosopher, Wilfried ver Eecke (1982), which indirectly is an attempt to expand Cros and Nawroth's concept of neoliberalism to the English-speaking world. Ver Eecke used in his text the concept of neoliberalism to define German ordo-liberalism as well as American monetarism, which according to ver Eecke share a strong preference for a state which reserves for itself the right to intervene in the market only in order to maintain the market economy as such, for instance with the institution of anti-trust legislation and monetary policies solely intended at price stability. In his article, the concept of neoliberalism is seen in a more elaborate manner, compared to the expositions given by Cros and Nawroth.

Under ver Eecke's understanding, neoliberalism is not an explanation of any kind of recent contributions to liberal theory, but rather a concept reserved for a particular kind of liberalism, which is marked by a radical commitment to laissez-faire economic strategies. Among the proponents of these policies, one finds more uncompromising classical liberals such as Mises and Hayek, monetarists and other economists bent on forming and preserving what they perceive of as free markets, such as Friedman, and finally also those libertarians whose much-repeated persistence on individual liberty issues in a demand for a minimal or practically non-existent state, like Nozick and Rothbard. David stand out as being one of the few who tries, in his A Brief History of Neoliberalism, to give the comprehensive definition of concept, which in part harks back to the analyses submitted by Cros, Nawroth and ver Eecke (Harvey 2005). His description illuminated on the phenomenon neoliberalism. This is explained as under:

"Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to

guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit" (Harvey 2005:2).

Neoliberal political philosophy: To thoroughly study neoliberalism, from the perspective of normative, political theory originated by Anna-Maria Blomgren (1997). In a critical analysis of the political thought of Friedman, Nozick and Hayek, she defines their respective political and economic theories as representative of neoliberal political philosophy. Blomgren basic characterisations of neoliberalism overlay to a considerable degree with Harvey's definition, but emphasise more evidently the internal diversity of neoliberal thought. This denotes, "Neoliberalism is commonly thought of as a political philosophy giving priority to individual freedom and the right to private property. It is not, however, the simple and homogeneous philosophy it might appear to be. It ranges over a wide expanse in regard to ethical foundations as well as to normative conclusions. At the one end of the line is anarcho-liberalism, arguing for a complete laissez-faire, and the abolishment of all government. At the other end is "classical liberalism", demanding a government with functions exceeding those of the so-called night-watchman state (Blomgren 1997:224).

In vast literature, it is observed that neoliberalism is a loosely demarcated set of political beliefs which most conspicuously and prototypically include the belief that the only legitimate purpose of the state is to defend individual, especially commercial, liberty, as well as strong private property rights (Hayek 1979). This belief usually issues in a belief that

the state ought to be minimal or at least considerably reduced in strength and size, and that any wrongdoing by the state beyond its sole legitimate purpose is unacceptable (Hayek 1979). These beliefs could apply to the international level as well, where a system of free markets and free trade ought to be executed as well; the only acceptable reason for regulating international trade is to protect the same kind of commercial liberty and the same kinds of strong property rights which ought to be realised on a national level (Friedman 2006). Neoliberalism also includes the belief that freely adopted market mechanisms is the optimal way of organising all exchanges of goods and services (Norberg 2001). It is believed that free markets and free trade will set free the creative potential and the business spirit which is built into the spontaneous order of any human society, and thereby lead to more individual liberty and well-being, and a more efficient allocation of resources (Hayek 1973).

Neoliberalism could also include a viewpoint on moral virtue. It is believed by thinkers that the good and virtuous person is one who is able to access the relevant markets and function as a competent actor in these markets. He or she is willing to accept the risks related with participating in free markets, and to adapt to rapid changes rising from such participation (Friedman 1980). Individuals are also visualized as being merely responsible for the consequences of the choices and decisions they freely make. Instances of inequality and blatant social injustice are morally acceptable, at least to the degree in which they could be seen as the result of freely made decisions (Nozick 1974). If a person demands that the state should control the market or make reparations to the unfortunate who has been caught at the losing end of a freely initiated market transaction, this is regarded as an sign that the person in question is morally immoral and underdeveloped, and scarcely different from a supporter of a totalitarian state (Mises 1962).

Neoliberalism becomes a slack set of ideas of how the relationship between the state and its external environment ought to be organised, and not a complete political philosophy (Malnes 1998). Actually, it is not assumed as a theory about how political processes ought to be organised at all. Neoliberalism is silent on the issue of whether or not there ought to be democracy and free exchanges of political ideas. Harvey (2005)

designated that policies inspired by neoliberalism could be applied under the sponsorships of autocrats as well as within liberal democracies. In fact, neoliberals just claim that as much as possible ought to be left to the market or other processes which individuals freely choose to take part in, and subsequently that as little as possible to be subjected to genuinely political processes. Advocates of neoliberalism are often in the critical literature depicted as sceptics of democracy: if the democratic process slows down neoliberal transformations, or threatens individual and commercial liberty, which it sometimes does, then democracy ought to be avoided and replaced by the rule of experts or legal instruments designed for that purpose. The practical application of neoliberal policies will lead to a transfer of power from political to economic processes, from the state to markets and individuals, and finally from the legislature and executives authorities to the judiciary (Tranoy 2006).

Practically, neoliberalism has shaped a market state rather than a small state. Shrinking the state has proved politically impossible, so neoliberals have turned instead to using the state to reshape social institutions on the model of the market -a task that cannot be done by a small state. An increase in state power has always been the inner logic of neoliberalism, because, in order to introduce markets into every part of social life, a government needs to be highly invasive. Health, education and the arts are more controlled by the state than they were in the period of Labour collectivism. Autonomous institutions are intertwined in the machinery of government targets and incentives. The consequence of redesigning society on a market model has been to make the state ubiquitous.

Theoretical framework demonstrated that the neoliberal state should favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade. These are the institutional arrangements considered essential to assure individual freedoms. The legal framework is that of freely negotiated contractual obligations between juridical individuals in the marketplace. The sanctity of contracts and the individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice must be protected. The state must use its monopoly of the means of violence to preserve these freedoms at all costs. To expand the concept, the freedom of businesses and corporations to operate within

this institutional framework of free markets and free trade is considered as a fundamental good. Private enterprise and business initiative are seen as the major factors to innovation and wealth creation. Intellectual property rights are protected so as to encourage technological changes. Constant increases in productivity should deliver higher living standards to everyone. Neoliberal theory holds that the elimination of poverty (both domestically and worldwide) can best be secured through free markets and free trade.

Neoliberals are not revolutionaries, who object to any kind of government, or libertarians, who want to limit the state to the provision of law and order and national defence. A neoliberal state can include a welfare state, but only of the most limited kind. For neoliberals, using the welfare state to realise an ideal of social justice is an abuse of power Social justice is an ambiguous and contested idea, and when governments try to realise it they compromise the rule of law and undermine individual freedom. The role of the state should be limited to safeguarding the free market and providing a minimum level of security against poverty.

The thinkers who helped shape neoliberal ideas are differing extensively among themselves on many vital issues. Oakeshott's scepticism has very little in common with Hayek's view of the market as the device of human progress, for example, or with Nozick's cult of individual rights.

It is debated that the neoliberal state is theoretically unstable. Others stated that social democracy is the only viable alternative. Neoconservatives have been among the loudest critics of neoliberalism. They debated that the unfettered market is amoral and destroys social consistency. A similar view has surfaced in British politics in Phillip Blond's "Red Toryism".

Inherent criticism can demonstrate that the neo-liberal theory of the state is internally conflicting. It cannot elaborate how these contradictions are to be resolved and in fact neoliberals who have become influenced that the minimal welfare state they favour is politically impossible and do not usually become social democrats. Most opt for a conservative welfare state, which aims to prepare people for the labour market rather than promoting any idea of social justice.

Neoliberalism has its strength to its philosophical appeal, but neoliberalism is not just an ideology, it purports to rest on the scientific foundations of modern liberal economics. Modern neoliberal economics is no less doctrinaire than its nineteenth century predecessor in resting on a set of simplistic assertions about the character of the market and the behaviour of market actors. The economist opponents of neoliberalism have constantly exposed how restrictive and unrealistic are the assumptions on which the neoliberal model is based. It is debated that the neoliberal model is impractical and somewhat to miss the point, since the neoliberal model does not purport so much to describe the world as it is, but the world as it should be. The point for neoliberalism is not to make a model that is more adequate to the real world, but to make the real world more passable to its model.

Liberal approach to the study of international politics has its roots in the developement of liberal political theory in the 17th Century. Closely connected with the emergence of the modern liberal state, the liberal tradition generally takes a positive view of human nature. Interestingly, some of the major contributors until the mid-20th Century were not international relations scltolars, but political philosophers, political economists, and people generally interested in international affairs. For example, John Locke, widely considered the first liberal thinker of the 17th Century, saw a great potential for human progress in modern civil society and capitalist economy, both of which, he believed, could flourish in states that guaranteed individual liberty. Liberals are generally of the view that the period since the late 17th Century constitutes a historical watershed during which a multifaceted process of modernisation has introduced or enhanced the possibility of a dramatic improvement in the moral character and material wellbeing of humankind. In other words, the liberals argue that the process of modernisation unleashed by the scientific revolution led to improved technologies which in turn made it possible to devise more efficient ways of producing goods and mastering nature. This was reinforced by the liberal intellectual revolution, which had great faith in human reason and rationality. Here lies the basis for the liberal belief in progress: the modern liberal state invokes a political and economic system that will

bring, in Jeremy Bentham's famous phrase, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number".

6.3 APPRAISAL OF NEOLIBERALISM THEORY OF STATE

In this theory, there is positive contribution for endogenizing the state into development theory (rather than treating it as an exogenous factor). Neoliberal arguments are based on the assumption that minimization of the State will create the conditions of “perfect competition”. Generally the markets are prone to failures themselves such as tendency towards monopoly/oligopoly profits.

Prerequisites of perfect competition do not exist because society already has a class structure where equal access to knowledge and know-how does not exist; hence there are no equal grounds for fair competition. Consequently, gross inequalities in income distribution or widespread poverty emerge as common outcomes. Even when competitive conditions exist, market may not provide the incentives for undertaking of necessary investments in infrastructure, social overhead capital (education and health system), technology R&D, etc.

To summarize, neoliberalism has flourished well in political economy, and as a result, become overextended to the point where pervasive concerns have been raised about its feasibility and relevance. Neoliberalism signifies a reaffirmation of the fundamental principles of the liberal political economy that was the principal political ideology of the nineteenth century in Britain and the United States. The arguments of political economy were based on intuition and statement rather than on rigorous analysis, but their strength rested on their political appeal rather than on their analytical rigor. Neoliberalism appeared as an ideological response to the crisis of the ‘Keynesian welfare state’, which was hastened by the generalised capitalist crisis related with the end of the post-war renewal boom and was brought to a head by the escalating cost of the US war against Vietnam at the beginning of the 1970s (Clarke 1988). The crisis revealed itself in a slowing of the pace of global capitalist accumulation, alongside rising inflation and a growing difficulty of financing government budget deficits, which forced

governments to impose restrictive monetary policies and cut state expenditure plans.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. What do you know Historical review?

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……

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2. Discuss Appraisal of neoliberalism theory of state.

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6.4 NEO-LIBERAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

What distinguishes the neo-liberals from the traditional liberal scholars? Do the neo-liberals present a contrasting view of world politics from that of the traditional liberals? What is it that necessitates the prefix neo before liberalism? Are the neo-liberals closer to the Realists and Neo-realists in their orientation than to the traditional liberals? These are some of the questions that we shall try and explore in the following section. The most important distinguishing feature of the neo-liberals is their declining confidence in its progress. Unlike the traditional liberals, the neo-liberals are far less optimistic about progress and cooperationist. This, however, does not mean that they are as pessimistic as the Realists or Neo-realists as seen in the previous Unit, As a category, the term neo-liberal refers to post-war liberal scholars who retained much of the belief of the traditional liberals except perhaps sharing their optimism. In the pre-Second World War period, most liberal writers had a strong belief in the growing, slow but steady, realisation of human freedom. However, in the post-War period, the new generation of scholars became much more

reluctant about committing themselves to the liberal noti011 of progress. This lack of optimism among the new generation of liberals was grounded in a number of considerations. As noted by Zacher and Matthew, "Liberals [neo-liberals] have not wanted to be branded as idealists as were many interwar liberals; the international events of this century (including two world wars and the Cold War) have made them wary about being too optimistic, and, in keeping with the ethos of contemporary social science, many have felt more comfortable about explaining than predicting".

In the academic world, neo-liberal generally refers to neo-liberal institutionalism (one of the strands of liberalism, which we shall discuss in detail later on in this Unit) or what is now called institutional theory. However, in the policy world, Neo-liberalism has a different connotation. In the domain of foreign policy, a neo-liberal approach seeks to promote free trade or open markets and Western democratic values and institutions. Inspired by such an ideology thus most of the Western liberal democracies have rallied around United States in its call for the "enlargement" of the community of democratic and capitalist nation-states. This brand of liberalism (Neo-liberalism) draws its ideological strength from the belief that all financial and political institutions created in the aftermath of the Second World War have stood the test of time, which provides the foundation but contemporary political and economic arrangements. What further ads weight to such a view is the belief that these financial and political institutions were created arid are being sustained by policy-makers who embrace neo-liberal or Realist Meorealist assumptions about the world. However, there are many who question such assumptions of liberalism. As noted by Steven L. Lanly: "In reality, neo-liberal foreign policies tend not to be as wedded to the ideals of democratic peace, free trade, and open borders. National interests take precedence over morality and universal ideals and, much to the dismay of traditional Realists; economic interests are given priority over geopolitical ones". The post-War liberalisin or Neo-liberalism is broadly divided into four main strands of thinking: institutional liberalism, sociological liberalism, republican liberalism, and interdependence liberalism. It is important to discuss these strands at

some length as they hold the key to our understanding of some of the important theories that we are supposed to learn in this Unit. However, we shall confine ourselves to only those aspects of these strands that are of immediate concern to us for the purpose of understanding this Unit.

6.5 CONCEPT OF WORLD ORDER

There is no single homogenous conception of order in world politics. Instead, one comes across competing conceptions of order in international relations theory. However, given our immediate objective and purpose, we shall focus mainly on the liberal conception of order and touch upon the Realist version only to the extent it can help draw a contrasting picture. The crucial difference between the two becomes visible from the different terms that they employ to describe order in international relations. While the Realists prefer the term "international order" to describe the nature of order in international politics, the liberals use "world order" for the same. Does it mean then that the difference between the two is merely semantic and not 'substantive'? The answer is a simple no. The Realists' conception of international order is state-centric which emphasizes stability and peace among states. The elements of such an international order are based on the traditional models of order such as the structure of the balance of power, sovereignty, the forms of diplotnacy, international law, the role of the great powers, the current forms of collective security, and the codes circumscribitlg the use of force. Such a conception thus focuses exclusively the structure of the post-Cold War system, especially upon the number of Great Power actors and the distribution of capabilities anlong them. In other words, it defines order largely in terms of the operative security structure, primarily understood in political-military sense, within the international system. The concept of world order, as conceptualized by the liberals on the other hand, is a much wider category in nature and scope. In sharp contrast to the Realists to treat states as the basic units of order, the liberals take individual human beings as its key units of order and construct order in terms of rights, justice, and prosperity. Unlike the Realists, the liberals assert that order in world politics emerges not from a balance of power but from the interactioris between many layers of governing

arrangements, comprising laws, agreed norms, international regimes, and institutional rules. The liberal conception of world order thus clearly has a widening agenda of order that encompasses, among other things, the relationship between economic and political dimensions, new thinking about security, debates about the consequences of globalisation, the role of human rights, and strategies for human emancipation. Its central claim is that patterns of integration and interdependence have become so deeply embedded in the Cold War period, albeit for strategic and geopolitical reasons, that they now have a self-sustaining momentum that precludes any return to war and autarchy. An important landmark in the development of the liberal conception of world order was the setting up of an organisation called World Order Models Project (WOMP). Established in 1968, it aimed at promoting the development of alternatives to the inter-state system with a view to eliminating war. For WOMPers (as they have come to be called), the unit of analysis is the individual while the level of analysis is global. Some of the key figures associated with WOMP like Mendlovitz and Falk focused on the questions of global government that today form the core of much of the work going on under the name of globalisation. In the more recent years, particularly since the mid-1990s, WOMP has become much wider in its focus by concentrating on the world's most vulnerable people and environment.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss Neo-liberal Approach to the Study of International Relations.

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2. How do you know Concept of World Order?

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6.6 CONCEPT OF GLOBALISM

Globalism is best understood when compared to the more familiar concept of globalisation. The technological, economic and cultural processes, which lead to globalisation, are often believed to be objective and impersonal, independent of the preferences, attitudes and actions of those political actors whose interests they deeply affect. Those who benefit from them can accelerate them at the most only marginally. They can be stopped or reversed even more marginally by those who suffer the consequences. Globalism, on the other hand, is a perspective consciously profited by rationalist, humanist and Universalist actors and thinkers of both liberal and socialist political persuasions. At the core of all globalist positions are the following shared assumptions. One, globalists believe the problems which the world faces are global in nature. The urgency, immediacy or intensity of these problems may vary, but they are not restricted to any particular locality, community, state or region, and therefore, if left unattended, all would suffer from their consequences, Problems of environrtiental degradation, population explosion, nuclear war, terrorism, narcotics and spread of HIV/A[DS are global in this sense. Secondly, all globalists believe that the solutions to these global problems also have to be global in scope. That is so because the resources required for handling these problems are beyond the reach of any nation, region or community. Not only financial and material resources need to be pooled globally, human inputs also have to be coordinated in order to achieve required levels of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Thirdly, all globalists believe that such coordination is possible on a sustained basis only when there is global consensus on the definition of problems as well as prioritization of preferred solutions. Such consensus in turn requires that decision-making processes are transparent and based democratic equality of participants. Given these assumptions, it is easy to see the objections, which globalists have against the kind of globalisation presently taking place. They characterise it as globalisation from above" because it is being shaped by the rich and the powerful states and corporations. They exploit the tremendous concentration of wealth and power in their hands to force unequal integration

6.7 SEARCH FOR LIBERAL-INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

The search for liberal-institutional mechanisms to help establish peace and ensure prosperity through cooperation goes back to the days of the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson, the chief proponent of the League of Nations, is considered to be the first liberal institutionalist who pointed out the importance of institutions in transforming the international relations from a "jungle" of chaotic power politics to a "zoo" of regulated and peaceful interaction. Although the League of Nations experiment turned out to be a disaster, later developments in the field of international organisations like the United Nations and European Union have rekindled new hope in the philosophy of liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalism or neo-liberal institutionalism, as a school of thought, shot to prominence for providing the most convincing challenge to Realist and Neo-realist thinking. Although neoliberal institutionalism shares many of the assumptions of Neo-realist thinking, there" are significant differences between the two over the issue of cooperation in the international system. Liberal institutionalists attack the Neo-realists for focusing exclusively on conflict and competition and thus minimizing the chances for cooperation even in an anarchic international system. The main claim of the liberal institutionalists is that international institutions and regimes help promote cooperation between states. But, what are institutions and regimes? And, how do they help in securing international cooperation? Institutions, according to Haas, Keohane, and Levy are persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles, constrain activity, and shape the expectations of actors. Such institutions may include organisations, bureaucratic agencies, treaties and agreements, and informal practices that states accept as binding. Young, on the other hand, defines regimes, as social institutions that are based on agreed rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures. These govern the interactions of various state and non-state actors in issue areas such as the environment or human rights. Varieties of treaties, trade agreements, scientific and trade protocols, market protocols, and the interests of producers, consumers, and distributors, for example, govern the global market in

coffee. Such regimes and institutions, for the liberal institutionalists, help govern an anarchic and competitive international system and they encourage, and at times require, multilateralism and cooperation as a means of securing national interests. The roots of this version of Neoliberalism can be seen in the functional integration scholarship of the 1940s and the 1950s and regional integration studies of the 1960s. These are better known as Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism schools of thought in tlle literature of international relations theory. However, before we take these up separately, it would be useful to look at some of the core assumptions of liberal institutionalism.

6.7.1 Core Assumptions of Neo-liberal Institutionalism

Although the neo-liberal institutionalists do concede that states are key actors in international relations, they refuse to buy the argument of the Realists who believe that states are the only significant actors. According to the neo-liberal institutionalists, states are rational or instrumental actors that always seek to maxirnise their interests in all issue areas. Neo-liberal institutionalists further believe that in the present-day competitive environment, states seek to maximise absohrie gains through cooperation as rational behaviour leads them to see value in cooperative behaviour. States are thus less concerned with gains or advantages by other states in cooperative arrangements. However, the neo-liberal institutionalists believe that the biggest obstacle to successful cooperation comes from the fear of non-compliance or the possibility of cheating by states. Such fears primarily emanate from the sovereign status enjoyed by the states in the international system leading to a general lack of trust among the states. However, the neo-liberal institutionalists believe that such fears of non-compliance and cheating can be allayed, if not eliminated altogether, through creation of institutions in the international system. Neo-liberal institutionalists recognise that cooperation may be harder to achieve in areas where leaders perceive they have no mutual interests. For example, cooperation in military or national security areas, where someone's gain is perceived as someone else's loss (a zero sum perspective) may be more difficult to achieve. However, it is believed that states in all likelihood

will be willing to shift loyalty and resources to institutions once these are perceived as mutually beneficial and if they provide states with increasing opportunities to secure their international interests.

6.7.2 Functionalism

David Mitrany, the most prominent proponent of the Functionalist school of through is accredited with fashioning this alternative view of international politics in response to the security/conflict conception of the Realist and Neo-realist scholars. Mitrany argues that greater interdependence in the form of transnational ties between countries could lead to peace. He is of tile view that cooperation should be arranged by technical experts and not by politicians. Some of the other important Functionalists like Joseph Nye, Ernst Haas, J.P. Sewell, Paul Taylor, A.J.R. Groom, John Burton, and Christopher Mitchell have necessary contributed to the Functionalist tradition of international relations theory. Presented as an operative philosophy that would gradually lead to a peaceful, unified, and cooperative world, Functionalism is widely regarded as the most insightful critique of the Realist framework of international politics. The main concern of the Functionalists is to develop piecemeal non-political cooperative organisations, which will not only help establish peace and secure prosperity but also render the practice of war obsolete eventually. However, this may not be forthcoming as long as the international system continues to be founded on suspicion and anarchy and war is accepted as an established means of settling international disputes. The institution of nation-states is considered to be the biggest obstacle in the path of fostering peace and prosperity. Aware of the fact that governments have vested interests and that nation-states will not be dismantled voluntarily, the Functionalists advocate a gradual approach toward regional or global unity. This, they believe, might eventually help isolate and render obsolete the rigid institutional structures of nation-states. But, how do the Functionalists propose to go about it? As noted above, the Functionalists' prime concern is with developing piecemeal cooperative organisations at the regional level in non-political areas like econon~ic, teclmical, scientific, social and cultural sectors where the possibility of forging effective cooperation

mong the states appears to be highly practical. These apparently non-political sectors are collectively referred to, in the Functionalist literature, as functional sectors where the possibility of opposition or resistance appears minimal. This is based on the assumption that efforts to establish function organisations at the micro level in non-political sectors such as energy production and distribution, transportation and communication control: health protection and improvement, labour standards and exchanges etc. are least likely to be met with opposition. There is a greater possibility of successful functioning of such non-political functional organisations as these can be of mutual advantage to the participating states. The possibility of a higher success rate of such functional bodies gets further enhanced by the fact that they do riot appear to pose any challenge, at least apparently, to the national sovereignty of the participating states. One of the most important assumptions of the Functionalist school is based on the concept of what is called "spillover" effect. The concept of spillover is similar to that of "demonstration" effect as used in the discipline of economics. 'The underlying belief of the spillover concept is that cooperation in one area would open new avenues for similar cooperation in other areas. For example, successful forging of cooperation in the area of coal and steel production would spill over into other functional areas like transportation, pollution control etc. Such a process of cooperation, the Functionalists argue, would eventually lead to political unification of a given region. The strength of the Functionalist school of thought lies in the fact that they tend to emphasise cooperative aspects of international behaviour and sidestep conflictive aspects. In contrast to the Realists who look at the world in terms of politics of conflict and irrationality, the Functionalists view the world through the prism of cooperation and reason. The Functionalists believe that the accumulation of the process of functional organisations would not only help link people and their interests across national boundaries but would also eventually relegate the nation-states to the "museum of institutional curiosities".

6.7.3 Neo-Functionalism

In contrast to the Functionalist theory, which seeks to create a New World order in which the sovereign states take a back seat, Neo-Functionalism or the integration theory seeks to create new states through the integration of the existing states. This is achieved initially at the regional level eventually coordinating, in the long run, in the creation of a single world state. The idea that integration between states is possible if the political process of spillover facilitates it is basically drawn from the experience of European Union. The neo-Functionalists thus prefer to emphasise cooperative decision-making processes and elite attitudes in order to assess the process towards integration. Erilst Haas is considered to be the chief proponent of this school of thought. Although Haas builds on Mitrany, he rejects the notion that technical matters can be separated from politics. Haas defines integration as "the tendency toward the voluntary creation of larger political units, each of which self-consciously eschews the use of force in the relations between tlie participating units and groups". Integration, for Haas, has lo do with getting self-interested political elite to intensify their cooperation- Put differently, Haas views integration as a process by which the actors concerned begin voluntarily to give up certain powers and evolve new techniques for tackling colnmori problelns and resolving mutual conflicts. Joseph Nye carries this theme further when he asserts that regional political organisations "have made modest contributions to the creation of islands of peace in the international system". These studies suggest that the way towards peace and prosperity is to have independent states pool their resources and even surrender some of their sovereignty to create integrated communities to promote economic growth or respond to regional problems. What distinguishes the neo-Functionalists from the Functionalists thus is that they focus primarily on formal institutions in an attempt to determine the extent to which national 21st opposed to international agencies carries out important functions.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Highlight Concept of Globalism.

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2. How to Search for Liberal-institutional Mechanisms?

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6.8 THEORY OF COMMUNICATION

Imagine a world without communication! You have a brilliant idea with you but don't possess the power of communication. You have a strong desire for something, but cannot express your desires. Life would be dull, blank and the world would not be worth living. Such is the power of communication.

Communication is the essence of life. It is a necessity. To express themselves, human beings need to communicate. An individual has to communicate to express his feelings, pass on information to the other human beings and share his thoughts and feelings.

Do only Human Beings Communicate?

Let us go through the following examples:

Ted spotted a poor weak pup lying almost lifeless on the streets and crying meekly. He took no time in taking the pup to a nearby vet and giving him the basic medical treatment the poor creature required. Have you ever thought how did Ted come to know that the pup requires immediate attention? The pup couldn't speak.

The answer to the above question is through communication.

Ted came to know about the condition of the pup through communication only. The crying of pup was actually an indication that the creature needs to be immediately attended by the doctor. Through his crying the pup tried to communicate Ted about his deteriorating condition and requirement of medical aid.

Another example:

A gardener waters the plants when the leaves start turning brown, become dry and start showing withering signs. Turning brown, drying of leaves are actually ways the tree tries to communicate to the gardener that it is dying and needs to be watered immediately.

All the above examples support the communication theory.

What is communication Theory ?

Communication theory was proposed by S. F. Scudder in the year 1980. It states that **all living beings existing on the planet communicate** although the way of communication is different.

Plants communicate their need to be taken care of and watered immediately through visible changes in the colour of the leaves, and the falling of leaves and flowers.

Animals communicate by sounds, several movements to indicate that they are hungry or unwell or need medical attention.

A mother would never understand that her child is hungry unless and until the child cries. Crying is again a form through which the child communicates that he is hungry and needs food. The same applies when he is injured, where he uses crying again as a tool to communicate his pain and need of urgent medical attention.

Thus the universal law of communication theory says that all living beings whether they are plants, animals, human beings communicate through sound, speech, visible changes, body movements, gestures or in the best possible way to make the others aware of their thoughts, feelings, problems, happiness or any other information.

If a child scores less marks in examinations, parents would not speak to the child for sometime- again an effort to communicate that the parents are angry over the child's performance and he needs to buck up for his further examinations. Try to irritate a stray dog, he will surely bark on you - again an animal's way to communicate that he is angry and should not be irritated further.

Like human beings, animals also communicate among themselves through gestures and body movements. Monkeys always carry their babies with them wherever they go, again a way through which the

mother tries to communicate that their babies are safe and the mother is there to take good care of them. During the mating season of animals, communication through gestures plays a very important role in bringing them close, the same way a peacock dances to attract its partner.

Another model of communication says that communication is simply the process of transferring information from the sender to the recipient where the recipient decodes the information and acts accordingly. Large number of people also support this model of communication.

Communication Theory Framework

Let us examine communication and communication theory through the following viewpoints:

- **Mechanistic -** The mechanistic view point says that communication is simply the transmission of information from the first party to the second party. The first party being the sender and the second party being the receiver.
- **Psychological -** According to the psychological view point, communication is simply not the flow of information from the sender to the receiver but actually the thoughts, feelings of the sender which he tries to share with the recepients. It also includes the reactions, feelings of the receiver after he decodes the information.
- **Social -** The social view point considers communication as a result of interaction between the sender and the receiver. It simply says that communication is directly dependent on the content of the speech. "How one communicates" is the basis of the social view point.
- **Systemic -** The systemic view point says that communication is actually a new and a different message which is created when various individuals interpret it in their own way and then reinterpret it and draw their own conclusion.
- **Critical -** The critical view point says that communication is simply a way with the help of which an individual expresses his power and authority among other individuals.

To summarize the communication theory proposes that to survive, every living entity, needs to communicate with others and also among themselves. Communication is a dire need of survival.

Boss to his employee -"I want you to bring the file to my table".
The boss left the poor employee confused as he forgot to mention the name of the file and the employee also didn't bother to ask his boss. The boss did communicate to his employee but the message was not clear to his employee - **An example of ineffective communication**.

Jenny to Duke -"Lets plan out a dinner tonight.
After the dinner Duke was visibly upset as she was not at all fond of Thai food and the restaurant had no other option. Jenny forgot to mention that she was planning to take Duke to a restaurant which only served Thai food.
In both the above real life situations, the devil called ineffective communication played the culprit. In today's scenario, the mantra is to effectively communicate. Only communication alone is not important but if an individual acquires the skill to effectively communicate, he has no looking back. Communication is simply the flow of information from the first party (the sender) to the second party (the receiver) irrespective of whether the recipient has properly downloaded the message or not, whereas effective communication is the flow of information in exactly the same manner the sender intends to do so.
"I want water" is **communication**.
"I want a glass of lukewarm water from the blue jug" is **effective communication**.
Communication is directly proportional to the choice of words or its content. The more precise and crisp the content is the more effective the communication would be. It is essential for the sender to use the correct words, phrases so that the information reaches the recipient bang on. An individual first must be very clear about what he actually wishes to convey, then the information or the thought should be clearly and sensibly put into correct and meaningful words /phrases also called as encoding. Haphazard words and abstract ideas only create

misunderstandings and confusions. The pitch and the tone of the speaker must be loud and clear so that the second party hears it correctly and responds the way the sender actually wants. Don't stammer or eat words.

The target audience must also be kept in mind while preparing the content of speech. For instance, if one is targeting a young group of college goers, there is no point in using complicated terminologies, corporate jargons or high vocabulary words because they would never be able to relate themselves with the speech resulting to an ineffective communication. Instead it would be wise if the speaker uses some slangs, cracks some jokes in between and creates a friendly atmosphere to capture the attention of the young crowd. It is the prime responsibility of the speaker to cross check with the listeners whether they have downloaded the correct information or not. One must ask questions in between to create interest and make things clear with the second party. Use phrases like "Is it clear?", "Am I audible?"," Understood"," Any Problems? "to make the communication more effective. An individual whenever shares his contact detail with anyone, should make it a habit to cross check with the other person whether he/she has noted the number correctly or not. Dont just go on, try to make eye contact with the listeners and take pauses to make the communication impressive as well as effective. The recipient must also develop a habit to give the sender feedback. If he has not understood the information clearly, it is his duty to ask and verify with the speaker.

Effective communication goes a long way in passing the correct and the desired information to the recipient and the work is accomplished without errors in a short span of time. Effective communication also nullifies the chances of misunderstandings, conflicts and errors which might crop in cases where the message is not clear.

John to employees - "I want the report".

John to employees - "I want the report on my table by end of the day today and the employee who submits the report at the earliest will get a treat from my side at the college cafeteria".

In both the above cases communication was done between the boss and the employee but in the first case the message was not clear. In the second case, the boss carefully mentioned the time limit and the reward

an employee would get if he is the first one to submit the report. The first is a case of communication and the second effective communication.

To conclude, don't just communicate, speak sensibly, clearly, convey your message in clear words, don't complicate things and most importantly don't forget to crosscheck with the recipient. Effective communication will definitely help the individual to make a mark of his own and stand apart from the crowd.

Communication Models

What is a Model?

A model is widely used to depict any idea, thought or a concept in a more simpler way through diagrams, pictorial representations etc. Models go a long way in making the understanding of any concept easy and clear. Through a model one can easily understand a process and draw conclusions from it. In simpler words a model makes the learning simple.

Aristotle Model of Communication

Aristotle was the first to take an initiative and design the communication model.

Let us first go through a simple situation.

In a political meeting, the prospective leader delivers speech to the audience urging for more votes from the constituency. He tries to convince the crowd in the best possible way he can so that he emerges as a winner. **What is he actually doing ?**

He is delivering his speech in a manner that the listeners would get convinced and cast their votes only in his favour, or in other words respond in the same manner the speaker wanted to. Here the leader or the speaker or the sender is the centre of attraction and the crowd simply the passive listeners.

The example actually explains the Aristotle model of communication.

According to this model, the **speaker plays a key role in communication**. He is the one who takes complete charge of the communication. The sender first prepares a content which he does by carefully putting his thoughts in words with an objective of influencing the listeners or the recipients, who would then respond in the sender's

desired way. No points in guessing that the content has to be very very impressive in this model for the audience or the receivers to get convinced. The model says that the speaker communicates in such a way that the listeners get influenced and respond accordingly.

The speaker must be very careful about his selection of words and content in this model of communication. He should understand his target audience and then prepare his speech. Making eye contact with the second party is again a must to create an impact among the listeners. Let us again go through the first example. The politician must understand the needs of the people in his constituency like the need of a shopping mall, better transport system, safety of girls etc and then design his speech. His speech should address all the above issues and focus on providing the solutions to their problems to expect maximum votes from them. His tone and pitch should also be loud and clear enough for the people to hear and understand the speech properly. Stammering, getting nervous in between of a conversation must be avoided. Voice modulations also play a very important role in creating the desired effect. Blank expressions, confused looks and similar pitch all through the speech make it monotonous and nullify its effect. The speaker should know where to lay more stress on, highlight which words to influence the listeners.

One will definitely purchase the mobile handset from that store where the sales man gives an impressive demo of the mobile. It depends on the sales man what to speak and how to speak in a manner to influence the listeners so that they respond to him in a way he actually wants i.e. purchase the handset and increase his billing.

The Aristotle model of communication is the widely accepted and the most common model of communication where the sender sends the information or a message to the receivers to influence them and make them respond and act accordingly. Aristotle model of communication is the golden rule to excel in public speaking, seminars, lectures where the sender makes his point clear by designing an impressive content, passing on the message to the second part and they simply respond accordingly. Here the sender is the active member and the receiver is passive one.

6.9 THEORY OF CONFLICT-RESOLUTION

Conflict resolution as a discipline has developed theoretical insights into the nature and sources of conflict and how conflicts can be resolved through peaceful methods to effectuate durable settlements.

Morton Deutsch: Cooperative Model

One of the first to develop insight into the beneficial consequences of cooperation as an academic enquiry was Morton Deutsch. In his view, a number of factors like the nature of the dispute and the goals each party aims at are pivotal in determining the kind of orientation a party would bring to the negotiating table in its attempt to solve the conflict. Two basic orientations exist. These are competitive and cooperative. Deutsch further predicts the type of interactions which would occur between negotiating parties as a result of their disputing style. Cooperative disposition of the party would evoke an atmosphere of trust and eventually lead to mutually beneficial options for settlement. On the other hand, competitive approach leads to win-lose outcomes. This approach is inclined to intensifying animosity and distrust between parties and is generally considered destructive.

Some critics of this approach argue, both cooperation and competition are essential to some extent to effectuate resolution of conflict since negotiating a desirable agreement always includes common and diverse goals. Thus finding a balance between these two approaches is the key to successful negotiation.

Roger Fisher and William Ury: Principled Negotiation

Other theorists who advocated cooperative conflict behavior include Roger Fisher and William Ury. They put forward four principles for effective negotiation. These four principles are:

- Separate people from their problem. What Fisher and Ury argue is that this principle helps parties to get a clearer picture of the substantive problem.
- Focus on interest rather than position.
- Generate a variety of options before settling on an agreement.

- Insist that the agreement be based on objective criteria.

At each stage of the negotiation process, the above principles should be observed. Developing a method for reaching good agreements is central to this model.

This model asserts that "separate people from their problem". However, this could make matters worse if human needs of the people are the problem. Moreover, conflicts between ethnic groups are mostly needs based conflicts since one group feels that its basic needs of identity, security, recognition or equal participation are being neglected. Here human needs model can be more useful than interest based model.

John Burton: Human Needs Model

John Burton's work is of immense significance in the field of human needs model. He argues when an individual or group is denied its fundamental need for identity, security, recognition or equal participation within the society, protracted conflict is inevitable. To resolve such conflict, it is essential that needs that are threatened be identified and subsequently restructuring of relationships or the social system take place in a way that needs of all individuals and groups are accommodated. For instance, this model can be useful in the case of Maldives where there are restraints on freedom and participation of its citizens in political life.

Bush, Folger And Lederach : Conflict Transformation

Theorists of conflict transformation, while referring to the interest-based and the human needs models argue, solution that satisfies each country's interests and needs could be reached through these models. However, if negative attitudes developed in each country during the conflict are not addressed, these could serve to generate further conflicts some time later. Whereas conflict transformation aims at a fundamental change in attitude and/or behavior of individuals and/or the relationship between two or more disputing parties.

This approach is very well exemplified in Bush and Folger's theory of transformative mediation and Lederach's model of conflict transformation. Lederach uses the term conflict resolution to refer to peacebuilding. For building peace destructive or negative communication

patterns need to be transformed or replaced by constructive or positive interaction patterns. Like Bush and Folger, Lederach stresses the need to transform the disputing parties by empowering them to understand their own situation and needs, as well as encouraging them to recognize the situation and needs of their opponents.

Conflict Transmutation

Those theorists, who practice conflict transmutation argue that conflict transformation may transform relationships, however it does not go far enough in addressing the underlying sources of conflict behavior. Conflict transmutation is centered on the principles found in alchemy as a set of contemplative practices that transform deeply encrusted feeling and thoughts that fuel destructive conflict behavior.

Conclusion

As we take a closer view of world events as well as mundane day to day reality of life, it becomes apparent that conflict is an indisputable fact of our physical and mental existence.

Conflict infact permeates each and every strand of human existence and often takes shape of diabolic cyclical violence unless dealt with creatively and constructively. Though each conflict resolution theory has its own limitations yet conflict resolution as a discipline can be of immense significance in this respect and as we ruminate the current world politics where the powerful does not have qualms about resorting to force at any given opportunity, conflict resolution theories are emblematic of how military force is not always the right approach for dealing with conflict effectively.

Conflict

According to oxford dictionary the word conflict is defined as

1 A serious disagreement or argument.

2 A prolonged armed struggle.

3 An incompatibility between opinions, principles, etc

conflict can be described as a disagreement between the parties, it arises due to lack of consensus between the parties. Conflict can arise due to various facts which can hinder the development in any sort of activity, generally it is caused due to:

* Rigidity of rules and regulations

* Inflexibility of the parties

* Lack of cooperation and understanding between the conflicting parties

* Due to the varied behaviour

A conflict is a normal situation to happen as it is the human nature which is so varied and dynamic that persons with same perception about one thing may end up in a conflict over the other and Participants in conflicts tend to respond on the basis of their perceptions of the situation. People generally base their perceptions over their values, culture, beliefs, information, experience, gender, and other variables. Conflict responses are both filled with ideas and feelings that can be very strong and powerful guides to our sense of possible solutions. Conflicts, to a large extent, are predictable and expectable situations that naturally arise as we go on managing the complex projects in which we have significantly invested. As such, if we are able to develop procedures for identifying conflicts which are likely to arise, as well as systems through which we can constructively manage those conflicts, we may be able to find out new opportunities that can transform our conflict into a productive result. Stephens P Robbins in his book Organizational Behaviour defines conflict as “Conflict is a process in which an effort is purposefully made by one person or unit to block another that results in frustrating the attainment of others goals or the furthering of his or her interests”

Industrial conflict

Industrial conflict refers to all the expressions of dissatisfaction which arise in an employment. There are many different kinds of industrial conflict, which can be divided into two broad classes

1 Formal.

2 Informal

Formal industrial conflict is an organized way of conflict through a Trade union. It is characterised by organized strikes, which is referred to withdrawal of labour so as to constitute a temporary breach of contract, using the collective strength of the workforce to avoid sanctions and achieve personal objective of increase in pay or improved working conditions. Strikes may be reinforced by other types of formal tactics such as go-slow tactics and work to rule.

Informal industrial conflict is not systematic or organized, it results directly from grievances, which arise at various situations. An informal industrial conflict includes protesting through absenteeism, frequent job-changing, negligence, and even accidents at work. An informal industrial conflict has rather more severe effects on the organization than a formal industrial conflict Industrial sociologists have also regarded spontaneous walk-outs and strikes as examples of informal industrial conflict. The idea of informal industrial conflict thus draws attention to the roots of behaviour which may appear strange from the point of view of management.

A conflict can arise in a company as humans of varied perception are working under a single group, but a manager should be able to anticipate conflicts as he is given a responsibility to handle the conflict, thus it is the duty of managers not only to provide solutions to industrial problems but also to predict the future conflicts by anticipating them in advance and coming up with a solution well in time so that the productivity of the firm is not affected due to the conflict

Functional and dysfunctional aspects of conflicts

Most experts today view conflicts as a useful aspect of an organization. It is claimed that the conflict helps in preventing the stagnation and provide new ideas and solutions to various issues, it also stimulates interest and curiosity. But a conflict is helpful to a level where it is minimum and can be resolved easily, therefore it is necessary to keep a proper control of conflict by keeping it at a minimum level, as it helps an organization in the following ways:

1 It acts as a stimulant for change in the systems which are not conductive to the organization. The existence of conflict means that there is some thing wrong with the systems, therefore it helps us in improving the systems well before in time as it can lead the organization to losses.

2 Conflict sometimes may lead to innovation and creativity as in a conflicting environment people tend to put forward imaginative suggessions to solve the problems. In such a challenging situation people usually think before they put forward their ideas to resolve issues.

3 Conflict can be used as a source of reducing the tension and frustration as people express their frustrations by means of conflict. It helps people to bring them back to their normal situation which can be beneficial for the firm.

While the positives of a conflict are few and limited, its negatives are abundant and may be severe for an organization. Conflict to an extent of healthy competition may be beneficial but when it exceeds that level it becomes destructive. Organizational conflicts have led to the closure of many organizations or has turned their profits into losses. Conflict may cause disequilibrium in an organization, it may lead to diversion of resources from constructive to the destructive activities also it is one of the major cause of stress and tension in an organization which leads to the decrease of overall productivity. These destructive causes by conflict are also known as dysfunctional aspects of conflict. But it is believed by certain scholars that Conflict itself does not create a problem, although it is the mismanagement of a conflict that can lead to a problem.

Thus the negatives of conflict overweigh its positives and an organization should try to remove the conflict from its very basic roots so as to sustain in the long run therefore the companies adopt various methods to resolve conflicts, but as a manager you should always give priority to that method which assures that the same conflict is not going to arise in the organisation. The process of removing organizational conflict is known as conflict resolution.

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is the process of reaching an agreement between the parties which are having a conflict or it is a process of reaching a consensus and improve the cooperation between the conflicting parties, conflict resolution is a way to overcome the problems of conflict. Conflict resolution includes strategies that help in handling the disputes between the conflicting parties. A given conflict should be viewed from the point of view of the issues that had led to its creation in order to resolve it and ensure that the conflict does not arise on the same grounds again. Thus "conflict resolution" refers to strategies of disposing off or settling disputes which may otherwise lead to violence or damage the relationship between various people, so it is always better to diffuse and resolve conflict before it damages the relations.

Negotiation as a Method of conflict resolution.

Methods of conflict resolution were originally developed for purposes of business management gradually these were used in the fields of international relations, legal settings etc. According to the principles of conflict resolution, the only true solution to a conflict is one that attempts to satisfy the inherent needs of all the parties involved. Thus an organisation should adopt such a method for conflict resolution that comes up with a solution for all the parties, it should come up with a resolution that satisfies the needs of all of them, because only those methods of resolving conflicts irradiates it and leaves less scope for the rise of conflict on the same issue.

Thus to resolve organizational conflicts negotiation is the best way in which it can be resolved, as it is through negotiations that the objective

of both the parties are considered and a point of consensus is reached through mutual negotiation by the parties.

Negotiation

Negotiation is one of the most useful approach used to make decisions to resolve organizational disputes. Negotiation is the most diverse approach to conflict resolution. Most conflict resolution programs employ some form of negotiation as the primary method of communication between parties. Hence it is also the major building block for many other alternative conflict resolution procedures, as it guides the organization to resolve disputes in one way or the other. Negotiation in an organization occurs between, managers and staff, employers and employees, professionals and clients, within and between organizations and between agencies and the public. Negotiation is a problem-solving technique in which two or more people who are in conflict with each other discuss their differences and issues so as to reach a joint decision on their common concerns. Negotiation requires participants to identify issues about which they differ, educate each other about their needs and interests, generate possible settlement options and bargain over the terms of the final agreement. In today's competitive environment negotiation is such a common problem-solving procedure that it is in everyone's interest to be familiar with negotiating skills.

Conflict resolution through negotiation is that it helps in

* Reduction of the obstacles to communication

* Maximized exploration of the alternatives to resolving the conflict

* Satisfaction of everyone's needs

* Developing negotiating channel to stop future conflicts

* Establishment of a model for future conflict resolution

Check Your Progress 4

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss the Theory of Communication.

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2. What do you know the Theory of Conflict-resolution?

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6.10 LET US SUM UP

Neoliberalism or neo-liberalism is the 20th-century resurgence of 19th-century ideas associated with laissez-faire economic liberalism and free market capitalism, which constituted a paradigm shift away from the post-war Keynesian consensus that had lasted from 1945 to 1980. Neoliberalism is generally associated with policies of economic liberalization, including privatization, deregulation, free trade, austerity, and reductions in government spending in order to increase the role of the private sector in the economy and society. However, the defining features of neoliberalism in both thought and practice have been the subject of substantial scholarly debate.

English-speakers have used the term "neoliberalism" since the start of the 20th century with different meanings, but it became more prevalent in its current meaning in the 1970s and 1980s, used by scholars in a wide variety of social sciences as well as by critics. The term is rarely used by proponents of free market policies. Some scholars have described the term as meaning different things to different people as neoliberalism has "mutated" into geopolitically distinct hybrids as it travelled around the world. As such, neoliberalism shares many attributes with other concepts that have contested meanings, including democracy.

The definition and usage of the term have changed over time. As an economic philosophy, neoliberalism emerged among European liberal scholars in the 1930s as they attempted to revive and renew central ideas from classical liberalism as they saw these ideas diminish in popularity, overtaken by recognition of the need to control markets, following the great depression and manifested in policies designed to counter the volatility of free markets, and mitigate their negative social consequences.:14–15 The impetus for this development arose from a desire to avoid repeating the economic failures of the early 1930s, which was identified to be created by the economic policy of classical liberalism.

When the term entered into common use in the 1980s in connection with Augusto Pinochet's economic reforms in Chile, it quickly took on negative connotations and was employed principally by critics of market reform and laissez-faire capitalism. Scholars tended to associate it with the theories of Mont Pelerin Society economists Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and James M. Buchanan, along with politicians and policy-makers such as Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and Alan Greenspan. Once the new meaning of neoliberalism became established as a common usage among Spanish-speaking scholars, it diffused into the English-language study of political economy. By 1994, with the passage of NAFTA and with the Zapatistas' reaction to this development in Chiapas, the term entered global circulation. Scholarship on the phenomenon of neoliberalism has been growing over the last few decades

6.11 KEY WORDS

Conflict: Conflict resolution is the process of reaching an agreement between the parties which are having a conflict or it is a process of reaching a consensus and improve the cooperation between the conflicting parties, conflict resolution is a way to overcome the problems of conflict.

Negotiation: Negotiation is one of the most useful approach used to make decisions to resolve organizational disputes.

6.12 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you know Historical review?
2. Discuss Appraisal of neoliberalism theory of state
3. Discuss Neo-liberal Approach to the Study of International Relations
4. How do you know Concept of World Order?
5. Highlight Concept of Globalism
6. How to Search for Liberal-institutional Mechanisms?
7. Discuss the Theory of Communication
8. What do you know the Theory of Conflict-resolution?

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6.14 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 6.2
2. See Section 6.3

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 6.4
2. See Section 6.5

Check Your Progress 3

1. See Section 6.6
2. See Section 6.7

Check Your Progress 4

1. See Section 6.8
2. See Section 6.9

UNIT 7: CONSERVATISM: CLASSICAL AND MODERN AND ITS VARIATIONS

STRUCTURE

7.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To discuss the Meaning of Conservatism
- To know the Numerous Uses of the Term 'Conservatism'
- To know the Conservatism: Its Characteristic Features
- To describe Some Representative Conservatives

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Conservatism, as a philosophy dedicated to the defense of an established order or an attitude with a defensive strategy toirnaintain the present status quo or in the classical sense of a 'right wrong ideology', is an impbrtant intellectual force today. That it is flourishing in the realm of ideas can be seen in a csre of principles recognised in most societies of our times. The philosophers of conservatism are one in highlighting the principles on which conservatism bases itself. These principles, as Clinton Rossiter sums up, are:

(i) The existence of a universal moral order sanctioned and supported by organised religion; (ii) The obstinately imperfect nature of inen in which unreason and sinfulness lurk always behind the curtain of civilized behavior; (iii) The natural inequality of men in most qualities of mind, body and character; (iv) The necessity of social classes and orders, and the consequent folly ofattempts at leveling by force of law; (v) The primary role of private property in the pursuit of personal liberty and the defense of social order; (vi) The uncertainty of progress, and the recognition that prescription is the chief method of such progress as a society may achieve; (vii) 'The need for a ruling and serving aristocracy, (vi ii) The Ii~nited search of hunian reason and the consequent importance of traditions, institutions, symbols, rituals and even prejudices; (ix) 'The fallibility and potential tyranny of n~ajority rule, and the consequent desirability of diffusing, limiting and balancing political power. Conservatisn~, as, a mood, prefers liberty over equality; tradition over changes; history over politics; past over present or atleast the future; prudent over inquisitive man; and ordered society over society demanding changes.

Conservatism is a political and social philosophy promoting traditional social institutions in the context of culture and civilization. The central tenets of conservatism include tradition, organic society, hierarchy, authority, and property rights. Conservatives seek to preserve a range of institutions such as religion, parliamentary government, and property rights, with the aim of emphasizing social stability and continuity. The more traditional elements—reactionaries—oppose modernism and seek a return to "the way things were".

The first established use of the term in a political context originated in 1818 with François-René de Chateaubriand during the period of Bourbon Restoration that sought to roll back the policies of the French Revolution. Historically associated with right-wing politics, the term has since been used to describe a wide range of views. There is no single set of policies regarded as conservative because the meaning of conservatism depends on what is considered traditional in a given place and time. Thus conservatives from different parts of the world—each upholding their respective traditions—may disagree on a wide range of issues. Edmund Burke, an 18th-century politician who opposed the French Revolution, but supported the American Revolution, is credited as one of the main theorists of conservatism in Great Britain in the 1790s.

According to Quintin Hogg, the chairman of the British Conservative Party in 1959: "Conservatism is not so much a philosophy as an attitude, a constant force, performing a timeless function in the development of a free society, and corresponding to a deep and permanent requirement of human nature itself." In contrast to the tradition-based definition of conservatism, some political theorists such as Corey Robin define conservatism primarily in terms of a general defense of social and economic inequality. From this perspective, conservatism is less an attempt to uphold traditional institutions and more, "a meditation on—and theoretical rendition of—the felt experience of having power, seeing it threatened, and trying to win it back". Conversely, some conservatives may argue that they are seeking less to protect their own power than they are seeking to protect "inalienable rights" and promote norms and rules that they believe should stand timeless and eternal, applying to each citizen.

7.2 MEANING OF CONSERVATISM

Liberal conservatism

Liberal conservatism incorporates the classical liberal view of minimal government intervention in the economy. Individuals should be free to participate in the market and generate wealth without government interference.[10] However, individuals cannot be thoroughly depended on to act responsibly in other spheres of life, therefore liberal conservatives

believe that a strong state is necessary to ensure law and order and social institutions are needed to nurture a sense of duty and responsibility to the nation. Liberal conservatism is a variant of conservatism that is strongly influenced by liberal stances.

As these latter two terms have had different meanings over time and across countries, liberal conservatism also has a wide variety of meanings. Historically, the term often referred to the combination of economic liberalism, which champions *laissez-faire* markets, with the classical conservatism concern for established tradition, respect for authority and religious values. It contrasted itself with classical liberalism, which supported freedom for the individual in both the economic and social spheres.

Over time, the general conservative ideology in many countries adopted economic liberal arguments and the term liberal conservatism was replaced with conservatism. This is also the case in countries where liberal economic ideas have been the tradition such as the United States and are thus considered conservative. In other countries where liberal conservative movements have entered the political mainstream, such as Italy and Spain, the terms liberal and conservative may be synonymous. The liberal conservative tradition in the United States combines the economic individualism of the classical liberals with a Burkean form of conservatism (which has also become part of the American conservative tradition, such as in the writings of Russell Kirk).

A secondary meaning for the term liberal conservatism that has developed in Europe is a combination of more modern conservative (fewer traditionalists) views with those of social liberalism. This has developed as an opposition to the more collectivist views of socialism. Often this involves stressing what are now conservative views of free market economics and belief in individual responsibility, with social liberal views on defence of civil rights, environmentalism and support for a limited welfare state. In continental Europe, this is sometimes also translated into English as social conservatism.

Conservative liberalism

Conservative liberalism is a variant of liberalism that combines liberal values and policies with conservative stances. The roots of conservative liberalism are found at the beginning of the history of liberalism. Until the two World Wars, in most European countries the political class was formed by conservative liberals, from Germany to Italy. Events after World War I brought the more radical version of classical liberalism to a more conservative (i.e. more moderate) type of liberalism.

Libertarian conservatism

Libertarian conservatism describes certain political ideologies most prominently within the United States which combine libertarian economic issues with aspects of conservatism. Its four main branches are constitutionalism, paleolibertarianism, small government conservatism and Christian libertarianism. They generally differ from paleoconservatives, in that they favor more personal and economic freedom.

Agorists such as Samuel Edward Konkin III labeled libertarian conservatism right-libertarianism.

In contrast to paleoconservatives, libertarian conservatives support strict laissez-faire policies such as free trade, opposition to any national bank and opposition to business regulations. They are vehemently opposed to environmental regulations, corporate welfare, subsidies and other areas of economic intervention.

Many conservatives, especially in the United States, believe that the government should not play a major role in regulating business and managing the economy. They typically oppose efforts to charge high tax rates and to redistribute income to assist the poor. Such efforts, they argue, do not properly reward people who have earned their money through hard work.

Fiscal conservatism

Fiscal conservatism is the economic philosophy of prudence in government spending and debt. In his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Edmund Burke argued that a government does not have the right to run up large debts and then throw the burden on the taxpayer:

[I]t is to the property of the citizen, and not to the demands of the creditor of the state, that the first and original faith of civil society is pledged. The claim of the citizen is prior in time, paramount in title, superior in equity. The fortunes of individuals, whether possessed by acquisition or by descent or in virtue of a participation in the goods of some community, were no part of the creditor's security, expressed or implied...[T]he public, whether represented by a monarch or by a senate, can pledge nothing but the public estate; and it can have no public estate except in what it derives from a just and proportioned imposition upon the citizens at large.

National and traditional conservatism

National conservatism is a political term used primarily in Europe to describe a variant of conservatism which concentrates more on national interests than standard conservatism as well as upholding cultural and ethnic identity, while not being outspokenly nationalist or supporting a far-right approach. In Europe, national conservatives are usually eurosceptics.

National conservatism is heavily oriented towards the traditional family and social stability as well as in favour of limiting immigration. As such, national conservatives can be distinguished from economic conservatives, for whom free market economic policies, deregulation and fiscal conservatism are the main priorities. Some commentators have identified a growing gap between national and economic conservatism: "[M]ost parties of the Right [today] are run by economic conservatives who, in varying degrees, have marginalized social, cultural, and national conservatives".National conservatism is also related to traditionalist conservatism.

Traditionalist conservatism is a political philosophy emphasizing the need for the principles of natural law and transcendent moral order, tradition, hierarchy and organicunity, agrarianism, classicism and high culture as well as the intersecting spheres of loyalty. Some traditionalists have embraced the labels "reactionary" and "counterrevolutionary", defying the stigma that has attached to these terms since the Enlightenment. Having a hierarchical view of society,

many traditionalist conservatives, including a few Americans, defend the monarchical political structure as the most natural and beneficial social arrangement.

Cultural and social conservatism

Cultural conservatives support the preservation of the heritage of one nation, or of a shared culture that is not defined by national boundaries. The shared culture may be as divergent as Western culture or Chinese culture. In the United States, the term "cultural conservative" may imply a conservative position in the culture war. Cultural conservatives hold fast to traditional ways of thinking even in the face of monumental change. They believe strongly in traditional values and traditional politics and often have an urgent sense of nationalism.

Social conservatism is distinct from cultural conservatism, although there are some overlaps. Social conservatives may believe that society is built upon a fragile network of relationships which need to be upheld through duty, traditional values and established institutions; and that the government has a role in encouraging or enforcing traditional values or behaviours. A social conservative wants to preserve traditional morality and social mores, often by opposing what they consider radical policies or social engineering. Social change is generally regarded as suspect.

A second meaning of the term social conservatism developed in the Nordic countries and continental Europe, where it refers to liberal conservatives supporting modern European welfare states.

Social conservatives (in the first meaning of the phrase) in many countries generally favour the pro-life position in the abortion controversy and oppose human embryonic stem cell research (particularly if publicly funded); oppose both eugenics and human enhancement (transhumanism) while supporting bioconservatism; support a traditional definition of marriage as being one man and one woman; view the nuclear family model as society's foundational unit; oppose expansion of civil marriage and child adoption to couples in same-sex relationships; promote public morality and traditional family values; oppose atheism, especially

militant atheism, secularism and the separation of church and state; support the prohibition of drugs, prostitution and euthanasia; and support the censorship of pornography and what they consider to be obscenity or indecency. Most conservatives in the United States support the death penalty.

Religious conservatism

March for Life in Paris, France, in 2012

Religious conservatism principally apply the teachings of particular religions to politics, sometimes by merely proclaiming the value of those teachings, at other times by having those teachings influence laws.

In most democracies, political conservatism seeks to uphold traditional family structures and social values. Religious conservatives typically oppose abortion, homosexual behavior, drug use, and sexual activity outside of marriage. In some cases, conservative values are grounded in religious beliefs, and conservatives seek to increase the role of religion in public life.

Paternalistic conservatism

Paternalistic conservatism is a strand in conservatism which reflects the belief that societies exist and develop organically and that members within them have obligations towards each other. There is particular emphasis on the paternalistic obligation of those who are privileged and wealthy to the poorer parts of society. Since it is consistent with principles such as organicism, hierarchy and duty, it can be seen as an outgrowth of traditional conservatism. Paternal conservatives support neither the individual nor the state in principle, but are instead prepared to support either or recommend a balance between the two depending on what is most practical.

It stresses the importance of a social safety net to deal with poverty, support of limited redistribution of wealth along with government regulation of markets in the interests of both consumers and producers. Paternalistic conservatism first arose as a distinct ideology in the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's "One Nation" Toryism. There have been a variety of one nation conservative governments. In the United Kingdom, the Prime Ministers Disraeli, Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, and Harold Macmillan were one nation conservatives.

In Germany, during the 19th-century German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck adopted policies of state-organized compulsory insurance for workers against sickness, accident, incapacity and old age. Chancellor Leo von Caprivi promoted a conservative agenda called the "New Course".

In the United States, the administration of President William Howard Taft was a progressive conservative and he described himself as "a believer in progressive conservatism" and President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared himself an advocate of "progressive conservatism".

In Canada, a variety of conservative governments have been part of the Red tory tradition, with Canada's former major conservative party being named the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada from 1942 to 2003. In Canada, the Prime Ministers Arthur Meighen, R. B. Bennett, John Diefenbaker, Joe Clark, Brian Mulroney, and Kim Campbell led Red tory federal governments.

Authoritarian conservatism

Authoritarian conservatism refers to autocratic regimes that center their ideology around conservative nationalism, rather than ethnic nationalism, though certain racial components such as antisemitism may exist. Authoritarian conservative movements show strong devotion towards religion, tradition and culture while also expressing fervent nationalism akin to other far-right nationalist movements. Examples of authoritarian conservative leaders include António de Oliveira Salazar and Engelbert Dollfuss. Authoritarian conservative movements were prominent in the same era as fascism, with which it sometimes

clashed. Although both ideologies shared core values such as nationalism and had common enemies such as communism and materialism, there was nonetheless a contrast between the traditionalist nature of authoritarian conservatism and the revolutionary, palingenetic and populist nature of fascism—thus it was common for authoritarian conservative regimes to suppress rising fascist and National Socialist movements. The hostility between the two ideologies is highlighted by the struggle for power for the National Socialists in Austria, which was marked by the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss.

Sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has examined the class basis of right-wing extremist politics in the 1920–1960 era. He reports:

Conservative or rightist extremist movements have arisen at different periods in modern history, ranging from the Horthyites in Hungary, the Christian Social Party of Dollfuss in Austria, the Stahlhelm and other nationalists in pre-Hitler Germany, and Salazar in Portugal, to the pre-1966 Gaullist movements and the monarchists in contemporary France and Italy. The right extremists are conservative, not revolutionary. They seek to change political institutions in order to preserve or restore cultural and economic ones, while extremists of the centre and left seek to use political means for cultural and social revolution. The ideal of the right extremist is not a totalitarian ruler, but a monarch, or a traditionalist who acts like one. Many such movements in Spain, Austria, Hungary, Germany, and Italy-have been explicitly monarchist... The supporters of these movements differ from those of the centrists, tending to be wealthier, and more religious, which is more important in terms of a potential for mass support.

7.3 NUMEROUS USES OF THE TERM 'CONSERVATISM'

It is much easier to cate the historical context i.e., period between 750 and 1850 as a response to the rapid series of changes in which conservatism evolved than to specify what is or what the conservatives believe. Sometimes, conservatism means outright opposition to all and every change; at others, it means an attempt to reconstruct a form of society which existed in an earlier period. Still at other times, it appears

to be primarily a political reaction and secondarily, a body of ideas. Conservatism, as Clinton Rossiter says, "is a word whose usefulness is matched only by its capacity to confident, distort and irritate." He adds: "Since the patterns of thought and action it denotes are real and enduring, and since no substitute seems likely to be generally accepted, conservatism will doubtless have a long life ..." Since World War II, the word 'conservatism' is being used in numerous way.

7.3.1 Temperamental Conservatism

Conservatism, by one definition, denotes a 'natural' and culture-determined disposition to resist dislocating changes in a customary pattern of living and working. According to Rossiter, "It effectively is, a temperament or psychological stance, a cluster of traits that are on daily display by most men in all societies;' He lists the important elements of conservative techniques as (a) habit (the enormous for which of society and its most precious conservative agent), (b) inertia (a force that often seems to be as powerful in the social world as in the physical), (c) fear (especially fear of the unexpected, the irregular and the uncomfortable, and (d) evaluation (a product of both fear of alienation from the group and a craving for its approval). So understood, one may speak, with propriety, of the conservatism of the poor, of the aged and of the ignorant. "At the same time", Rossitter writes, "one must assign a high value to the conservative temperament in the pattern of social survival and even of social progress"

7.3.2 Situational Conservatism

Conservatism by a second definition, related to the first, is an attitude of opposition to disruptive changes in the social, economic, legal, religious, political or cultural order. "It describes", Rossiter clarifies, "somewhat less crudely and solnewhat more effectively, a pattern of social behaviour, a cluster of principles and prejudices that are on daily display by many men in all developed societies." The distinguishing feature of this conservatism is the fear of change, which become transformed in the political arena, as Rossiter tells, "into the fear of radicalism,. ." In this instance, "the radicalism of men who propose to make the world order ...

at the expense of old values, institutions and patterns of living". Situational conservatism is not confined only to the well-to-do; it extends to all levels of people who lament change in the status quo. It is unfortunate that both temperamental conservatism and situational conservatism-tend to be equated to authoritarianism, obscurantism, racism, fascism, alienation, maladjustment, and the closed mind' studies are needed before these elements are linked to either of conservatism.

7.3.3 Political Conservatism

Conservatism, by still another definition, is the aspirations and activities, most of them defensive rather than creative, of parties and movements that celebrate inherited patterns of morality and tested institutions that oppose the reforming plans of the moderate left and the schemes of the extreme left. Political conservatism is a pheriomenon which is ~~niversal of organised society, and essentially, the defense of a going society. Reaction is not conservatism. It is the postion of men who sigh for Inore intensively than they celebrate the present and who feel that a retreat back into it is worth trying. The conservative is a man essentially at rest: generally, well-adjusted psychologically as well as prograrnnatically to "a world he never made." The reactional.y is a tnan always in motion, "refises to", Rossiter points out, "acknowledge that whatever has been settled must enceforth be considered good or at least tolerable, and he seems willing to erase same paws, scrap some institutions, even amend his nation's constitution, so that he call roll back the social process to the time which his countrymen first went foolishly astray". This should not mean that a restorations is a conservative always, though there seems a relationship between a restorationist in the sense of conservative and a revolution. In the sense of a restorationist, a conservative is delusionist and like a revolutionist, he may have outbursts. But it is going too far. A conservative, which a revolutionary is not, is a lnan of order in whose scheme of things, a shattered society has no place. Conservatisln is restorationism in so far as it comes to holding a brief for traditions, customs, morals, history and the older institutions. It is radical in so far as these all, as mentioned above, are to be protected from attacks of either liberal or socialist-Marxist measures. It is liberal is so far as its

values are not challenged. It is reactionary in so far as the trace of history remains within the control of tested lnoral gospels. Rossiter writes: "He (conservative), like the liberal, must reason and discriminate; he, like the radical, may have to plan and gamble. The conservative as reformer, the right-wrong politician who tries to out promise liberals in the area of welfare legislation, is a uncomfortable man. The conservative as revolutionary, the traditionalist who acts 'radically' to preserve the crumbling values and institutions of his community, is no conservative at all".

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer
b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss the Meaning of Conservatism.

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2. How do you know the Numerous Uses of the Term 'Conservatism'?

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7.4 CONSERVATISM: ITS CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES

"The desire to conserve", the words which Edmund Burke used, is the underlying theme of conservative ideology, though it is not the sole objective which conservatives of all shades seek to attain. Authoritarian conservatism has often been reactionary; it either refuses to yield to change or attempts to turn the clock back. Revolutionary conservatism may use the term radical conservatism ad tends to regain or reestablish or argue for a conservative fabric of revolutionary character. The characteristic features of conservatism, as evolved it1 different forms and conveying the fundamentals of conservatism can be identified.

7.4.1 History and Tradition

The role of history and tradition is basic to any type of conservatism. History, reduced to its essentials, is nothing but experience. It is deductive thought in matters of liurnan relationship; Legitimacy is the work of history. "To see things authentically as a conservative", Manheim writes, "is to experience events ill the past. True history is expressed not in linear and chronological fashion:, but in the persistence of structures, communities, habits and prejudices generation after genekation. The correctness of history or of experience for that matter is a persisting con emphasis. 'This has been shown by Burke, Rourke, Oakeshott and Voegelin, to mention la few. Social reality can be understood through a historical approach: "We cannot know where we are, mud1 less where we are going, until we know where we have been. That is the bedrock position of the conservative philosophy of history". ('Conservatism: Dream and Reality') history is represented in traditions, and traditions constitute an important component of history. As such a central tendency of conservatism is, with regard to history, its defense of traditions, its desire to maintain established customs and institutions. Burke was talking about tradition when he conceived of society as a partnership between "those who are living, those who are dead and those with are to be born". Tradition is, Chesterton says, "a democracy of the dead." In this sense, tradition reflects the accumulated wisdom of the past. The institutions and practices of the past have been tested by time, and should the conservatives demand, be preserved for the benefit of the living and for generations to come.

7.4.2 Human Imperfection, Prejudice and Reason

First and foremost, conservatives adopt a pessimistic view of human nature. According to conservatives, we are all psychologically flawed and imperfect. Indeed, during the Enlightenment conservative theorists rejected the rationalist assumption that we should be optimistic about humanity and seek to improve it. The conservative view of human nature is largely grounded upon the Catholic notion of original sin and Biblical warnings over human wickedness.

Secondly, Conservatives also believe that we are driven by baser instincts rather than higher reasoning – this is a fundamental difference with liberalism. For instance, conservatives believe that we seek protection for ourselves, our homes and our families. As such, we are by instinct suspicious of outsiders and prefer to live in a society based upon cultural homogeneity. Human beings are also drawn towards competition over the acquisition of money, status and property. At times, this can lead to behaviour that needs to be regulated by the forces of law and order.

Thirdly, those ideologies which adopt a fixed view of human nature are inherently wrong. The leading proponent of this argument is the Austrian theorist Karl Popper (1962). Moreover, we cannot predict the future and should simply recognise the limits of our understanding. Those ideologies that promise a utopian system must be open to criticism in order to expose such thinking as a doomed exercise in self-deception. Ultimately, all humans are intellectually flawed.

Prejudice and Discrimination—Getting to the Roots

"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."—Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

DESPITE that lofty ideal, prejudice and discrimination continue to plague mankind. This sad fact reflects not only our times but also the imperfection of humans. (Psalm 51:5) Nevertheless, the situation is far from hopeless. Granted, we may be unable to eliminate the discrimination we see around us, but we can work to root out prejudices that may lodge within ourselves.

A good start is to acknowledge that none of us are above developing prejudices. The book Understanding Prejudice and Discrimination says: "Perhaps the most important conclusions to emerge from prejudice research are these: (1) no one capable of human thought and speech is immune from harboring prejudice, (2) it often takes deliberate effort and awareness to reduce prejudice, and (3) with sufficient motivation, it can be done."

Education has been described as “the most powerful tool” in the fight against prejudice. The right education can, for example, expose the root causes of prejudice, enable us to examine our own attitudes more objectively, and help us deal wisely with prejudice when we are victims.

Getting to the Roots

Prejudice causes people to distort, misinterpret, or even ignore facts that conflict with their predetermined opinions. Prejudice may have its beginnings in seemingly innocent, but misguided, family values, or it may be sown by those who deliberately promote warped views of other races or cultures. Prejudice can also be fostered by nationalism and false religious teachings. And it can be a product of inordinate pride. As you reflect on the following points and on pertinent principles taken from the Bible, why not examine your own attitudes and see if changes are in order?

Associates. Humans are gregarious by nature, and this is a good thing. Indeed, the Bible says that “one isolating himself will seek his own selfish longing” and will even disregard practical wisdom. (Proverbs 18:1) However, we should choose our associates wisely, for they can exert a powerful influence on us. Wise parents, therefore, take a deep interest in their children’s associates. Studies have shown that children as young as three years of age can develop racial biases, which they pick up from the attitudes, words, and gestures of others. Of course, parents themselves should do all in their power to be a good influence on their little ones, knowing that parental influence is usually the most powerful factor in shaping a child’s values.

▪ What does the Bible say? “Start a boy [or girl] on the right road, and even in old age he will not leave it.” (Proverbs 22:6, The New English Bible) “He that is walking with wise persons will become wise, but he that is having dealings with the stupid ones will fare badly.” (Proverbs 13:20) If you are a parent, you might ask yourself: ‘Am I directing my children along a path that is true and just in the eyes of God? Do I associate with people who have a wholesome effect on me? Am I a good influence on others?’—Proverbs 2:1-9.

Nationalism. One dictionary defines nationalism as "a sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations." Ivo Duchacek, a professor of political science, observed in his book Conflict and Cooperation Among Nations: "Nationalism divides humanity into mutually intolerant units. As a result people think as Americans, Russians, Chinese, Egyptians, or Peruvians first, and as human beings second—if at all." A former UN secretary-general wrote: "So many of the problems that we face today are due to, or the result of, false attitudes—some of them have been adopted almost unconsciously. Among these is the concept of narrow nationalism—'my country, right or wrong.'"

▪ What does the Bible say? "God loved the world [all mankind] so much that he gave his only-begotten Son, in order that everyone exercising faith in him might not be destroyed but have everlasting life." (John 3:16) "God is not partial, but in every nation the man that fears him and works righteousness is acceptable to him." (Acts 10:34, 35) Ask yourself, 'If God's love is impartial—embracing people of all nations, including me—should I not strive to imitate him, especially if I profess to reverence him?'

Racism. Racists believe "that race accounts for differences in human character or ability and that a particular race is superior to others," says one dictionary. Yet, as is noted in The World Book Encyclopedia, researchers "have not discovered any scientific basis for such claims of [racial] superiority." The gross injustices that racism fosters, such as people's systematic denial of rights to fellow humans, are painful evidence that racism rests on falsehoods and fallacies.

▪ What does the Bible say? "The truth will set you free." (John 8:32) "[God] made out of one man every nation of men." (Acts 17:26) "Not the way man sees is the way God sees, because mere man sees what appears to the eyes; but as for Jehovah, he sees what the heart is." (1 Samuel 16:7) Ask yourself: 'Do I try to see all humans as God does? Do I try to find out what others—perhaps those of a different race or culture—are really like by getting to know some of them personally?'

When we get to know people on a personal level, we more readily see through misleading stereotypes.

Religion. The book The Nature of Prejudice says: “Abominations inevitably result when men use their religion to justify [selfish pursuits] and ethnic self-interest. It is then that religion and prejudice merge.” What is especially striking, the same book observes, is how readily many religious people “seem to slip from piety into prejudice.” Evidence in support of those words is seen in racially exclusive churches, sectarian hatred and violence, and acts of terror inspired by religion.

▪ What does the Bible say? “The wisdom from above [from God] is . . . peaceable, reasonable, . . . not making partial distinctions.” (James 3:17) “The true worshipers will worship the Father with spirit and [religious] truth.” (John 4:23) “Love your enemies and . . . pray for those persecuting you.” (Matthew 5:44) Ask yourself: ‘Does my religion promote genuine love toward all, even toward those who may want to hurt me? Are the doors of my church open to people of all kinds, regardless of nationality, skin color, gender, income, or social status?’

Pride. In the form of inordinate self-esteem or haughtiness, pride can make a person more susceptible to prejudice. For example, pride can cause a person to be prone to feelings of superiority or disdain toward the less educated or the materially poor. It may also make him inclined to believe propaganda that elevates his national or ethnic group. Clever propagandists, such as Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler, have deliberately nurtured national and racial pride to rally the support of the masses and to malign those considered to be different or undesirable.

▪ What does the Bible say? “Everyone that is proud in heart is something detestable to Jehovah.” (Proverbs 16:5) “[Do] nothing out of contentiousness or out of egotism, but with lowliness of mind [consider] that the others are superior to you.” (Philippians 2:3) Ask yourself: ‘Do I take secret delight in flattering comments about my own race or ethnic group or in disparaging remarks about others? Am I inclined to be jealous of those who have talents that I lack, or do I take genuine delight in their abilities?’

Yes, for good reason the Bible cautions: “More than all else that is to be guarded, safeguard your heart, for out of it are the sources of life.”

(Proverbs 4:23) So view your heart as truly precious, and let nothing corrupt it! Instead, fill it with godly wisdom. Then, and only then, will 'thinking ability and discernment safeguard you, to deliver you from the bad way, from the person speaking perverse things.'—Proverbs 2:10-12.

7.4.3 Organic Society, Liberty and Equality

Liberalism is more than one thing. On any close examination, it seems to fracture into a range of related but sometimes competing visions. In this entry we focus on debates within the liberal tradition. (1) We contrast three interpretations of liberalism's core commitment to liberty. (2) We contrast 'old' and 'new' liberalism. (3) We ask whether liberalism is a 'comprehensive' or a 'political' doctrine. (4) We close with questions about the ' reach' of liberalism — does it apply to all humankind? Must all political communities be liberal? Could a liberal coherently answer this question by saying No? Could a liberal coherently answer this question by saying Yes?

Hobbes generally is treated as one of the first and greatest social contract thinkers. Typically, Hobbes also is seen as an advocate of unlimited monarchy. On Hobbes's theory, Leviathan's authority is almost absolute along a particular dimension: namely, Leviathan is authorized to do whatever it takes to keep the peace. This special end justifies almost any means, including drastic limitations on liberty. Yet, note the limitations implicit in the end itself. Leviathan's job is to keep the peace: not to do everything worth doing, but simply to secure the peace. Hobbes, the famed absolutist, in fact developed a model of government sharply limited in this most important way.

Paradigmatic liberals such as Locke not only advocate the Fundamental Liberal Principle, but also maintain that justified limitations on liberty are fairly modest. Only a limited government can be justified; indeed, the basic task of government is to protect the equal liberty of citizens. Thus John Rawls's paradigmatically liberal first principle of justice: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberty compatible with a similar system for all" (Rawls, 1999b: 220).

7.4.4 Authority and Power

Despite the differences between government systems in the Middle East and the United States, their governments play the same fundamental role: in some fashion, they exert control over the people they govern. The nature of that control—what we will define as power and authority—is an important feature of society.

Sociologists have a distinctive approach to studying governmental power and authority that differs from the perspective of political scientists. For the most part, political scientists focus on studying how power is distributed in different types of political systems. They would observe, for example, that the United States' political system is divided into three distinct branches (legislative, executive, and judicial), and they would explore how public opinion affects political parties, elections, and the political process in general. Sociologists, however, tend to be more interested in the influences of governmental power on society and in how social conflicts arise from the distribution of power. Sociologists also examine how the use of power affects local, state, national, and global agendas, which in turn affect people differently based on status, class, and socioeconomic standing.

What Is Power?

Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini are show riding together in a car.

Nazi leader Adolf Hitler was one of the most powerful and destructive dictators in modern history. He is pictured here with fascist Benito Mussolini of Italy. (Photo courtesy of U.S. National Archives and Records Administration)

For centuries, philosophers, politicians, and social scientists have explored and commented on the nature of power. Pittacus (c. 640–568 B.C.E.) opined, "The measure of a man is what he does with power," and Lord Acton perhaps more famously asserted, "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely" (1887). Indeed, the concept of power can have decidedly negative connotations, and the term itself is difficult to define.

Many scholars adopt the definition developed by German sociologist Max Weber, who said that power is the ability to exercise one's will over

others (Weber 1922). Power affects more than personal relationships; it shapes larger dynamics like social groups, professional organizations, and governments. Similarly, a government's power is not necessarily limited to control of its own citizens. A dominant nation, for instance, will often use its clout to influence or support other governments or to seize control of other nation states. Efforts by the U.S. government to wield power in other countries have included joining with other nations to form the Allied forces during World War II, entering Iraq in 2002 to topple Saddam Hussein's regime, and imposing sanctions on the government of North Korea in the hopes of constraining its development of nuclear weapons.

Endeavors to gain power and influence do not necessarily lead to violence, exploitation, or abuse. Leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohandas Gandhi, for example, commanded powerful movements that effected positive change without military force. Both men organized nonviolent protests to combat corruption and injustice and succeeded in inspiring major reform. They relied on a variety of nonviolent protest strategies such as rallies, sit-ins, marches, petitions, and boycotts.

Modern technology has made such forms of nonviolent reform easier to implement. Today, protesters can use cell phones and the Internet to disseminate information and plans to masses of protesters in a rapid and efficient manner. In the Arab Spring uprisings, for example, Twitter feeds and other social media helped protesters coordinate their movements, share ideas, and bolster morale, as well as gain global support for their causes. Social media was also important in getting accurate accounts of the demonstrations out to the world, in contrast to many earlier situations in which government control of the media censored news reports. Notice that in these examples, the users of power were the citizens rather than the governments. They found they had power because they were able to exercise their will over their own leaders. Thus, government power does not necessarily equate to absolute power.

7.4.5 Property and Life

Property, in the abstract, is what belongs to or with something, whether as an attribute or as a component of said thing. In the context of this article, it is one or more components (rather than attributes), whether physical or incorporeal, of a person's estate; or so belonging to, as in being owned by, a person or jointly a group of people or a legal entity like a corporation or even a society. Depending on the nature of the property, an owner of property has the right to consume, alter, share, redefine, rent, mortgage, pawn, sell, exchange, transfer, give away or destroy it, or to exclude others from doing these things, as well as to perhaps abandon it; whereas regardless of the nature of the property, the owner thereof has the right to properly use it (as a durable, mean or factor, or whatever), or at the very least exclusively keep it.

In economics and political economy, there are three broad forms of property: private property, public property, and collective property (also called cooperative property).

Property that jointly belongs to more than one party may be possessed or controlled thereby in very similar or very distinct ways, whether simply or complexly, whether equally or unequally. However, there is an expectation that each party's will (rather discretion) with regard to the property be clearly defined and unconditional,[citation needed] so as to distinguish ownership and easement from rent. The parties might expect their wills to be unanimous, or alternately every given one of them, when no opportunity for or possibility of dispute with any other of them exists, may expect his, her, its or their own will to be sufficient and absolute.

The Restatement (First) of Property defines property as anything, tangible or intangible whereby a legal relationship between persons and the state enforces a possessory interest or legal title in that thing. This mediating relationship between individual, property and state is called a property regime.

In sociology and anthropology, property is often defined as a relationship between two or more individuals and an object, in which at least one of these individuals holds a bundle of rights over the object. The distinction between "collective property" and "private property" is regarded as a confusion since different individuals often hold differing rights over a single object.

Important widely recognized types of property include real property (the combination of land and any improvements to or on the land), personal property (physical possessions belonging to a person), private property (property owned by legal persons, business entities or individual natural persons), public property (state owned or publicly owned and available possessions) and intellectual property (exclusive rights over artistic creations, inventions, etc.), although the last is not always as widely recognized or enforced. An article of property may have physical and incorporeal parts. A title, or a right of ownership, establishes the relation between the property and other persons, assuring the owner the right to dispose of the property as the owner sees fit.

7.4.6 Relation and Morality

Theory of Relationship between Law and Morality

Ever since the revival of the scientific study of jurisprudence the connection of law and morality has much discussed, but the question is not yet, and perhaps never will be settled. Every variety of opinion has been entertained, from the extreme doctrine held by Austin that for the purpose of the jurist, law is absolutely independent of morality, almost to the opposite positions, held by every Oriental cadi, that morality and law are one. The question is an important one, and upon the answer which is given to it depends upon the answer which is consequences. The problem is an intensely practical one.

The popular conception of the connection between law and morality is that in some way the law exists to promote morality, to preserve those conditions which make the moral life possible, and than to enable men to lead sober and industrious lives. The average man regards law as justice systematized, and justice itself as a somewhat chaotic mass of moral principles. On this view, the positive law is conceived of as a code of rules, corresponding to the code of moral laws, deriving its authority from the obligatory character of those moral laws, and being just or unjust according as it agrees with, or differs from them. This, like all other popular conceptions, is inadequate for scientific purposes, and the jurist, so for at least as he is also a scientist, is compelled to abandon it.

For it is contradicted by the fact's. positive laws do not rest upon moral laws and common notions of justice furnish no court of appeal from the decrees of the State. The average man confounds law and morality, and identifies the rules of law with the principles of abstract justice.

No Distinction in Ancient Times

In the earlier stages of the society there was no distinction between law and morals. In Hindu law, the prime source of which are the Vedas and the Smritis, we do not find such distinction in the beginning. However, later on, Mimansa laid down certain principles to distinguish obligatory from recommendatory injunctions. In the West also the position was similar. The Greeks in the name of the doctrine of 'natural right' formulated a theoretical moral foundation of law. The roman jurist in the name of 'natural law' recognized certain moral principles as the basis of law. In the Middle Ages, the Church become dominant in Europe. The 'natural law' was given a theological basis and Christian morals were considered as the basis of law.

Moral as a part of law

There are some who assert that even if law and morals are distinguishable it remains true that morality is in some way an integral part of law or of legal development, that morality is "secreted in the interstices" of the legal system, and to that extent is inseparable from it.

Thus it has been said that law in action is not a mere system of rules, but involves the use of certain principles, such as that of the equitable and the good (aequum et bonum). By the skilled application of these principles to legal rules the judicial process distills a moral content out of the legal order, though it is admitted that this does not permit the rules themselves to be rejected on the general found of their immorality. Another approach would go much further and confer upon the legal process an inherent power to reject immoral rules as essentially non-legal; this seems to resemble the classical natural law mode of thought, but it is urged, the difference is that according to the present doctrine it is a matter of the internal structure of the legal system, which treats

immoral rules as inadmissible rather than as being annulled by an external law of nature.

If value judgments such as moral factors, form an inevitable feature of the climate of legal development, as in generally admitted, it is difficult to see the justification for this exclusive attitude.

Value judgment which enter into law will require consideration of what would be a just rule or decision, even though not objective in the sense of being based on absolute truth, may, nevertheless, be relatively true, in the sense of corresponding to the existing moral standards of the community

Whether it is convenient or not to define law without reference to subjective factors, when we come to observe the phenomena with which law is concerned and to analyze the meaning and use of legal rules in relation to such phenomena, it will be found impossible to disregard the role of value judgments in legal activity, and we cannot exercise this functional role by stigmatizing such judgments as merely subjective or unscientific.

The Problem about the Nature of Law J.Raz (1982)The theory of knowledge attempts to clarify the nature of knowledge, the philosophy of logic examines the definition of logic, moral philosophy reflects on the nature and boundaries of morality and so on.

One finds philosophers who took the enquiry concerning the nature of law to be an attempt to define the meaning of the word "law". Traditionally those who adopted the linguistic approach concentrated on the word "law". However, it encountered the overwhelming problem that that word is used in a multiplicity of non-legal contexts. We have laws of nature and scientific laws, laws of God and thought, of logic and of language, etc. Clearly the explanation of "law" has to account for its use in all these contexts and equally clearly any explanation which is so wide and general can be of very little use to legal philosophers.

Only one assumption can the explanation of "law" hope to provide the answer to the legal philosopher's inquiry into the nature of law. That assumption is that the use of "law" in all its contexts but one is analogical or metaphorical or in some other way parasitical on its core meaning as displayed in its use in one type of context and that that core meaning is the one the legal philosopher has at the centre of his enquiry.

Unfortunately, the assumption is mistaken. Its implausibility is best seen by examining the most thorough and systemic attempt to provide an analysis of "law" based on this assumption, that proposed by John Austin in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined.

The Lawyers' Perspective

Many legal philosophers start from an unstated basic intuition: "The law has to do with those considerations which it is appropriate for the courts to rely upon in justifying their decisions."

Most theorists tend to be by education and profession lawyers and their audience often consists primarily of law students. Quite naturally and imperceptibly they adopted the lawyers' perspective on the law. Lawyers' activities are dominated by litigation in court, actual or potential. They not only conduct litigation in the courts. They draft documents, conclude legal transactions, advise clients, etc., always with an eye to the likely outcome of possible litigation in which the validity of the document or transaction or the legality of the client's action may be called into question. From the lawyer's point of view the law does indeed consist of nothing but considerations appropriate for courts to rely upon. Hans Kelsen says he follows a combination of the linguistic approach and the institutional approach: "Any attempt to define a concept in question. In defining the concept of law we must begin by examining the following questions:

Do the social phenomena generally called law present a common characteristic distinguishing them from other social phenomena of a similar kind?

The clue to the methodological approach Kelsen was in fact pursuing is in his insistence that legal theory must be a pure theory. Kelsen regarded it as doubly pure. It is pure of all moral argument and it is pure of all sociological facts. Kelsen indicates his belief that the analysis of legal concepts and the determination of the content of any legal system depends in no way at all on the effects the law has on the society or the economy, nor does it involve examination of people's motivation in obeying the law or in breaking it.

For Kelsen, it is self-evident that legal theory is free of all moral considerations. The task of legal theory is clearly to study law. If law is such that it cannot be studied scientifically then surely the conclusion that if the law does involve moral considerations and therefore cannot be studied scientifically, then legal theory will study only those aspects of the law which can be studied scientifically.

Since Kelsen has no good reason to insist that legal theory should be free from moral consideration, he has no good reason to delimit the law in the way he does.

The international Approach

It is the lawyer's perspective which delivers the verdict. Yet there is something inherently implausible in adopting the lawyer's perspective as one fundamental methodological stance. There is no doubting the importance of the legal profession and of the judicial system in society. It is however, unreasonable to study such institutions exclusively from the lawyer's perspective.

Institutional approach seems much superior to its rivals. The institutional approach strives to present an analysis of a central political institution should be accepted as the analysis of law. From the institutional point of view, the basic intuition is the starting point for further critical reflection. It is entirely plausible to regard the notion of law as bound up with that of a judicial system but what are the essential characteristics of a court and why are they important to the political organization of society? Three features characterize courts of law:

1. They deal with disputes with the aim of resolving them.
2. They issue authoritative rulings which decides these disputes.
3. In their activities they are bound to be guided, at least partly, by positivist authoritative consideration.

At the highest level of philosophical abstraction the doctrine of the nature of law can and should be concerned with explaining law within the wider context of social and political institutions. It shows how the inclination to identify the theory of law with a theory of adjudication and legal considerations with all those appropriate for courts is based on a short

sighted doctrine overlooking the connection of law with the distinction between executive and deliberative conclusion. Clearly, a theory of adjudication is a moral theory. It concerns all the considerations affecting reasoning in the courts, both legal and non-legal.
When the doctrine of the nature of law is identified with a theory of adjudication it becomes itself a moral theory. The doctrine of the nature of law yields a test for identifying law the use of which requires no resort to moral or any other evaluative argument. But it does not follow that one can defend the doctrine of the nature of law itself without using evaluative arguments. Its justification is tied to an evaluative judgment about the relative importance of various features of social organizations and these reflect our moral and intellectual interest and concerns.

Law and Morality

In the modern world, morality and law are almost universally held to be unrelated fields and, where the term "legal ethics" is used, it is taken to refer to the professional honesty of lawyers or judges, but has nothing to do with the possible "rightness" or "wrongness" of particular laws themselves.

This is a consequence of the loss of the sense of any "truth" about man, and of the banishment of the idea of the natural law. It undermines any sense of true human rights, leaves the individual defenseless against unjust laws, and opens the way to different forms of totalitarianism. This should be easy enough to see for a person open to the truth; but many people's minds have set into superficial ways of thinking, and they will not react unless they have been led on, step by step, to deeper reflection and awareness.

Relationship between Law and Morality or Ethics

Law is an enactment made by the state. It is backed by physical coercion. Its breach is punishable by the courts. It represents the will of the state and realizes its purpose.

Laws reflect the political, social and economic relationships in the society. It determines rights and duties of the citizens towards one another and towards the state.

It is through law that the government fulfils its promises to the people. It reflects the sociological need of society.

Law and morality are intimately related to each other. Laws are generally based on the moral principles of society. Both regulate the conduct of the individual in society.

They influence each other to a great extent. Laws, to be effective, must represent the moral ideas of the people. But good laws sometimes serve to rouse the moral conscience of the people and create and maintain such conditions as may encourage the growth of morality.

Laws regarding prohibition and spread of primary education are examples of this nature.Morality cannot, as a matter of fact, be divorced from politics. The ultimate end of a state is the promotion of general welfare and moral perfection of man.

It is the duty of the state to formulate such laws as will elevate the moral standard of the people. The laws of a state thus conform to the prevailing standard of morality. Earlier writers on Political Science never made any distinction between law and morality.

Plato's Republic is as good a treatise on politics as on ethics. In ancient India, the term Dharma connoted both law and morality. Law, it is pointed out, is not merely the command of the sovereign, it represents the idea of right or wrong based on the prevalent morality of the people.

Moreover, obedience to law depends upon the active support of the moral sentiments of the people. Laws which are not supported by the moral conscience of the people are liable to become dead letters.

For example laws regarding Prohibition in India have not succeeded on account of the fact that full moral conscience of the people has not been aroused in favor of such laws.

As Green put it, "In attempting to enforce an unpopular law, a government may be doing more harm than good by creating and spreading the habit of disobedience to law. The total cost of such an attempt may well be greater than the social gain."

Although law and morality arc interdependent yet they differ from each other in their content, definiteness and sanction.

Some points of distinction between law and morality may be brought out as follows:

Law:

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the law as:

'the body of rules, whether proceeding from formal enactment or from custom, which a particular state or community recognizes as binding on its members or subjects.'

That this should be regarded as the definition of law for the English language is evidence of the influence legal positivism has upon the philosophy of law in our culture. The central themes of positivism are the contentions: firstly, that the existence of law rests upon identifiable social facts and, secondly, that it is necessary to maintain a conceptual distinction between law and morality. In this essay I will examine the positivist assertion that law is identifiable independently of morality, with a particular focus on the theory of H.L.A Hart.

1. Law regulates and controls the external human conduct. It is not concerned with inner motives. A person may be having an evil intention in his or her mind but law does not care for it.

Law will move into action only when this evil intention is translated into action and some harm is actually done to another person.

2. Law is universal in a particular society. All the individuals are equally subjected to it. It does not change from man to man.

3. Political laws are precise and definite as there is a regular organ in every state for the formulation of laws.

4. Law is framed and enforced by a determinate political authority. It enjoys the sanction of the state. Disobedience of law is generally followed by physical punishment.

The fear of punishment acts as a deterrent to the breach of political law.

5. Law falls within the purview of a subject known as Jurisprudence.

Morality:

1. Morality regulates and controls both the inner motives and the external

actions. It is concerned with the whole life of man.

The province of law is thus limited as compared with that of morality because law is simply concerned with external actions and docs not take into its fold the inner motives.

Morality condemns a person if he or she has some evil intentions but laws are not applicable unless these intentions are manifested externally.

2. Morality is variable. It changes from man to man and from age to age. Every man has his own moral principles.

3. Moral laws lack precision and definiteness as there is no authority to make and enforce them.

4. Morality is neither framed nor enforced by any political authority. It does not enjoy the support of the state. Breach of moral principles is not accompanied by any physical punishment.

The only check against the breach of morality is social condemnation or individual conscience. 'Moral actions are a matter of choice of inner conscience of the individual, laws are a matter of compulsion'.

5. Morality is studied under a separate branch of knowledge known as Ethics.

We may conclude the discussion in the words of Gilchrist, "The individual moral life manifests itself in manifold ways. The state is the supreme condition of the individual moral life, for without the state no moral life is possible.

The state, therefore, regulates other organizations in the common interest. The state, however, has a direct function in relation to morality."

Points to Remember

Laws may be defined as external rules of human conduct backed by the sovereign political authority. Law and morality are intimately related to each other.

Laws are generally based on the moral principles of a particular society. Some points of distinction may be brought out as follows:

(a) Laws regulate external human conduct whereas morality mainly regulates internal conduct.

(b) Laws are universal; morality is variable.

(c) Laws are definite and precise while morality is variable.

(d) Laws are upheld by the coercive power of the state; morality simply enjoys the support of public opinion or individual conscience.

(e) Laws are studied under Jurisprudence but morality is studied under Ethics.

Law and freedom

Both law and morality imply human freedom. Clearly, without freedom one cannot speak of morality. But the same holds for law, for if it were automatically and not freely obeyed, men would be mere robots. Law is not a simple indication of what happens, such as the law of physics; it is an admonition to free persons about what they are required to do if they wish to live freely and responsibly in society; and it normally carries with it a sanction or punishment to be imposed on whoever is shown to have acted against given norms of conduct. Just law, properly understood, appeals to freedom.

Nevertheless one of the most generalized liberal ideas is that law is by nature the enemy of freedom. Servais Pinckaers holds that Catholic moralists have gone through many centuries under the influence of this mentality which has led, by reaction, to the anti-law approach of much of contemporary moral theology. In this view, law and freedom were seen as "two opposed poles, law having the effect of limitation and imposing itself on freedom with the force of obligation. Freedom and law faced each other as two proprietors in dispute over the field of human actions. The moralists commonly said, "Law governs this act, freedom governs

that one..." The moralists were traditionally the representatives of the moral law, and their mission was to show to conscience how to apply it in a particular situation, in a "case of conscience". Today we witness a strong tendency to invert the roles; the moralists now regard themselves as defenders of freedom and of personal conscience" [as against the law].

Law and justice

Law cannot attempt to regulate the purely interior sphere of personal conduct; morality can. Human or civil law is connected with external actions, precisely insofar and because they impinge on the rights or lawful actions of others. Hence the necessary connection of law with justice. For the regulation of interpersonal relations must work from the basic principle of justice: "to each his due". Hence arises the fundamental question of what is due to each one, and from this the further question of human rights.

To each his due. Something is due to each. This is the sense of equality before the law. "The possibility of giving his or her due not only to a relative, friend, citizen or fellow believer, but also to every human being simply because he is a person, simply because justice requires it, is the honor of law and of jurists. If there is an expression of the unity of the human race and of equality between all human beings, this expression is rightly given by the law, which can exclude no one from its horizon under pain of altering its specific identity".

Even for those who see law and freedom in mutual opposition, the whole concept of law is essentially connected with that of justice. The ancient principle lex iniusta non est lex (an unjust law is not a law), is at the basis of so many modern protests in the name of freedom. "This law is discriminatory, therefore it is not just". But justice is a moral concept; so these protests bear out the intrinsic connection between law and morality, "There is another crucial link between the virtues and law, for knowing how to apply the law is itself possible only for someone who possesses the virtue of justice".

'The law must respond to "living situations"...' Very good, but not in the sense that it must take the situation as its norm. Justice must remain the norm, and sometimes the law must regain ground for justice.

Influence of Morals on Law

Law and Morals act and react upon and mould each other. In the name of 'justice', 'equity', 'good faith', and 'conscience' morals have in-filtered into the fabrics of law. In judicial law making, in the interpretation of legal precepts, in exercising judicial discretion (as in awarding punishment) moral considerations play a very important role. Morals work as a restraint upon the power of the legislature because the legislature cannot venture to make a law which is completely against the morals of the society. Secondly, all human conduct and social relations cannot be regulated and governed by law alone. A considerable number of them are regulated by morals. A number of action and relations in the life of the community go on very smoothly without any intervention by law. Their observance is secured by morals. So far as the legal rules are concerned, it is not the legal sanction alone that ensure their obedience but morals also help in it. Thus, morals perfect the law. 'In marriage, so long as love persist, there is little need of law to rule the relations of the husband and wife – but the solicitor comes in through the door, as love flies out of the window.'

Growing Importance of Morals

Now, sociological approach has got its impact upon the modern age. This approach is more concerned with the ends that law has to pursue. Thus, recognized values, or, in other words, morals (of course the morals of the modern age) have become a very important subject of study for good law making. On international law also morals are exercising a great influence. The brutalities and inhuman acts in World Wars made the people to turn back to morals and efforts are being made to establish standards and values which the nations must follow. Perhaps there is no other so forceful ground to justify the Nuremberg Trials as morals. If the law is to remain closer to the life of the people and effective, it must not ignore morals.

7.5 SOME REPRESENTATIVE CONSERVATIVES

Liberal conservatism is a political ideology combining conservative policies with liberal stances, especially on economic, social and ethical issues, or a brand of political conservatism strongly influenced by liberalism.

Liberal conservatism incorporates the classical liberal view of minimal government intervention in the economy, according to which individuals should be free to participate in the market and generate wealth without government interference. However, liberal conservatism also holds that individuals cannot be thoroughly depended on to act responsibly in other spheres of life, therefore liberal conservatives believe that a strong state is necessary to ensure law and order and social institutions are needed to nurture a sense of duty and responsibility to the nation. They also support civil liberties, along with some social conservative positions. In Europe, liberal conservatism is the dominant form of contemporary conservatism and centre-right politics.

Both "conservatism" and "liberalism" have had different meanings over time in different centuries. The term "liberal conservatism" has been used in quite different ways. It usually contrasts with "aristocratic conservatism", which deems the principle of equality as something discordant with human nature and emphasizes instead the idea of natural inequality. As conservatives in democratic countries have embraced typical liberal institutions such as the rule of law, private property, the market economy and constitutional representative government, the liberal element of liberal conservatism became consensual among conservatives. In some countries (e.g. the United Kingdom and the United States), the term "liberal conservatism" came to be understood simply as "conservatism" in popular culture, prompting some conservatives who embraced more strongly classical liberal values to call themselves "libertarians" instead. However, there are differences between classical liberals and libertarians.

Nevertheless, in the United States conservatives often combine the economic individualism of classical liberals with a Burkean form of conservatism that emphasizes the natural inequalities between men, the irrationality of human behavior as the basis for the human drive for order and stability and the rejection of natural rights as the basis for

government. However, from a different perspective, American conservatism (a "hybrid of conservatism and classical liberalism") has exalted three tenets of Burkean conservatism, namely the diffidence toward the power of the state, the preference of liberty over equality, and patriotism while rejecting the three remaining tenets, namely loyalty to traditional institutions and hierarchies, scepticism regarding progress and elitism.[7] Consequently, in the United States the term "liberal conservatism" is not used. American "modern liberalism" happens to be quite different from European liberalism and occupies the centre-left of the political spectrum, in contrast to many European countries where liberalism is often more associated with the centre and centre-right while social democracy makes up a substantial part of the centre-left. The opposite is true in Latin America, where economically liberal conservatism is often labelled under the rubric of neoliberalism both in popular culture and academic discourse.

For their part, in their embracement of liberal and free market principles, European liberal conservatives are clearly distinguishable from those holding national conservative, fully social-conservative and/or outright populist views, let alone a right-wing populist posture. Being liberal often involves stressing free market economics and the belief in individual responsibility together with the defense of civil rights and support for a limited welfare state. Compared to other centre-right political traditions, such as Christian democracy, liberal conservatives are less traditionalist and more economically liberal, favouring low taxes and minimal state intervention in the economy.

Some regional varieties and peculiarities can be observed:

In much of central and northwestern Europe, especially in Germanic and traditionally Protestant countries, as well as the United Kingdom and Belgium, a divide persists between liberal conservatives (including Christian democrats) and liberals (including conservative liberals and social liberals).

In most Nordic countries, liberal conservatives, Christian democrats and liberals form distinct political families and have each their own party.

In most countries where Romance languages are spoken and where Catholicism is or has been dominant, as well as in Greece, liberal conservative movements, often encompassing Christian democrats and liberals, have more recently gained traction and the terms "conservative" and "liberal" may be understood as synonymous.

Consequently, at the European level, Christian democrats and most liberal conservatives are affiliated to the European People's Party (EPP), while liberals (including conservative and social liberals) to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE Party).

In this context, some traditionally Christian-democratic parties (such as Christian-Democratic and Flemish in Belgium, the Christian Democratic Appeal in the Netherlands, the Christian Democratic Union in Germany and the People's Party in Austria) have become almost undistinguishable from other liberal-conservative parties. On the other hand, newer liberal-conservative parties (such as New Democracy in Greece, the Social Democratic Party in Portugal, People's Party in Spain, Forza Italia / The People of Freedom / Forza Italia in Italy, the Union for a Popular Movement / The Republicans in France and most centre-right parties from countries once belonging to the Eastern Bloc and Yugoslavia) have not adopted traditional labels, but their ideologies are also a mixture of conservatism, Christian democracy and liberalism.

In the modern European discourse, "liberal conservatism" usually encompasses centre-right political outlooks that reject at least to some extent social conservatism. This position is also associated with support for moderate forms of social safety net and environmentalism (see also green conservatism and green liberalism). This variety of "liberal conservatism" has been espoused by Nordic conservatives (the Moderate Party in Sweden, the Conservative Party in Norway and the National Coalition Party in Finland), which have been fending off competition from right-wing populists to their right and do not include Christian democrats, and, at times, the British Conservative Party. In an interview shortly after taking office as Prime Minister in 2010, David Cameron introduced himself a "liberal conservative". During his first speech to a party conference in 2006, Cameron had defined this as believing in

individual freedom and human rights, but being skeptical of "grand schemes to remake the world".

Historically, in the 18th and 19th centuries "conservatism" comprised a set of principles based on concern for established tradition, respect for authority and religious values. This form of traditionalist or classical conservatism is often considered to be exemplified by the writings of Joseph de Maistre in the post-Enlightenment age. Contemporaneous "liberalism" – now recalled as classical liberalism – advocated both political freedom for individuals and a free market in the economic sphere. Ideas of this sort were promulgated by John Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, who are respectively remembered as the fathers of classical liberalism, the separation of church and state, economic liberalism, utilitarianism and social liberalism.

Alexis de Tocqueville

According to scholar Andrew Vincent, the maxim of liberal conservatism is "economics is prior to politics". Others emphasize the openness of historical change and a suspicion of tyrannical majorities behind the hailing of individual liberties and traditional virtues, by authors such as Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville, as the basis of current liberal conservatism, as seen both in the works of Raymond Aron and Michael Oakeshott. However, there is general agreement that the original liberal conservatives were those who combined conservative social attitudes with an economically liberal outlook, adapting a previous aristocratic understanding of natural inequalities between men to the rule of meritocracy – without directly criticizing privileges of birth as long as individual liberties were guaranteed. Over time, the majority of conservatives in the Western world came to adopt free market economic ideas as the Industrial Revolution progressed and the aristocracy lost its power, to the extent that such ideas are now generally considered as part of conservatism. Nonetheless, in most countries the term "liberal" is used to describe those with free market economic views. This is the case, for example, in continental Europe, Australia and Latin America

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

3. How do you know the Conservatism: Its Characteristic Features?

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4. Describe Some Representative Conservatives.

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7.6 LET US SUM UP

Generally, legal rules are composite and are derived from heterogeneous source. In India, if we examine all the legal perspective, we shall find that some of them have come from personal laws and local custom, a good number of them are based on foreign rules and principles (mainly English), some are based on the logic or political ideology and so on. Secondly, 'public opinion' which greatly influences law is made up of a number of things – political ideas, economic theory, ethical philosophy etc. These directly and indirectly influence law. Therefore, when so many elements work in shaping the legal precepts, the matter cannot be put in such a simple way as the 'relation between law and morals', because a number of factors join hands in influencing law, and morals is only one of them. However, some observations can be made about the relationship between law and morals.

7.7 KEY WORDS

Conservatism: Conservatism is a political and social philosophy promoting traditional social institutions in the context of culture and civilization. The central tenets of conservatism include tradition, organic society, hierarchy, authority, and property rights.

7.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Discuss the Meaning of Conservatism
2. How do you know the Numerous Uses of the Term 'Conservatism'?
3. How do you know the Conservatism: Its Characteristic Features?
4. Describe Some Representative Conservatives.

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7.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 7.2
2. See Section 7.3

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 7.4
2. See Section 7.5